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ABSTRACT

In the last few years alone, calls for transparency by consumers have grown
louder. No longer are consumers willing to sit back and allow firms to make ‘closed
door’ decisions that benefit the company (and its executives) at the expense of consumers
and society. This dissertation begins to answer the call for a greater understanding of
transparency from both practitioner and academic perspectives. In particular, this
dissertation focuses on systematically developing a succinct definition of perceived firm
transparency, developing a valid measure of transparency, and empirically testing
antecedents and consequences of transparency.
Two studies were conducted to develop the transparency scale following a
thorough review of the transparency literature across six fields. Study 1 was dedicated to
scale development and validation for the transparency construct. Study 2 was dedicated
to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric properties and
validity.
The complete proposed model was tested in Study 3 utilizing scenarios in a
between-subjects design with a student sample. Study 4 further tested the proposed
model in a slightly more ecologically valid setting with a more diverse sample. Studies 3
and 4 showed that transparency has significant direct impact on reducing skepticism, and
increasing trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention; and these impacts are of
substantial magnitude. Studies 3 and 4 also tested a few antecedents of perceived firm
transparency including perceived firm reciprocity, perceived consumer effort, and

iv

negative information. Reciprocity and consumer effort both had a significant impact on
perceptions of firm transparency in Studies 3 and 4, and negative information impacted
perceptions of transparency in Study 3 only.
At its core, transparency means that a firm is perceived to be open and forthright
with stakeholders. This dissertation shows that stakeholders reward firms for being
transparent; and those rewards come in the form of decreased skepticism and increased
favorable attitudes toward the firm, trust, and purchase intention. Managers can focus on
increasing perceptions of transparency by providing stakeholders with opportunities for
mutual conversations, by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company and
its offerings, and by sharing more negative information about itself.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades consumers have become increasingly skeptical and “on
guard” against firms’ persuasion attempts (Darke & Ritchie, 2007). This phenomenon
has been recognized in marketing literature. For example, an influential model in the
marketing literature, Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) (Friestad & Wright, 1994),
has consumer skepticism as a key concept and is based on the idea that consumers have
theories about a firm’s persuasion attempts. The Reputation Institute (2009) also
indicates that consumers are increasingly unwilling to give firms the benefit of the doubt.
Companies like Enron, WorldCom, Andersen Consulting, Xerox, and others that have
had a lack of openness and forthrightness with stakeholders have even further increased
consumer skepticism and decreased consumer confidence that firms operate within the
constraints of social and ethical norms (Hein, 2002). Instead, consumers are increasingly
skeptical and distrustful of business practices in general and of advertising in particular
(Darke & Ritchie, 2007). This dissertation explores the role of transparency in reducing
levels of consumer skepticism and influencing marketplace behaviors. Transparency is
defined here as:
the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is open and
forthright regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder.
In an environment in which consumers are on guard against persuasion attempts,
it is necessary to better understand different approaches to reducing consumer skepticism.
The approach-avoidance model (Knowles & Linn, 2004) of persuasion implies there are
1

two ways that firms can create change with the target of persuasion. The approach or
Alpha strategy creates change by overt tactics such as increasing the attractiveness of the
offer to the target of persuasion, for example, by providing extra incentives (such as
limited time offers). However, these strategies can be ineffective when consumers are
aware of them because they may use their persuasion knowledge to avoid such persuasive
tactics (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). Covert marketing (such as advertorials and product
placements) is another example of Alpha strategies in which the attractiveness of the
offer is increased by concealing the persuasion effort altogether. However, covert Alpha
strategies have obvious legal implications including ramifications from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). Ultimately, both overt and covert marketing tactics may only further
increase consumer skepticism and decrease trust.
An alternate solution is that firms can take into account consumer skepticism in
their persuasion attempts instead of trying to overtly or covertly get around it. One way
that firms can do this is through Omega strategies. Omega strategies decrease resistance
and increase receptivity toward the persuasive message (Knowles & Linn, 2004). Omega
strategies include such tactics as removing resistance and skepticism to the message, and
redefining the relationship as a dyadic, cooperative interaction and conversation rather
than a one-way persuasive message. This dissertation presents transparency, in which
firms are upfront with and revealing of themselves to stakeholders, as a key Omega
strategy to increase persuasiveness of their marketing messages and to decrease consumer
skepticism of overt persuasion attempts.
Practitioners and managers seem to agree that, in general, consumers tend to be
skeptical of overt persuasion attempts. This can be seen by the large amounts of
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academic research into covert marketing (Ashley & Leonard, 2009; Wei, Fischer, &
Main, 2008) in which marketers try to get around consumer skepticism by hiding
persuasion attempts, and also by the prevalence of these tactics in the marketplace
(Kaikati & Kaikati, 2004). However, these types of techniques seem to be perceived as
underhanded and tend to backfire unexpectedly (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2004) causing a
decrease in: brand trust (Ashley & Leonard, 2009), brand commitment (Ashley &
Leonard, 2009), emotional attachment (Ashley & Leonard, 2009), attitude toward the
brand (Cowley & Barron, 2008; Wei et al., 2008), and purchase intention (Ashley &
Leonard, 2009). As a result, it is necessary to explore alternate marketing approaches to
reducing consumer skepticism which are ultimately more favorable to the firm. An
alternative to covert marketing is firm transparency.
In this thesis, the construct of transparency is introduced as a potentially
important key antecedent to reducing consumer skepticism. According to the literature
stream grounded in the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad & Wright, 1994),
when persuasion attempts of a firm are salient to the consumer, the consumer reacts with
resistance, or coping behaviors of which consumer skepticism is one type. From an
academic standpoint, transparency is an important area to study because it extends the
PKM (Friestad & Wright, 1994) beyond explaining what causes consumer persuasion
knowledge to become salient (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000) and how consumers cope
with persuasion attempts (Kirmani, Campbell, & Iacobucci, 2004), to better
understanding how firms can reduce coping behaviors such as consumer skepticism.
Academically, this dissertation also addresses the call by Darke and Ritchie (2007) to
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develop a strategy for dealing with distrustful consumers in the marketplace by
presenting transparency as one means to reduce consumer skepticism.
From a practical standpoint, transparency is an important area to study because it
has the potential to change the way consumers perceive marketers and their persuasion
attempts. Firms will not fully benefit from marketing efforts until firms improve their
reputation from antagonistic to cooperative. The implication of this change is that it can
begin to change the naïve theories that consumers have about firm behavior in the
marketplace.
When Transparency May be Especially Important
Based on this author’s suppositions, it is suggested here that transparency may be
especially beneficial to firms under several different circumstances: when industry
transparency is low, when the firm is managing corporate reputation crisis events, for
products in which quality assessments are difficult, when all brands in the product
category are viewed by consumers as being similar on important attributes, and when
there is minimal information to form judgments. Following is a discussion of each of
these five circumstances.

When Industry Transparency is Low
It is surmised that when consumers perceive an entire industry to be lacking in
transparency then this perception will translate to individual firms as well, especially
when consumers have little experience interacting with the firm. Similarly, findings by
Darke and Ritchie (2007) found that one advertiser’s credibility can be affected simply
when consumers are distrustful of other advertisers (Darke & Ritchie, 2007). Hence,
perceptions of an industry as a whole may be used as input in developing trait inferences
4

for and attitudes toward individual firms. Currently, industries plagued with a lack of
transparency and consumer distrust certainly include the financial and automobile
industries and the public sector. Other industries that may be perceived as lacking
transparency based on past transgressions, unethical behaviors, crisis cover-ups, and
general closed-door operations, include the pharmaceutical, diamond, toy, bank, oil, and
healthcare industries. It is easy to see there are numerous industries that could benefit
from increased perceived firm transparency.

In Managing Corporate Reputation during Crisis Events
Transparency may be especially important when a firm’s corporate reputation is
at stake. Sometimes events occur causing stakeholders to be more skeptical and further
question a firm’s trustworthiness. Such events, from a firm’s point of view, might be
termed a ‘crisis’ event if the event causes stakeholders to strongly react to it. Firms must
respond to crisis events publicly in order to manage its corporate reputation. A firm that
either does not respond to a crisis or stalls in responding will probably be perceived as
lacking openness and forthrightness. Following are few examples of how firms and
brands have reacted to their own crisis events and subsequent consumer reactions. These
examples illustrate that transparency may be especially important during a crisis situation
in managing corporate reputation. The first example is of the oil company, Exxon, whose
drunken ship captain accidentally crashed his vessel dumping 10.8 million gallons of oil
off the coast of Alaska causing extraordinary wildlife and ecological damage (Cutler,
2008; Holusha, 1989). It took Exxon’s CEO, Lawrence Rawl, six days to come out in
front of the public and be open about the spill (Klara, 2010). The Exxon catastrophe, to
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this day, is used as a public relations example of what not to do when managing crisis
events (Holusha, 1989). Although the public could have integrated other factors into its
assessment of Exxon’s corporate reputation, practitioners seem to converge on the idea
that a firm must quickly be open and forthright with the public in order to minimize
damage to a firm’s corporate reputation (Cutler, 2008; Holusha, 1989; Klara, 2010);
hence, transparency is required in the event of a crisis.
Celebrity brands have crisis events too, like Martha Stewart with insider trading
(Anonymous, 2002) and Tiger Woods with infidelity (Hendershot-Hurd, 2009). Both of
these celebrities engaged in a “no comment” strategy lacking transparency and
subsequently potentially caused longer term negative effects to their corporate reputations
as compared to had they engaged in immediate transparency. According to an article in
PR News magazine, had Stewart opened her records on day one, come clean and
forthrightly answered questions from the media and investigators, chances are we
wouldn’t have enough coverage to analyze (Anonymous, 2002). In sum, crisis events
may be best solved with transparency.

For Product Categories that Make Quality Assessments Difficult
It is proposed that transparency will be especially important to firms selling
products or services in which consumers find it difficult to make quality assessments.
Categorizing products as either hedonic or utilitarian provides a useful schema to predict
when transparency is especially important. It is proposed that transparency will be most
beneficial to firms when products are seen as hedonic as compared to utilitarian. The
reason for this is because with hedonic products, benefits are more subjective and thus
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may require consumers to make a quality assessment comparing benefits communicated
by the firm to expectations that the actual benefits received will be the same as those
communicated. Additionally, it is suggested that in the absence of experience or capacity
for cognitive processing, consumers may seek cues through the firm’s forthrightness and
openness that the product or service actually delivers the promised benefits that the firm
communicates. Products that fit into this category may include luxury automobiles and
watches, video games, MP3 players, and music CDs. Most all services fall under this
category as pre-consumption quality assessments are difficult to make due to the
intangible nature of services. Examples include fancy restaurant meals, travel packages,
massages, and salon services to name just a few.

When All Brands in the Product Category are viewed by Consumers as Being Similar
on Important Attributes
It is suggested that transparency may be especially important to a firm when
consumers perceive the product as being undifferentiated from competing products, such
as commodity goods. All else being equal, consumers should want to buy from
transparent companies rather than non-transparent ones. When products are
undifferentiated, then shifting from selling based on product attributes to firm attributes
(i.e. transparency) may provide a competitive advantage. Firms can aim for perceived
firm transparency at the level just slightly ahead of its competitors to gain a competitive
advantage.

When there is Minimal Information to Form Judgments
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Finally, regarding the nature of a firm’s stakeholders, transparency may be
especially important when there is minimal information to form judgments. In the
absence of knowledge about the firm’s products, consumers may look for any favorable
cue about the product or firm in forming evaluations, of which transparency is one.
Consumers may also look for cues that the firm will be open and forthright past the first
few initial encounters.
Scope of Transparency
It is not the contention of this dissertation that firms should be completely
transparent. That is neither practical for firms, nor is it demanded by consumers. An
assumption of this dissertation is that consumers are reasonable with regard to how much
transparency is required by firms. For example, firms may be expected to be closed with
regard to information that might breach security, safety, or confidentiality of its
stakeholders including employees, investors, and customers. In some circumstances, it
may also be reasonable to expect a firm to be closed when its competitive advantage is at
risk by being transparent. For example, internal operations processes that cut operating
expenses, such as supply chain efficiencies, may provide a competitive advantage and
thus consumers may feel that this lack of transparency is acceptable. Patents also provide
a competitive advantage, such as the Coke formula, and thus may be overlooked by
consumers in evaluating firm transparency.
It is also important to emphasize that this dissertation focuses on transparency
from the consumer perspective rather than transparency from the firm perspective.
Therefore what is within the scope of this dissertation is investigating antecedents and
consequences of consumer perceptions of firm transparency. What is outside the scope is
investigating transparency from the firm’s perspective such as antecedents that may lead
8

to a firm increasing its transparency behaviors. Investigating transparency from the firm
perspective would be an interesting extension of this dissertation as future research.

Research questions and objectives
To explore transparency in the context of reducing consumer skepticism, this
dissertation will address the following research questions:
1. What do consumers’ perceive as transparency?
2. What are the consequences to the firm associated with consumers’ levels
of perceived transparency?
3. What is the process by which transparency impacts important marketing
constructs such as consumer skepticism, perceived trustworthiness,
attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention?
This dissertation includes the following specific objectives:
1. To define transparency, establish its scope, and clearly delineate how it
is different from other similar constructs.
2. To develop a measure of transparency and establish its psychometric
properties including convergent and discriminant validities.
3. To empirically test the impact of transparency, perceptions on
consumer skepticism and other important marketing constructs such as
perceived trustworthiness, attitude toward the firm, and purchase
intention.
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Organization of Dissertation
Chapter 2 provides a background of transparency research in various contexts
including business-to-business, business-to-consumer, and business-to-supplier. Because
little research for this construct exists in the marketing domain, the literature review is
drawn from six other domains including accounting, information technology/information
systems, political science, management, and communications. The resulting work from
chapter 2 is a list of emerging themes in the academic and practitioner literature which
for defining, conceptualizing, or referring to transparency.

Chapter 2 also discusses

constructs and concepts that are related to, but distinct from, transparency. Chapter 3
includes a review of the qualitative research that was conducted in order to validate the
themes of transparency. The resulting work from chapter 3 is a final definition of
transparency from which a conceptual framework of transparency is developed. Chapter
4 proposes a framework of transparency and conceptualizes the process by which
transparency impacts important marketing constructs. Chapter 5 discusses the process for
developing the final transparency scale. Chapter 6 tests the proposed hypotheses in the
theoretical model. Chapter 7 provides a general discussion, managerial implications,
limitations, and suggestions for future research.

10

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

There are several objectives for this chapter. The first objective is to provide the
reader with a background on the concept of transparency. Although this construct has
been touched on in marketing literature, it has not yet been explicitly defined, and thus,
this dissertation will draw from literature streams such as finance, accounting,
information technology, political science, management, public health, and
communications to provide a more thorough review of this construct. A summary of the
literature is provided in Table 1. The next objective for this chapter is to determine the
emerging themes from academic and practitioner literature. A summary of the major
themes is provided in Table 2. The third objective is to clarify what makes this construct
different from other existing constructs and a summary is provided in Table 3.
Constructs will be identified which are similar to transparency and this dissertation will
delineate their similarities and differences. Resulting from this work is some insight as to
potential antecedents and consequences of transparency suggested by existing literature
and the author’s own qualitative research.
Transparency Definitions
According to Webster’s Dictionary, transparency is a quality of an entity which
allows light to pass through it (House, 1998b). It has been only in about the last few
years that the term “transparency” has become a buzz word used by consumers, critics,
practitioners, academics, government officials, and non-government watch-dog
organizations in the context of describing organizations. However, what is meant by
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“transparency” is often inconsistent, sometimes vague, and mostly confused with other
constructs such as disclosure and honesty; the academic literature is no different.
According to the guidelines for creating good construct definitions as set forth by
MacKenzie (2003), a good definition includes specifying the construct’s conceptual
theme in unambiguous terms such that it is clearly distinguishable from other constructs
(MacKenzie, 2003). Specifically, a good definition ought to start with the construct name
followed by “is” and then the definition or description, such as “transparency is…”.
However, a review of the transparency literature reveals that most conceptualized
definitions of transparency replace “is” with “referred to” or “achieved by” which either
does not provide a concrete, rigorous definition or defines the construct in terms of its
antecedents. Additionally, most authors (Eggert & Helm, 2003; Hofstede, 2003;
Hultman & Axelsson, 2007) conceptualize transparency in terms of information
exchanged or provided to the public, which is not transparency but rather disclosure. To
disclose is to make known or public (House, 1998a). In spite of the literature’s shortcomings in rigorously defining transparency, it provides some insight, none-the-less, into
what might be important definitional elements of consumer perceptions of transparency.
Unless noted otherwise, the transparency literature discussed in this chapter is
theoretical, and thus we are left without measured scale items for this concept. In a few
cases, which will be pointed out in the literature review, authors have attempted to
empirically measure a construct which they’ve called “transparency”, however, either
their conceptualization differs from the one presented here or the definition and
measurement of the construct does not hold up to Mackenzie’s (2003) guidelines for
proper construct definition and measurement.

12

Article Selection
Articles were found by searching the term “transparency” in Google Scholar,
ABI/Inform and ProQuest databases. Transparency had to be a major topic of discussion
in the article in order for it to be included in the coding procedure. This resulted in
approximately 39 articles from both academic and practitioner literature and from
marketing, finance, accounting, information technology, political science, management,
public health, and communications fields. Transparency definitions presented in each
article were then coded into categorical themes. Some articles included multiple
definitions or descriptions of transparency which yielded 48 definitions that were coded
into themes. Table 1 provides a summary of the transparency literature discussed in this
section.
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Table 1: Summary of Literature
Author (Year) Study
Type
Murphy, Laczniak,
and Wood (2007)

Context
Ethics in
Relationship
Marketing

Conceptual paper

Objective

Main Contribution

Marketing Academic Literature
Discusses relationship
Transparency is seen as an
marketing from a virtue
overarching virtue that is
ethics perspective.
essential/needed at all stages of
relationship marketing.

Transparency Description
Transparency described in terms of
openness and clarity of
communications.

Lazarus and
McManus (2006)

Management of
customer
relationships

Explores transparency as
an approach in the
management of
organizations and
customer relationships.

Transparency is needed to: create indepth relationships, for product
innovation, and to create a sense of
trustworthiness

Transparency is defined in terms
of 1) openness, candor, free flow
of information and 2) dialogue with
stakeholders.

Prahalad and
Ramaswamy (2004)

Co-creation of
value

Explores the concept of
value and co-creation
based on interaction
between firm and
consumer.

Consumers create value through their
experiences with the firm;
transparency is key element necessary
when interacting with consumers;
consumers create value through their
experiences with the firm.

Transparency is providing access to
information.

B2B buyer/
supplier

Introduces relationship
transparency to the
buyer/supplier literature
and investigates its
impact on business
relationships.

Vendor transparency delivers value to
the customer, increases customer
satisfaction, and ultimately leads to
favorable behavioral intentions.

Transparency is an individual's
subjective perception of being
informed about the relevant actions
and properties of the other party in
the interaction.

B2B buyer/
supplier

Explores the concept of
transparency

Transparency can vary based on a
firm's level of disclosing
technological, organizational, supply,
and cost/pricing information.

Transparency is defined in terms of
"the ability to 'see through' and to
share information that is not usually
shared between two businesses.

Conceptual

Eggert and Helm
(2003)
Empirical

Hultman and
Axelsson (2007)
Case Study
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(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Hofstede (2003)

Context

Objective

Conceptual working
paper

Transparency Description

Supply chain

Defines transparency

A prerequisite to transparency is
knowing what information
stakeholders need and providing it in a
way so the meaning is understood.

Transparency of net chain is the
extent to which all the net chain's
stakeholders have a shared
understanding of, and access to, the
product-related information that
they request, without loss, noise,
delay, and distortion.

Supply chain

Conceptualizes
transparency from a
strategic alliance
perspective

Transparency is subjective from the
point of view of the observer; an
observer’s perceived transparency of
the system can be influenced by the
degree to which access to information
and a learning opportunity is provided
by the system to the observer;
Transparency will be perceived as low
when: 1) the observer has not defined
what s/he is interested in learning
about, 2) the system isn't able or
willing to provide the requested
information, or 3) the information
provided isn't what was requested

Transparency is the extent to which
properties of a system are
observable to the observer.

Conceptual Paper

van Dijk, Duysters,
and Beulens (2003)

Main Contribution

15

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
McKay (2008)

Context
CRM (Data
management)

Trade magazine
article

Blackshaw (2008)

Marketing Practitioner Literature
Explores the concept of
Transparency is showing information
transparency from both
to customers in a convenient manner
CRM philosophy and
and the focus should be on
CRM data management
information that the customer wants.
systems perspectives
The author proposes transparency is
"behind" loyalty, retention, and
customer devotion, but it doesn't
guarantee trust. CRM systems should
integrate all customer data so any
contact employee has the ability to see
customer interactions with the firm.

Ethics guidelines

Transparency Description
Transparency is letting customers
know what's happening.

Discusses six drivers of
brand credibility
including trust,
authenticity,
transparency, listening,
responsiveness, and
affirmation.

Transparent brands are those which
much (or at least the most relevant)
information and data are known about
it.

Transparency described as
openness and visibility: "let the sun
shine in", "easy to learn", "easy to
discover", "no secrets".

Marketing

Provides ethical
guidelines to marketers.

Transparency involves creating a
spirit of openness.

Marketing

Provides ethical
guidelines to word of
mouth marketers.

Marketers can be more transparent by:
communicating clearly, accepting
constructive criticism, explaining and
acting on significant product or
service risks, and disclosing pricing
and terms.
WOM marketers can be more
transparent by: saying on whose
behalf you're speaking, saying what
you truly believe, and saying who you
are/never falsifying your identity.

Ethics guidelines

WOMMA (2010)

Main Contribution

Branding

Trade magazine
article

AMA (2010)

Objective
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Transparency is related to honesty
and forthrightness.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
CI (2006)

Context
Marketing

Report

Nielsen (2004)

Business
reporting

Conceptual working
paper

Nielsen (2005)
Conceptual working
paper

Business
reporting

Objective

Main Contribution

Investigates the level of
transparency in the
pharmaceutical industry

With regard to pharmaceutical
companies being open about their
marketing practices, CI notes that this
industry lacks transparency.

Accounting & Finance (Business Reporting) Academic Literature
Compares types of
Transparency is not only merely
information reported in
disclosing an infinite amount of
9 different business
information but also it must be
reporting models
relevant. Two categories of
information represented in business
reporting models: mandated (i.e.
financial data) and voluntary (i.e.
intellectual capital, sustainability).
Develops the concept of
voluntary disclosure and
its relationship to
transparency and user
uncertainty.

Transparency may be reduced with
voluntary disclosure; voluntary
disclosure introduces uncertainties
and lack of understanding because:
lack of standardization, and thus
comparability of information; lack of
time to analyze the information; lack
of frames from which to analyze the
info; lack of interest in these types of
information; and lack of correct form
on which the information is conveyed.
however, it's a paradox in that the
capital market craves more
information yet they seemingly don't
know how to interpret it.
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Transparency Description
Transparency is related to
forthrightness and openness.

Transparency is an outcome of
internal and external stakeholders'
agreements on interpretations of the
company.

Transparency is an outcome of
internal and external stakeholders'
agreements on interpretations of the
company.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Nielsen and Madsen
(2009)

Context
Business
reporting

Critical perspective

Bainbridge (2009)

Business
reporting

Practitioner literature

GRI (2009)
Non-government
organization reporting
guidelines

Business
reporting

Objective

Main Contribution

Transparency Description

Discusses transparency
in terms of two prevalent
information disclosure
methods: disclose as
much as possible versus
disclose only the "right"
information.

The author argues that reporting only
the "right" information will lead to
greater transparency because users'
are constrained by bounded rationality
and time and suggests the disclose-asmuch-as-possible method hinders
information processing.

Transparency is a means of
achieving mutual understanding.
Transparency is an outcome of
internal and external stakeholders'
agreements on interpretations of the
company.

Accounting & Finance (Business Reporting) Practitioner Literature
Reviews the GRI
More complete reporting encourages
reporting framework as
positive sustainability effort behaviors
a means of achieving
from the firm and enables all
transparency in
stakeholders to make more informed
sustainability reporting.
choices.
Provide a framework
for companies outlining
for what, how and when
to disclose sustainability
information.

A report is high in transparency when
it is complete, relevant, accurate,
neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and
formatted and in a language
understandable to stakeholders.
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The goal of transparency should be
to make costs, benefits, values, and
risks as clear as possible.

Transparency is “the complete
disclosure of information on the
topics and Indicators required to
reflect impacts and enable
stakeholders to make decisions, and
the processes, procedures, and
assumptions used to prepare those
disclosures".

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Santana and Wood
(2009)

Context
Information
Technology

Conceptual

Vaccaro (2006)

Information
Technology

Conceptual book
chapter

Vaccaro and Madsen
(2009a)
Conceptual/qualitative

Information
Technology

Objective

Main Contribution

Information Technology Academic Literature
Reviews transparency in Author relates transparency to
the context of
capitalist economics which require
Wikipedia's writing and
marketplace actors have full and
editing processes.
accurate information available from
which to base their decisions;
withholding information causes power
asymmetry.
Discusses three ethical
Adopting and using information
perspectives (security,
technology platforms as
privacy, and
communication methods with
transparency) that
employees and customers should take
should be taken into
into consideration ethical perspectives
consideration when
including level of security of personal
adopting information
data required, level of privacy of the
technology platforms as
users required, and what and how
communication methods much detailed information about
with employees and
internal activities should be made
customers.
available on the system (transparency)
without sacrificing the firm's market
position.
Discusses the forces that
affect a firm's
information
transparency.

A firm's level of transparency depends
on: 1) customer demand for
transparency, 2) nature of
competition, 3) pressure of investors
for transparency, and 4) ethical
pressures.
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Transparency Description
Full transparency requires
information providers are credible
and legitimate, information itself is
fairly represented and verifiable,
and the information providers are
held accountable for the
information they distribute.
Transparency is the degree of
completeness of information
regarding a firm's own business
activities provided to the market.
Transparency is sharing every kind
of information concerning its
business activities requested by
society; opaque (the opposite of
transparent) firms do not disclose
any kind of information other than
that required by law.

See Vaccarro (2006)

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Vaccaro and Madsen
(2009b)

Context
Information
Technology

Conceptual

Florini (2007)
Book chapter

Politics

Objective

Main Contribution

Transparency Description

Discusses different types
of transparency (static
and dynamic) and argues
that dynamic
transparency is an
ethical standard of
which firms should
strive.

The conceptualization of transparency
as unidirectional telling of
standardized reporting information
does not satisfy the ethical obligation
of companies to share information that
stakeholders need to assess if the
product/service will have
consequences on his/her life.
Dynamic transparency leads to the
receipt of more complete information
by customers; however, firms can
overload information causing "data
asphyxia" rather than greater
transparency; quality and relevance of
data more important than quantity.

Authors suggest transparency is the
necessary ingredient for the
development of trustworthy and
accountable institutions. Dynamic
transparency is bilateral sharing of
information contrasted with static
transparency which is one-way
telling of information.

Political Science Academic Literature
Defines transparency
The holders of information often have
and discusses the idea
incentives to keep information secret;
that publicly useful
transparency contributes to
information is generally
overcoming the agency problem
underprovided.
brought by information asymmetry;
one reason to be secret is to guard
against being accused of making a
mistake.
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Transparency is the degree to
which information is available to
outsiders that enables them to have
informed voice in decisions and/or
to assess the decisions made by
insiders.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Gupta (2008)

Context

Conceptual

Transparency
International

Politics

Reporting Guidelines

Hebb (2006)
Case study

Management

Objective

Main Contribution

Argues that stakeholders
should not focus on
transparency processes
to assess transparency of
a government/
organization but rather
transparency outcomes.

Author suggests using comparative
analysis to scrutinize transparency
efforts of an organization such as: 1)
who discloses, 2) to whom is the info
disclosed, 3) what is disclosed, 4) to
meet what ends, 5) is it voluntary or
mandatory, 6) is it standardized or
non-standardized

Political Science Practitioner Literature
Transparency
Developed a tool to measure
International is a
transparency and improve
nonprofit organization
accountability by governments and
with the mission of
non-government organizations. The
reducing corruption in
measures are reflected in terms of
government.
properties of the information
disclosed.
Management Academic Literature
Discusses the California Transparency is important for
Public Employees
stakeholders to judge in whose best
Retirement System's
interest a firm is run; secrecy distorts
(CalPERS) efforts to
the decision-making process; based on
make sure companies in case study of CalPERS, negative
the portfolio are
capital market performance is more
transparent.
acceptable to stakeholders when
accompanied by high transparency as
compared to low.
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Transparency Description
Transparency is seen as
operationalized by information
disclosure.

Transparency is a principle that
allows those affected by
administrative decisions, business
transactions or charitable work to
know not only the basic facts and
figures but also the mechanisms
and processes.
Transparency is about the
availability of information to all the
actors within the firm, principals,
agents and stakeholders alike.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Welch and Rotberg
(2006)

Context

Objective

Main Contribution

Management

Discusses negative
consequences of
transparency on
management behaviors.

Management

Investigates various
firm-level behavioral
factors as possible
antecedents to
stakeholder trust.

Management may act to reduce risk if
transparency is a policy so as not to be
blamed for bad decisions, as such
they could become more risk averse
resulting in less innovativeness for the
firm.
Transparency is not an antecedent of
trust for any stakeholder type
including clients, suppliers,
employees, and investors after
controlling for other firm-level factors
(integrity, benevolence, and
competence). Transparency may be
important when assessments of
integrity, benevolence and
competence are unable to be made.

Conceptual

Pirson and Malhotra
(2007, 2008)
Empirical

Higgins (2005)

Management

Industry magazine
interview

Bryant (2010)
Popular press
newspaper interview

Management

Management Practitioner Literature
Herb Baum, president
Baum was able to turn around an
and CEO of Dial is
underperforming company by
interviewed in this
managing the company with a
article.
leadership style he calls transparency.

Vineet Nayar, CEO of
HCL Technologies is
interviewed in this
article.

Transparency in Nayar's organization
has led to a culture of trust and
honesty. Nayar creates transparency
by posting all employee performance
reviews on the company’s internal
website for all to see.
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Transparency Description
Transparency described as “open
and notorious” achieved by full
disclosure.

Scale items used to measure
transparency imply transparency is
perceived as high by stakeholders
when a firm explains decisions,
says if something goes wrong, and
openly shares all relevant
information.

Transparency described as always
telling the truth, being honest and
open about how you run your life
and business, and fessing up when
you make mistakes.

Transparency is being completely
open.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
O'Malley and
Thompson (2009)
Conceptual

Context
Public health

Objective

Main Contribution

Public Health Academic Literature
Describes transparency
Information should be provided to
and provides guidelines
stakeholders if: 1) the information is
for determining whether needed by stakeholders to avoid injury
or not certain
or risk, 2) the information is relevant
information should be
to a decision-making process and 3)
released by an
there no compelling reason to
organization.
withhold or modify the information.
An outcome of transparency is that
people are informed in an accurate,
accessible, and timely manner and 2)
stakeholders are given timely access
to the evidence and assumptions used
to inform management planning,
policy and control decisions, and info
about decision-making processes and
outcomes.

(table 1 continued)

Communications Academic Literature
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Transparency Description
Transparency is related to quality
of information such that
information needed should be
factually accurate, easily
understood by the intended
audience and presented in a manner
that promotes adoption of the
desired behaviors. Transparency is
also related to the building of trust
between the organization and
consumers such that by being
forthcoming and open on all
aspects (of the emergency) trust
should be facilitated.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Plaisance (2007)

Context

Objective

Main Contribution

Mass Media
Ethics

Discusses transparency
as the essence of ethical
behavior.

Transparency is a necessary but
insufficient condition for trust. One
can increase transparency but still
provide half-truths; all deceptions lack
the element of transparency and lack
of transparency is a prerequisite for all
deceptive acts.

Transparency is truthful
forthrightness and proactive
information disclosure.

Public Relations

Grounded in the context
of ethics, public
relations and advertising
practitioners are
discussed as being either
Principled Advocates or
Pathological Partisans.

Transparency is openness which
results in meeting others’
“reasonable requirements for
information”. The opposite of
transparency is secrecy.

Journalism

Discusses why
transparency as a goal
for reporters is
important.

The Principled Advocate represents
the advocacy virtues of humility,
truth, transparency, respect, care,
authenticity, equity, and social
responsibility. The Pathological
Partisan represents the opposing vices
of arrogance, deceit, secrecy,
manipulation, disregard, artifice,
injustice, and raw self-interest.
Secrecy is the opposite of
transparency and it involves
unjustified concealment, hiding,
silence, suppression, furtiveness, and
covertness.
Transparency functions as a system of
accountability and as a way of
increasing legitimacy with citizens.

Conceptual

Baker (2008)
Conceptual

Allen (2008)
Conceptual
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Transparency Description

Transparency is defined as making
public the traditionally private
factors that influence creation of
the news.

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Rawlins (2008)

Context

Objective

Public Relations

Investigates the
relationship between
transparency efforts and
trust in the context of
employee-employer
relationships.

Two dimensions of transparency
efforts, providing substantial/quality
information and holding itself
accountable, explain .55 of the
variance when regressed on trust.

Public Relations

Develops two scales to
measure stakeholder
perceptions of
organizational
transparency.

Transparency is measured based on
firm traits such that stakeholders
perceive a firm as highly transparent
when the firm has a reputation for
integrity, respect, and communication
openness. Transparency is also
measured based on firm efforts such
that stakeholders perceive a firm as
highly transparent when the firm
participates in two-way
communication, provides
substantial/quality information, holds
itself accountable, and is not secretive
with regard to the information it
discloses.

Empirical

Rawlins (2009)
Empirical

Main Contribution
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Transparency Description
Transparency is the deliberate
attempt to make available all
legally releasable information whether positive or negative in
nature - in a manner that is
accurate, timely, balanced, and
unequivocal, for the purpose of
enhancing the reasoning ability of
publics and holding organizations
accountable for their actions,
policies, and practices.
See Rawlins (2008)

(table 1 continued)
Author (Year) Study
Type
Christensen (2002)

Context

Conceptual

Main Contribution

Transparency Description

Corporate
communications

Discusses transparency
as a condition and a
strategy for corporate
communications.

Transparency should be viewed as a
condition of communicating with
stakeholders in the current business
environment because stakeholders
expect unrestricted access to
information and corporate
accountability. Transparency can also
be a strategy in which firms
strategically decide which information
to provide in order to appeal to certain
stakeholders. The strategic approach
is more logical given stakeholders are
only looking for a minimum level of
information to reduce uncertainty.

Transparency is related to
providing quality information (clear
and insightful) rather than quantity.
Transparency should be
investigated from the stakeholder's
perspective.

Public Relations

Discusses the need for
organizations to provide
visual transparency as a
part of communicating
with stakeholders.

Visual transparency is especially
important at early stages of orientation
and when an abundance of
information is available. If the
stakeholder's information requirement
is ill-defined then visuals should be
symbolic whereas when stakeholder's
information requirement is welldefined, then visuals should be iconic
and resemble reality.

Visual transparency is about
organizations opening their doors
to show how their goods are
produced. Transparency is about
sharing what is not usually known.

Conceptual

van Woerkum and
Aarts (2009)

Objective
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Marketing Literature
Few authors have investigated transparency in the B2C context in the marketing
literature. For both the B2C and B2B contexts, the major consensus of the authors with
regard to transparency is that it is important to developing and maintaining relationships
with stakeholders of the firm.
B2C Context. Murphy et al. (2007) conceptualize transparency as
communication and action that is open and clear and as the overarching virtue, or good
habit that is essential at all stages of relationship marketing. The authors suggest that
firms must make their ethical virtues explicit to stakeholders in order for stakeholders to
trust them. Further, transparency is the key ingredient of relationship marketing,
meaning relationships will not flourish without transparency (Murphy, Laczniak, &
Wood, 2007).
Organizations such as the American Marketing Association (AMA), the Word of
Mouth Marketing Association (WOMMA), and Consumers International (CI) view
transparency as an ethical value that marketers should embrace with its stakeholders. The
AMA notes on its website that transparency involves creating a “spirit of openness”
(AMA, 2010). AMA offers guidelines for what marketers can do to become more
transparent which include communicating clearly, accepting constructive criticism,
explaining and acting on significant product or service risks, and disclosing pricing and
terms. The AMA’s guidelines for transparency could be interpreted to mean that
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transparency is a firm being open with its stakeholders, but openness here seems to
include “accepting customer feedback” according to the AMA.
Like the AMA, the WOMMA also views transparency as a core ethical value
along with honesty noting that transparency is the core foundation of its code of ethics:
“ethical word of mouth marketers always strive for transparency and honesty in all
communications with consumers, with advocates, and with those people who advocates
speak to on behalf of a product” (WOMMA, 2010). Specifically, and brought about by
covert marketing activities such as 1) Sony Erickson’s fake tourists, and 2) bloggers
covertly writing about products for compensation, the WOMMA urges marketers to be
more transparent by saying on whose behalf one is speaking, saying what one truly
believes, and saying who one is/never falsifying your identity (WOMMA, 2010).
Finally, Consumers International (CI), a global organization with 220 member
organizations in 115 countries, acts to protect consumer rights which among them
includes the right “to be given facts needed to make an informed choice and to be
protected against dishonest or misleading advertising and labeling” (CI, 2010). CI notes
that there is a “staggering lack of transparency” in the pharmaceutical industry because
“only two (firms) reported code of conduct violations publicly” suggesting that this
industry should be more open to sharing information with the public and “only one (firm)
provides their marketing code of conduct directly to consumers” suggesting firms need to
be more proactive with sharing information. CI provides suggestions for what
information should be provided to consumers including marketing policies, codes of
conduct for gift giving, marketing codes of conduct, and allocation of marketing budget.
28

Transparency is also seen as an important building block to the co-creation of
value in the firm-customer dyad (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). The authors note that
it is difficult for dialogue to occur without access and transparency to information which
suggests that transparency may be an antecedent of customer-firm dialogue. Although
the authors provide no formal definition of their conceptualization of transparency, they
suggest that transparency is about providing access to as much information as the
customer needs.
Tom McManus, a leading authority on transparency in business, also notes that
transparency is important to business relationships. MacManus defines transparency in
terms of openness, candor, free flow of information, and dialogue with stakeholders.
“Openness” and “candor” seem to be fairly consistent with other interpretations of
transparency. “Dialogue with stakeholders” has been previously suggested by Prahalad
and Ramaswamy (2004) as an outcome of a firm’s transparent behaviors such that when a
firm engages in transparent behaviors, this results in an environment conducive for twoway dialogue. “Free flow of information” may be more appropriate as an antecedent of
transparency such that perceptions of transparency should increase when stakeholders
perceive that firms allow information to flow freely to them. Finally, trustworthiness was
suggested as a consequence of transparency (Lazarus & McManus, 2006).
B2B context. With regard to B2B relationships, most of the transparency
literature is couched in the context of relationships within the supply chain. For example,
Eggert and Helm (2003; pg. 103) define transparency in terms of relevance of
information exchanged in the context of buyer-supplier relationships: “an individual’s
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subjective perception of being informed about the relevant actions and properties of the
other party in the interaction” (Eggert & Helm, 2003). The authors’ scale items refer to
how often relevant information is exchanged with the supplier, and how aware the buyer
is of the supplier’s economic situation, organizational structure, and technical abilities.
Eggert and Helm (2003) found that vendor transparency significantly predicted perceived
customer value.
Hultman and Axelsson (2007) also discuss transparency in terms of buyersupplier relationships. The authors suggest there are four types of transparency in buyersupplier relationships. However, upon close examination of the literature, the authors
really mean that there are four types of information for which if disclosure is increased,
transparency may also increase. These information types include technological,
organizational, supply, and cost/price. Hultman and Axelsson (2007) define
transparency, stating it is the ability to ‘see-through’ and to share information that is
usually not shared between two business partners (Hultman & Axelsson, 2007). The
authors also note that sharing of information need not be reciprocal and that it can be
unidirectional or bidirectional.
Another example of transparency discussed in the supply chain context is that of
Hofstede (2003; page 18). He defines transparency as the “extent to which all the
netchain’s stakeholders have a shared understanding of, and access to, the product-related
information that they request, without loss, noise, delay and distortion” (Hofstede, 2003).
From this it seems that transparency allows all parties to see the same relevant
information and/or firm behaviors and thus facilitates shared understanding.
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Finally, van Dijk et al. (2003; page 6) define transparency broadly as “the extent
to which properties of a system are observable to the observer” in which a ‘system’ refers
to either a netchain, relationship, or partner within a supply chain (van Dijk, Duysters, &
Beulens, 2003).

The authors state that an observer’s perceptions of transparency of a

system can be influenced by the degree to which access to information and a learning
opportunity is provided by the system to the observer. This description seems fairly
consistent with others that conceptualize transparency as making things observable which
leads to a shared understanding of meaning.
The popular press literature also provides insight into the concept of transparency
and its importance to customer relationship management. Lauren McKay in Customer
Relationship Management magazine (2008; page 26) states that transparency is “the root
of the customer experience” (McKay, 2008) suggesting that without it, relationships will
not flourish. McKay (2008) notes that transparency is about letting customers know what
is happening by providing relevant information in a manner that is convenient to retrieve.
Pete Blackshaw (2008; page 52) in Marketing Management magazine also notes
the importance of transparency in relationship management stating that customers often
want to know the “brand behind the brand” which occurs through transparency
(Blackshaw, 2008). A firm can do this by being open and visible, by providing relevant
information to customers, enlarging fine print, and making information clear and easy to
read. He states, “a corporation or brand is transparent if much (or at least the most
relevant) information and data are known about it” and further conceptualizes a
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transparent firm as one that “lets the sun shine in”, is “easy to learn and discover”, and
has “no secrets” (pg. 52).

Accounting and Finance (Business Reporting) Literature
In business reporting literature, more often than not, literature with the term
“transparency” in its title refers to information disclosure and business reporting. With
regard to business reporting of firms, Nielsen and colleagues (2004, 2005, 2009) define
transparency as an outcome of stakeholders’ agreements on interpretations of the
company, it is a mutual understanding, and that transparency should “invoke” the ability
for stakeholders to compare information disclosed across time and countries (Nielsen,
2004, 2005; Nielsen & Madsen, 2009). The authors also note that transparency is not
only merely disclosing information but that the information disclosed must be relevant.
This suggests that transparency enables stakeholders to see into the firm.
Nielsen and Madsen (2009) propose that not all information leads to transparency.
They note there are two prevalent business reporting strategies which most firms employ
that include 1) disclosing as much information as possible and 2) disclosing only the
“right” information. The authors suggest that while firms that disclose as much
information as possible view this strategy as a “good thing” toward creating transparency,
it actually is not a good strategy at all. The authors address what is “right” information
from the perspective of the firm by labeling it as that which is “comparable” and “linked
to strategic intent of the company” (pg. 852). They propose this type of disclosure will
lead to greater transparency, because users are better able to process limited quantities of
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information given time constraints. This view of what information is “right” is from the
firm’s perspective in that firms decide which information is right. To bring Nielsen’s and
Madsen’s (2009) “right” information constraint into the perspective of stakeholders, one
might evaluate “right” information as that which stakeholders perceive is relevant.
Bainbridge (2009) suggests the goal of transparency should be to make costs,
benefits, values, and risks as clear as possible and he supports the GRI reporting
framework as one means of doing so. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a nonprofit
organization that helps firms become more transparent, especially with regard to
economic, environmental, and social performance reporting, defines transparency as “the
complete disclosure of information on the topics and indicators required to reflect
impacts and enable stakeholders to make decisions, and the processes, procedures, and
assumptions used to prepare those disclosures” (GRI, 2006; pg. 6). It seems the GRI not
only considers providing stakeholders with relevant and complete information as a part of
transparency but it also considers providing stakeholders with an understanding of how
the information was derived as a part of transparency. Additionally, the GRI provides a
reporting framework of guidelines for what, how, and when information should be
reported by firms in order to be more transparent, in essence suggesting antecedents of
transparency. With regard to what is reported, the GRI suggests disclosing information
that is relevant and complete; with regard to the quality/reliability of the information
reported, the GRI suggests disclosing information that is accurate, neutral, and
comparable; and with regard to how and when information is reported, the GRI suggests
disclosing information that is clear, timely, and in a format and language appropriate to
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the intended audience (Bainbridge, 2009; GRI, 2006). The GRI’s definition and
framework for transparency is consistent with other conceptualizations in that
transparency is about sharing relevant and complete information. A new element which
the GRI brings into the transparency definition is that transparency should allow
stakeholders to understand the processes used to derive reported information. Therefore,
it’s not only important to disclose relevant and complete information but that it’s also
necessary to disclose how the information was derived.

Information Technology Literature
The information technology literature stream tends to conceptualize transparency
in terms of information exchange, and particularly with regard to how much information
is exchanged. For example, in the context of information and communication
technologies (ICT) for businesses, and in particular Internet-based communication tools,
transparency is viewed as the degree of completeness of information provided by each
company to the market in terms of business activities (Vaccaro, 2006; Vaccaro &
Madsen, 2006, 2009b). A transparent company is one that “shares every kind of
information concerning its business activities requested by society” (Vaccaro, 2006; pg.
146) contrasted with an opaque firm at the other end of the transparency continuum
described as one that discloses only the information required by law. This
conceptualization of transparency seems to be similar to other conceptualizations in
which authors view transparency in terms of information exchanged or provided to the
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public, and in which characteristics of disclosure (such as what, how, and when
information is disclosed) are seen as the same thing as transparency (Eggert & Helm,
2003; GRI, 2006; Hofstede, 2003; Hultman & Axelsson, 2007). However, disclosure is
more like a proxy or “signal” for transparency (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008) and thus an
antecedent, rather than a true measure of transparency.
In a follow-up paper, the authors (Vaccaro & Madsen, 2009a) discuss different
types of transparency and argue that dynamic transparency is an ethical standard of which
firms should strive. Dynamic transparency is bilateral sharing of information contrasted
with static transparency which is one-way telling of information. The authors note that
the typical conceptualization of transparency in existing literature to this point, as
unidirectional telling of standardized reporting information, does not satisfy the ethical
obligation of companies to share information that stakeholders need to assess if the
product/service will have consequences on his/her life. They also suggest that while
dynamic transparency may lead to the receipt of more complete information by
customers, it may also lead to information overload causing "data asphyxia"(Vaccaro &
Madsen, 2009a; Vaccaro & Madsen, 2007; pg. 121) rather than greater transparency thus
quality and relevance of data is more important than quantity (Vaccaro & Madsen,
2009a) . Finally, these authors suggest transparency is necessary for the development of
trustworthy and accountable institutions.
From a business-to-consumer perspective, Santana and Wood (2009) discuss
transparency in reference to the online website, Wikipedia. The authors note that, on the
one hand, this site’s process transparency is high because its policies and processes for
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becoming a contributor are clear and easily accessible, but yet on the other hand this
site’s identity transparency and information transparency are low because contributors
may remain anonymous by providing fictitious names and the information may not be
fairly represented and verifiable. The authors note that marketplace actors should have
“full and accurate information available on which to base their decisions” (Santana &
Wood, 2009); pg. 135) which has been suggested in other literature as well.
Political Science Literature
In the political science literature transparency is referred to as “enabling citizens
to gather information on the policies and behavior of their governments” (Florini, 2007;
pg. 5), and is closely intertwined with concepts of accountability, inclusiveness,
legitimacy, democracy (Gupta, 2008), and governance-by-disclosure (Gupta, 2008;
Mason, 2008). Florini defines transparency as “the degree to which information is
available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to
assess the decisions made by insiders” (pg. 5). Arguing that publicly useful information
is generally underprovided, she notes that holders of information often have incentives to
keep information secret, such as to guard against being accused of making a mistake.
Transparency, on the other hand, contributes to overcoming the agency problem brought
by information asymmetry (Florini, 2007).
Gupta (2008) suggests using comparative analysis to scrutinize transparency
efforts of an organization such as: 1) who discloses, 2) to whom is the info disclosed, 3)
what is disclosed, 4) to meet what ends, 5) is it voluntary or mandatory, and 6) is it
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standardized or non-standardized. This seems to be another example of an author
describing transparency in terms of information disclosure.
Transparency International, a nonprofit organization with the mission of reducing
corruption in government, defines transparency on its website as “a principle that allows
those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to
know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes” and
further states, “It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly,
predictably and understandably” (Transparency, 2010). Transparency International, in
conjunction with The Carter Center (chartered by former president, Jimmy Carter),
developed a tool to measure transparency in response to the idea that hiding information
about donations to political parties breeds corruption. The measurement tool, CRINIS,
meaning ray of light in Latin, communicates to governments and their constituents what
can be done to improve transparency and accountability in political finance. CRINIS
measures transparency based on: 1) who has access to the financial data ranging from
internal network to organization party to the public, 2) quality characteristics of the data
including comprehensiveness, depth, and reliability, and 3) oversight mechanisms
ranging from internal-only to independent public auditors. Here, the CRINIS tool
provides firms with ways they can improve transparency based on what, when, and how
information is disclosed. There is also the notion that stakeholders must also be able to
see the processes used to generate information in order for firms to be transparent, which
has been suggested in other literature (GRI, 2006).
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Management Literature
With few exceptions, management academics and practitioners conceptualize
transparency in terms of information disclosure.
According to Hebb (2006; page 386), transparency is “fundamentally about the
availability of information to all the actors within the firm, principals, agents and
stakeholders alike” (Hebb, 2006). In her article, she discusses the California Public
Employees Retirement System's (CalPERS) efforts to make sure companies in the
portfolio are transparent. Hebb notes that CalPERS, a major pension fund administrator
and management watch dog for poorly performing companies within its portfolio, keeps
an eye on a firm’s transparency and performance levels and, in some cases, calls for more
transparency from firms within its portfolio. Based on her case study of CalPERS and
the performance of companies in its porfolio, Hebb (2006) indicates that negative capital
market performance seems to be more acceptable to stakeholders when accompanied by
high transparency as compared to low.
Finally, Pirson and Maholtra (2007, 2008) conceptualize transparency in terms of
to what degree a firm explains its decisions to stakeholders, admits wrongdoings, and
openly shares all relevant information (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008) which is similar
to that of Welch and Rotberg’s (2006; pg. 938) description of transparency as “open and
notorious” achieved by full disclosure (Welch & Rotberg, 2006).
The popular press and industry publications in recent years have also been
publishing articles related to transparency. For example, in an interview for Marketing
Management magazine, Herb Baum, former president and CEO of Dial, a $1.3 billion
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consumer goods company, and author of The Transparent Leader: How to Build a Great
company Through Straight Talk, Openness, and Accountability, discusses how he
transformed the failing company through transparency. He sites that his leadership style
is “transparency” which he defines as “always telling the truth, being honest and open
about how you run your life and business, and fessing up when you make mistakes”
(Higgins, 2005); pg. 15).
CEO of HCL Technologies, Vineet Nayar, in The New York Times also discusses
his management style as creating an organization that is completely open, which he calls
transparency. Nayar creates transparency by posting all employee performance reviews
on the company’s internal website for all to see. He notes that this has led to a culture of
trust and honesty (Bryant, 2010). Interestingly, whereas the former CEO of Dial sees
honesty as a part of transparency, the CEO of HCL Technologies sees honesty as a
consequence of transparency.
Public Health Literature
In the context of communicating public health emergency information to the
public, about such topics as disease and virus outbreaks, O’Malley et al. (2009), describe
transparency and provides guidelines for public health officials to determine how much
transparency is needed and whether or not certain information should be released by an
organization. Although they do not formally define transparency, O’Malley et al. suggest
transparency is when an organization is “forthcoming and open on all aspects (of an
emergency; pg. 616) which results in increased public trust in the organization. They
also note that transparency is related to the quality and timing of information dispersed.
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More specifically, transparency not only means that organizations distribute information
that is factually accurate and easily understood by the intended audience, but also that
organizations provide stakeholders with that information in a timely manner. The authors
suggest that while “transparency suggests that all relevant information ought to be
communicated or made accessible, it has to be recognized there may be legitimate
reasons for withholding certain information” (pg. 616). Information should be provided
to stakeholders if: 1) the information is needed by stakeholders to avoid injury or risk, 2)
the information is relevant to a decision-making process and 3) there is no compelling
reason to withhold or modify the information, such as compromising security or
confidentiality (O'Malley, Rainford, & Thompson, 2009).
Communications Literature
Ethics seems to be a major context in which transparency is couched in the
communications literature. Plaissance (2007) argues for transparency in media ethics,
defining transparency in terms of both a behavior and an attitude. Regarding transparent
behavior, he states (pg. 118) it is “conduct that presumes openness in communication and
serves a reasonable expectation of forthright exchange when parties have a legitimate
stake in the possible outcomes or effects of the communicative act” (Plaisance, 2007); he
also calls this behavior as being “aboveboard”. Regarding transparent attitude,
Plaissance suggests firms are transparent when they take the attitude of “proactive moral
engagement” when deception or omission could lead to lack of due diligence on the part
of the stakeholder; he also calls this a general “spirit of openness” (pg. 188).
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Grounded in the context of ethics, Baker (2008) discusses public relations and
advertising practitioners as being either Principled Advocates or Pathological Partisans.
She views transparency as an ethical virtue of the Principled Advocate, one that is
morally driven, and conceptualizes it as openness which results in meeting others’
“reasonable requirements for information” (Baker, 2008). She sites that an agent who is
transparent “freely volunteers information that others have a legitimate need to know;
and” in the context of mass media “who is candid and open about the sources of
advocacy messages and the messages employed for persuasion (pg. 244). Baker suggests
that transparency and secrecy are at opposing ends of a continuum in which secrecy is a
vice of the Pathological Partisan, one that abandons morals and virtues. Further, she
explains that secrecy is the opposite of transparency and it involves unjustified
concealment, hiding, silence, suppression, furtiveness, and covertness.
In the context of journalist practices, Allen (2008) discusses why transparency as
a goal for reporters is important. He defines transparency as “making public the
traditionally private factors that influence creation of the news” (pg. 323). Allen suggests
that transparency should be the goal for journalists and it is important to help ensure
accountability of reporting and establish perceived legitimacy among citizens. He states
that transparency goes beyond disclosing details about a news story that might influence
the creation of it but to also disclosing doubts the journalist may have as to the
truthfulness of the information s/he reports (Allen, 2008).
In the context of corporate communications, Christensen (2002) discusses
transparency as both a condition and a strategy. Transparency should be viewed as a
41

condition for communicating with stakeholders in the current business environment
because stakeholders expect unrestricted access to information. On the other hand,
transparency can also be a strategy for communicating with stakeholders in which firms
strategically decide which information to provide in order to appeal to certain
stakeholders (Christensen, 2002). Although he provides no formal definition of
transparency, Christensen offers some insight into this concept. He comments that
transparency is best conceptualized from the stakeholder’s perception and as providing
quality information (clear and insightful) rather than quantity of information. Because
the majority of stakeholders neither care enough about the organization to learn all about
it nor do they have the capacity for unlimited information processing the strategic
approach to transparency seems best.
Whereas most authors discuss transparency as information disclosure without
regard for specifying modes of disclosure (such as verbal, written, or visual), van
Woerkum (2009) discusses it specifically in the context of visual information. His
central claim is that organizations need to provide visuals such as photos and videos as a
part of communicating with stakeholders and this is especially important at early stages
of orientation and when an abundance of information is available. He seems to imply
that information disclosed should be clear to the audience, which has been noted in other
literature as well. Van Woerkum also provides insight into what type of information
should be visualized commenting that if the stakeholder's information requirement is illdefined then visuals should be symbolic whereas when stakeholder's information
requirement is well-defined, then visuals should be specific and resemble reality of the
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firm (van Woerkum & Aarts, 2009). Implying firm openness, he notes that visual
transparency is about sharing what is not usually known and it is about organizations
opening their doors “to show how their goods are produced” (pg. 436) by providing
visual material. A Washington state newspaper, The Spokesman-Review, offers a good
example of an organization implementing visual transparency efforts. This newspaper
posts webcasts on its website of behind-the-scenes editorial meetings as a part of its
Transparent Newsroom Initiative (Fernando, 2007).
Rawlins (2009) is perhaps the academic who provides the most important
milestone in transparency research; he developed a scale to measure this concept, which
is an essential starting point for better understanding transparency. However, Rawlins
falls short in rigorously defining and measuring transparency. He defines transparency as
“the deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable
information – whether positive or negative in nature – in a manner that is
accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing
the reasoning ability of publics and holding organizations accountable for
their actions, policies, and practices” (pg. 75).
The problem with this definition is that by adding into it a description of how, when, and
in what format information is provided, he has actually added a “disclosure” or
“perception of disclosure” dimension which may be problematic since a review of the
literature indicates disclosure may be an antecedent to perceived transparency.
Interestingly, however, some of Rawlins’ scale items reflect themes consistent with other
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literature including “open/closed”, “disclosing/concealing”, “guarded/candid”, and
“makes it easy to find the information”.

Transparency Themes Emerging from Literature: An Integrated View
An objective of the literature review was to conceptualize transparency by
defining it based on a critical review of the themes found during the literature review
process. An exhaustive review of the transparency literature across six different fields
revealed that there were not only differences across fields in the way transparency was
defined or conceptualized but also within specific fields. For example, within the
marketing literature, we see at least eight different definitional themes or elements
identified as central to transparency by different authors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Open with stakeholders, including open to feedback
Being upfront and candid
Not hiding relevant information
Being honest
Sharing relevant information with public
Providing access to information
Having a shared understanding
Communicating clearly

Clearly, some of these themes are referring to the same general idea, such as
being upfront and candid and not hiding relevant information. We also notice that some
other themes are either antecedents or consequences of other themes. For example,
providing access to information and communicating clearly can be seen as antecedents of
being open with stakeholders and being upfront and candid while being honest and
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having a shared understanding may be consequences of being open with stakeholders and
being upfront and candid. The eight themes identified in the existing marketing literature
on transparency reveals themes located at different points in a cause and effect chain,
thus emphasizing the need to develop a tight and precise definition of transparency.
The differences across fields are also evident as we look at the themes emerging
from the accounting literature and others. Researchers in this area have identified mutual
understanding, disclosure of comparable information, complete disclosure of relevant
information, and communicating in a timely manner as important themes associated with
transparency. It is easy to see that while some of these themes are in agreement with the
themes identified in the marketing literature, the others seem to be quite unique to their
field such as disclosure of comparable information in accounting literature, emphasis on
quantity of information in the information technology literature, fessing up to mistakes in
the management literature, and sharing information not usually shared in the
communications literature. In spite of the differences across and within fields about the
core themes associated with the transparency construct, there were some core themes
associated with transparency that appear to transcend the boundaries of different
disciplines. In fact, these themes emerged in all the six literature streams that were
reviewed in this dissertation. These were the themes of “being open” and “being
forthright” with respect to issues that are “relevant” to stakeholders.
Being open. The first emerging theme from the literature review that comes up
when transparency is discussed is that of “openness”. While not all authors explicitly
used the terms “open” or “openness” the meaning seemed to be the same. Researchers
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and non-government organizations (NGOs) conceptualize transparency of a firm as
“being open” (Blackshaw, 2008; CI, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006), allowing
stakeholders to “see-through” it (Hultman & Axelsson, 2007), and openly sharing
information (Hofstede, 2003; Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008; Vaccaro, 2006; Vaccaro &
Madsen, 2006, 2009a, b). It seems a firm may be perceived as open if it affords
stakeholders the opportunity to learn about it. This might be envisioned by a glass
building in which everything inside is visible.
Being forthright. The second emerging theme is that of “forthrightness”.
Researchers and NGOs conceptualize transparency of a firm as “letting customers know
what’s happening” (McKay, 2008), “explaining decisions and saying when something
goes wrong” (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008), “fessing up” when a firm makes a mistake
(Higgins, 2005), “forthright exchange” (Plaisance, 2007), and “freely” volunteering
information (Baker, 2008). It seems a firm may be perceived as forthright when it gets
straight to the point and proactively opens itself up to stakeholders without regard for
consequences. There is a difference between open and forthright. For example, imagine
you engage in an interaction with a salesperson in which you’re trying to learn more
about a particular product. The salesman answers all of your questions and thus you may
perceive him as open. Now imagine the salesperson knows there are questions you
haven’t asked which have been important to others in the decision-making process. The
salesperson provides you with this information as well since you didn’t ask. In this case,
he proactively provided you with a learning opportunity, and hence you may perceive
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him as forthright. This scenario might especially apply for highly complex products or
for novice users.
Relevance. The third emerging theme from the literature review is that of firm
behavior relevance. Specifically, in order for firms to act transparently, they should be
open and forthright about that which is “useful” (Florini, 2007), and “relevant”
(Blackshaw, 2008; Eggert & Helm, 2003; McKay, 2008; Nielsen, 2004, 2005; Nielsen &
Madsen, 2009) to stakeholders.
Three secondary themes also emerged. These were later deemed inappropriate to
include into the definition of transparency. For example, “honesty” (Higgins, 2005;
WOMMA, 2010) was an initial coded theme but it may be more appropriate if
conceptualized as a consequence of transparency rather than a definitional element. This
is because honesty or perceptions of a firm being honest are a direct consequence of a
firm being seen as open and forthright, which were two of the emerging themes.
A second theme was “disclosure characteristics” such as disclosing clear
information and disclosing information in a timely manner (Bainbridge, 2009;
Christensen, 2002; GRI, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009; Rawlins, 2009; van Woerkum &
Aarts, 2009), but here characteristics related to what, how, or when information is
disclosed is conceptualized as an antecedent of transparency rather than a definitional
element.
Finally, a third theme, “ethics/morality” emerged from the literature in which
transparency is discussed as an ethical behavior (AMA, 2010; Baker, 2008; Murphy et
al., 2007; Plaisance, 2007; WOMMA, 2010). Ethics is perceived here as a consequence
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of transparency. More discussion on these three constructs will follow at the end of this
chapter in the section that discusses constructs that are similar to transparency.
Table 2 provides a summary of the major themes of the transparency construct
used in various literature streams.
Table 2: Themes Emerging from Literature
Transparency is a Firm that is Open
It is communication and action that is open and clear (Murphy et al. 2007)
Related to availability of firm-specific information (Bushman et al. 2004)
Sharing of every kind of information (Vacarro 2006; Vacarro and Madsen 2006, 2009b)
Accessibility of information (Zhu 2002)
Information is easily accessible (Santana and Wood 2009)
Degree to which information is available (Florini 2007)
Availability of information to all actors within the firm, principals, agents, and
stakeholders (Hebb 2006)
Open and notorious (Welch and Rotberg 2006)
It is creating an organization that is completely open (Bryant 2010)
Make public traditionally private factors that influence creation of news (Allen 2008)
Unrestricted access to information; information is clear and insightful (Christensen 2002)
Sharing what is not usually known and opening doors to show how goods are produced
(van Woerkum and Aarts 2009)
Involves creating a spirit of openness; Accept constructive criticism; explain and act on
product/service risks; disclose pricing and terms (AMA 2010)
Openness, candor, free flow of information, and dialogue with stakeholders (Lazarus and
Mcmanus 2006)
Conduct that presumes openness in communication (Plaisance 2007)
Spirit of openness (Plaisance 2007)
Candid and open (Baker 2008)
(table 2 continued)
Freely volunteers information (Baker 2008)
Properties of a system are observable to the observer, access to information, affordance
of a learning opportunity (vanDijk et al. 2003)
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Let customers know the ‘brand behind the brand’ by being open and visible; described as
“let the sun shine in”, “easy to learn and discover”, and has “no secrets” (Blackshaw
2008)
Should provide not only basic facts and figures about the company but also processes and
mechanisms behind decisions (Transparency International 2010)
Should report conduct violations publicly; provide marketing codes of conduct directly to
consumers (Consumers International 2008)
Being honest and open (Higgins 2005)
Openly shares all relevant information (Pirson and Malhotra 2007, 2008)
Ability to ‘see-through’ and to share information that is usually not shared between
partners (Hultman and Axelsson 2007)
Transparency is a Firm that is Forthright
It’s about letting customers know what’s happening (McKay 2008)
Say who you are, what you believe, don’t falsify identity (WOMMA 2010)
Transparency is explaining decisions and saying when something goes wrong (Pirson and
Malhotra 2007, 2008)
Always telling the truth and fessing up when you make mistakes (Higgins 2005)
Conduct that serves a reasonable expectation of forthright exchange when parties have a
legitimate stake in the outcome of a communicative act (Plaisance 2007)
Deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable information whether positive
or negative, in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal (Rawlins
2009)
Stakeholders have access to product-related information they request without loss, noise,
delay, and distortion (Hofstede 2003)
Firm Behaviors Should Be Relevant to the Consumer
Transparency is not merely disclosing information but that the information disclosed
must be relevant (Neilsen 2004, 2005; Nielsen and Madsen 2009)
The information that is ‘right’ to disclose to consumers is that which is relevant to the
consumer (Nielsen and Madsen 2009)
Subjective
perception of being informed about relevant actions of the other party (Eggert
(table 2 continued)
and Helm 2003)
Relevant information should be made accessible (O’Malley et al. 2009)
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Subjective perception of being informed about relevant actions of the other party (Eggert
and Helm 2003)
Provide relevant information (McKay 2008)
A brand is transparent if much or at least the most relevant information and data are
known about it (Blackshaw 2008)
Involves being open and providing information to consumers to make an informed
choice (Consumers International 2008)
Information should be publicly useful (Florini 2007)
Shares relevant information (Pirson and Malhotra 2007, 2008)
Information reported should be accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a
format appropriate for the intended audience (Bainbridge 2009; GRI 2006)
Transparency is being Honest
It is being honest and always telling the truth (Higgins 2005)
Don’t falsify identity (WOMMA 2010)
Transparency Relates to What, How, and When Information is Disclosed
Information is easily assessable (Santana and Wood 2009)
Information is clear and insightful (Christensen 2002)
Information shoud be accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a format
appropriate for intended audience (Bainbridge 2009; GRI 2006)
Disclose pricing terms (AMA 2010)
Transparency is being Ethical/Moral
A trait-based dimension of a firm that includes integrity, respect for stakeholders, and
communication openness (Rawlins 2009)
Proactive moral engagement (Plaissance 2007)

Working Definition
Based on the emerging themes from the literature review and following
MacKenzie’s (2003) guidelines for excellent construct definition, the working definition
50

for transparency is: the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is
forthright and open regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder. This definition will be
evaluated and revised if necessary in chapter 3 as qualitative research is conducted to
validate the themes derived in this chapter.
Constructs Related to Transparency
This section is a review of constructs and concepts discussed in the literature that
are similar to, yet distinct from, transparency. Table 5 below summarizes the
differentiation of transparency with disclosure, communication, ethics, trust, and honesty
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Table 3: Constructs Similar to Transparency

Construct
Disclosure,
mandatory
disclosure, voluntary
disclosure, selfdisclosure

Citations
Cozby 1973; Healy and Palepu 2001;
Hofstede 2003; van Dijk et al. 2003;
Nielsen 2004; Eccles and Mavrinac 1995;
Nielsen 2005; Allen 2008; Dawkins and
Fraas 2008; DeKinder and Kohli 2008;
Williams 2008; AMA 2010; Chaudoir and
Fisher 2010; WOMMA 2010

Definition
Any purposeful public release of
information - financial, social or
environmental, required or voluntary,
qualitative or quantitative, and
provided either proactively or by
requisition; sharing of personal
information.

Differs from Transparency
Narrowly measures whether and what
information is disclosed. Transparency does
not measure information. Disclosure is
probably one of the ways a firm can
manipulate perceptions of transparency.

Communication,
communication
openness,
information
communication

Robertson and Gatignon 1986; Anderson
and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus
1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Smith and
Barclay 1997; Ahearne, Jelinek, and Jones
2007

Formal and informal sharing of
information; the essence of each get at
perceptions of how well a firm
communicates with its stakeholders.

Ethics, ethical
evaluations

Sherwin 1983; Ferrell and Gresham 1985

Trust

Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994;
Morgan and Hunt 1994; Doney and
Cannon 1997; Ahearne, Jelinek, and Jones
2007; Eisingerich and Bell 2008; Yim et
al. 2008

Assessment of "just" or "right"
standards of behavior between parties
in a situation; evaluated based on
what one believes is fair and
culturally, familially, and
individually acceptable.
Perceived credibility and benevolence
(desiring to help others); willingness
of stakeholder to rely on the target;
confidence in an exchange partner's
reliability and integrity.

Perceptions of communication are formed
narrowly based on assessments of the
information provided. Transparency does not
measure assessments of information but
rather perceptions of firm openness and
forthrightness. Communication is probably
one of the ways a firm can impact
perceptions of transparency.
Does not measure "forthrightness" or
"openness"; transparency probably increases
perceptions that a firm is ethical.
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Trust does not measure "forthrightness" or
"openness" but rather a willingness to rely on
a firm; trust may be a consequence of
transparency.

(table 3 continued)
Construct
Honesty

Citations
Pechman 1992; Priester and Petty 1995

Definition
Perceived honesty of a source; what is
said reflects the message sender’s true
opinion.

Transparency

Dapko dissertation conceptualization

Extent to which a stakeholder
perceives a firm's conduct is
forthright and open regarding matters
relevant to the stakeholder.
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Differs from Transparency
Does not measure the "open" or "forthright"
dimension of transparency; honesty may
indirectly capture an assessment of perceived
honesty thus honesty may be a necessary but
not sufficient condition for transparency;
honesty may also be a consequence of
transparency in that transparency may lead a
firm to being more honest and subsequently
consumer perceptions of honesty should also
increase.

Disclosure. Conceptually, transparency and disclosure are distinct. When a firm
discloses about itself, the firm may then be seen as being open. While the two may be
seen as similar, there are key distinctions. Some literature indicates disclosure may be a
“signal” of transparency (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008; pg. 95), and thus is an antecedent of
transparency. Below is a review of what the construct of disclosure includes and then a
discussion of how it differs from transparency.
Disclosure refers to a firm providing information about itself (Chaudoir & Fisher,
2010; Cozby, 1973; Dawkins & Fraas, 2008; Williams, 2008). It is a behavior of a firm in
which information is shared about itself to stakeholders. In journalism, disclosure refers
to providing information about the interests of the writer which may bear on the subject
being written about, for example, if the writer has worked with an interview subject in the
past (Allen, 2008). In psychology, disclosure or self-disclosure refers to sharing personal
information such as one’s feelings with others (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010; Cozby, 1973).
In accounting and finance, disclosure refers to public companies sharing information
about itself like past financial performance, future forecasts, and current operations,
which might be kept secret if the company was a privately held company or a partnership
(Nielsen, 2004, 2005). In marketing, disclosure refers to providing product-related
information, pricing, and terms to a stakeholder without loss, noise, delay, or distortion
(AMA, 2010; Hofstede, 2003; van Dijk et al., 2003; WOMMA, 2010).
Some disclosure literature delineates between mandatory disclosure and voluntary
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is disclosure of information that is regulated by the
government (Healy & Palepu, 2001) such as earnings reports in an accounting context,
health side effects in pharmaceutical advertising, and contractual terms and agreements in
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mobile phone plan advertising, to name a few. Voluntary disclosure, on the other hand,
is disclosure of information that is at the discretion of management (Healy & Palepu,
2001) or a firm revealing information about itself that it is not required to by law to
reveal (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008). Voluntary disclosures may include information about
the firm's costs, investments, likely earnings, new product developments, product
launches, strategies, and personnel decisions in a business strategy context, (DeKinder &
Kohli, 2008), providing competitive comparison pricing in a sales context, and two-sided
messaging in an advertising context, to name a few. A review of the disclosure literature
across disciplines reveals a commonality in that disclosure is any purposeful public
release of information by a firm to stakeholders.
This dissertation conceptualizes disclosure, a firm behavior, as an antecedent of
transparency, a stakeholder perception about a firm. The firm discloses information and
what follows is consumer evaluations of that disclosure and of the firm. Disclosure is
one potentially important behavior that a firm can control and manipulate to alter
perceptions of transparency. However, the academic and practitioner literature indicates
that in most cases simply disclosing information is not enough to warrant perceptions of
transparency. For example, pharmaceutical companies are mandated to disclose in their
advertisements certain information such as health risks. Often the information is
disclosed via “fine print” in which the font is much smaller than other information
provided in the advertisement, or via voiceovers in which the communicator discloses
information much faster than other information that is communicated in the
advertisement. The firm disclosed the required information yet consumers may not
perceive this as being transparent.
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It seems likely, then, that in order for disclosure to have positive effects on
perceived firm transparency then disclosure must be seen as an internal, willful, voluntary
act of the firm. The perception, then, that the firm is voluntarily providing information
seems to be a key antecedent to perceptions of transparency.
Communication. Several construct derivatives for ‘communication’ exist in the
marketing literature including ‘communication’ of a channel partner (Anderson & Weitz,
1989; Anderson & Narus, 1990) and supplier (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), ‘communication
openness’ of an industry (Robertson & Gatignon, 1986) and selling partnership (Smith &
Barclay, 1997a), and ‘information communication’ of a salesperson (Ahearne, Jelinek, &
Jones, 2007). Unlike disclosure in which scale items typically reflect what information is
disclosed, communication-related constructs are typically measured in terms of one party
sharing or communicating information with another party (Ahearne et al., 2007;
Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Robertson &
Gatignon, 1986; Smith & Barclay, 1997b, a), frequency of communications (Palmatier,
Dant, Grewal, & Evans, 2006; Smith & Barclay, 1997a) and/or by characteristics of
information provided such as information timeliness (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Smith &
Barclay, 1997a), information relevance/meaningfulness(Anderson & Narus, 1990), and
information objectivity/two-sidedness (Ahearne et al., 2007). Upon a close review of the
communication constructs, it seems that the essence of each get at perceptions of how
well a firm communicates with its stakeholders. For example, a seminal
“communication” construct is that of Morgan and Hunt (1994), in which they use the
scale items “In our relationship, my major supplier…” followed by “…keeps us informed
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of new developments” and “…communicates well his expectations for our firm's
performance”.
Although communication is similar to transparency, they are not the same. This
dissertation conceptualizes communication as an antecedent of transparency.
Communication refers to assessments of the quality of information provided or to
assessments of how well a firm communicates with its stakeholders. Therefore this
dissertation sees a firm sharing information and communicating well as two of the ways
that could lead a firm to be perceived as transparent.
Ethical Evaluations. The literature discusses ethical evaluations in terms of an
assessment of “just” or “right” standards of behavior between parties in a situation
(Ferrell & Gresham, 1985). These ethical judgments are made based on what one
believes is fair and acceptable in terms of cultural, familial, and individual standards
(Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Reidenbach, Robin, & Dawson, 1991), and may be person
and context specific depending on one's cultural environment, professional environment,
industry environment, organizational environment, and personal characteristics (Hunt &
Vitell, 2006).
According to Robin and Reidenbach (1987), the key to success of any corporate
culture is the selection and implementation of core values. When implemented and
communicated to all parties, these values define the profile or face of the organization
and become an integral part of the organizational mission. A firm's profile is a projection
to external publics with whom the organization interacts, identifying how the
organization chooses to interact with those publics (Robin & Reidenbach, 1987).
Transparency could be a core value that a company embeds into its culture (Baker, 2008;
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Plaisance, 2007). When these values are successfully implemented and communicated
then it could give ethical direction to the marketing activities of the organization (AMA,
2010; Robin & Reidenbach, 1987; WOMMA, 2010), and subsequently, consumers may
perceive the firm to be more ethical as a result of firms engaging in transparency
behaviors. This dissertation conceptualizes transparency as most likely increasing
perceptions that a firm is ethical.
Trust. The marketing literature generally conceptualizes trust in terms of
perceived credibility and benevolence (desiring to help others) (Doney & Cannon, 1997),
a willingness of the stakeholder to be vulnerable in the presence of, or rely on, the target
(Ahearne et al., 2007; Ganesan, 1994), and confidence in an exchange partner’s
reliability, integrity, and competency (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Bart, Shankar, Sultan, &
Urban, 2005; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rawlins, 2008; Yim, Tse,
& Chan, 2008). Trust is a key mediating variable (KMV) between firm actions and
stakeholder actions (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Trust and transparency are conceptually distinct. Trust does not measure
‘openness’ or ‘forthrightness’ that is captured in the transparency construct. Conceptual,
empirical and practitioner literature suggests that trust may be a consequence of
transparency (Bryant, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009; Rawlins,
2008). Transparency is said to be needed to create a sense of trustworthiness (Lazarus &
McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009) and “transparency is the necessary ingredient for
the development of trustworthy and accountable institutions” (Vaccaro & Madsen,
2009b); pg. 223). Practitioners also suggest that transparency is an antecedent of trust.
Vineet Nayar, CEO of a large technology firm, HCL Technologies, states that

58

transparency in his organization has “led to a culture of trust and honesty” (Bryant,
2010). On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that transparency may only
be an antecedent of trust when stakeholders are unable to make assessments of a firm’s
integrity, benevolence, and competence (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008).
Honesty. Honesty is referred to as the degree to which what is said reflects the
message sender’s true opinion (Pechmann, 1992) and may be assessments of truthfulness
of an advertisement, person, or firm. According to Plaissance (2007; pg. 203), “one can
increase transparency but still provide half truths…all deception lacks the element of
transparency and lack of transparency is a prerequisite for all deceptive acts” (Plaisance,
2007). Another way of looking at this relationship is from the ethical perspective that
when a firm employs transparency as an ethical corporate value then firm behavior
should naturally lead to increased honesty. As such, honesty may be a consequence of
transparency in that transparency may lead a firm to being more honest and subsequently
consumer perceptions of honesty should also increase.

Along these lines, transparent

firms “are correctly seen as honest when telling the truth but give themselves away when
they lie” (Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010); pg. 217).
Chapter Summary
While the term “transparency” is used in the trade press (Blackshaw, 2008;
Bryant, 2010; CI, 2006; GRI, 2006; Higgins, 2005; McKay, 2008; Transparency, 2010)
and academic literature (Eggert & Helm, 2003; Hofstede, 2003; Hultman & Axelsson,
2007; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; Murphy et al., 2007; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004;
van Dijk et al., 2003), there is a lot of ambiguity in terms of what practitioners and
academics mean by the term. The term transparency is used a lot in the business press
today particularly in the context of financial and economic crises all over the world. As a
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result, the word “transparency” is often used to connote different things by different
people. For example, when a prominent hedge fund manager is caught engaging in
dishonest practices, there is a call for transparency by several industry experts and
academics. However, some of these experts are calling for greater honesty among
managers in this industry so that the public’s trust can be regained; others are calling for
greater disclosure of relevant information by firms and managers, while yet others have
called for managers to be more open and upfront with the public about information that
may be seen as relevant to an investor in an investment decision. The ultimate goal of all
these experts may be the same; i.e. to suggest ways to restore the public’s trust in the
industry. Here, the term transparency is used as an umbrella term to refer to stakeholder
perceptions that a firm’s conduct is forthright and open regarding matters relevant to the
stakeholder.
There are several constructs similar to transparency, such as disclosure,
communication, ethics, trust, and honesty, but all do not capture the essence of
‘forthrightness’ and ‘openness’ of transparency as conceptualized in this dissertation. A
review of these constructs indicates that these may either be antecedents or consequences
of transparency rather than conceptually the same as transparency. Two important
antecedents of transparency may be disclosure and communication. Three important
outcomes of transparency may perceived ethicality, trust, and perceived honesty which
may be attributed to the boundary spanner, the firm, or both when stakeholders perceive
transparency.
The next chapter will discuss the procedure used to validate the themes and will
provide a final definition of transparency based on this work.
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CHAPTER 3: THEME VALIDATION AND FINAL TRANSPARENCY
DEFINITION

This section reviews the qualitative research that was conducted in order to
validate the themes derived from the literature review. First this involved a coding task
with expert judges who coded transparency definitions using predetermined themes that
emerged from the literature review. Second, interviews, focus groups, and open-ended
surveys were conducted to further validate the themes and to ensure “everyday”
consumers think about transparency in the same way as practitioners and academics.
Theme Coding
Procedure. Judges (marketing Ph.D. students) participated in a qualitative sorting
procedure to substantiate the major themes found by the author. The sorting procedure
included providing each judge independently with a set of index cards with each card
including a definition or description of transparency found in the literature. The judges
were told “what is on the cards is a description or definition of transparency from the
literature” and they were instructed to “sort these cards into piles that represent similar
concepts or ideas”. Because the sorting procedure was used to validate previous theme
coding, judges were given predefined categories and were told to put each card into a
category that best represents what is on the card. The categories included those that were
identified by the author (i.e. open, forthright, relevance) as well as an “other” category.
The judges were also asked to “further refine the ‘other’ group into subcategories and to
label each subcategory”. The same forty-eight descriptions previously used to identify
emerging themes (see Table 2) were then used as the qualitative data for theme validation
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by judges, marketing Ph.D. students, along with the three previously identified themes
(open/openness, forthright/forthrightness, and sharing relevant information) and one
additional theme (other) for the sorting procedure.
Theme inter-rater reliability. The PRL reliability measure (Rust & Cooil, 1994)
was calculated to assess the inter-rater reliability of the qualitative judgments. The PRL
reliability measure was calculated by dividing the total number of agreements between
each pair of judges by the total number of potential agreements. In this case, there were
four judges resulting in a total of 6 potential pair-wise agreements per item. Each judge
evaluated 48 items for a total of 288 potential agreements. There were a total of 168
agreement pairs resulting in .58 proportion of inter-judge agreement. This corresponds to
a PRL reliability of .89 which indicates the inter-rater reliability is adequate because the
PRL reliability is a “direct extension and generalization of Cronbach’s alpha to the
qualitative case” (Rust & Cooil, 1994). Table 2 shows the 48 transparency definitions
and descriptions from existing literature that were used to identify initial themes and used
in the inter-rater coding procedure. The theme consensus for each item was consistent
with the researchers’ conceptualization of the forthright, open, and relevant dimensions
of the transparency construct.
Interviews, Focus Groups, and Surveys
Next, interviews, focus groups, and open-ended surveys were conducted to further
validate the themes.
Procedure. Interviews and focus groups were semi-structured and discoveryoriented in nature. In particular this means that, while the researcher had certain
objectives with pre-formulated relevant questions for the interviews and focus groups,
she also allowed for the participants to speak freely on the topic. The researcher
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conducted the interviews and focus groups both on and offline. Regarding the online
method, the researcher used Eluminate! software which allowed her to utilize an online
version of a “whiteboard” and text chatting for discussions with participants. The
researcher did not utilize the voice or video capabilities of this software. Regarding the
offline method, the researcher arranged for interviews and focus groups in a safe
environment.
Participant recruitment. Participant recruitment commenced with an email
invitation to friends and family of the researcher to include the nature of the study and
potential harms. Upon participant confirmation that s/he would participate, for both the
online and offline research, the researcher emailed the participant with a link to an online
survey that included the IRB consent form with the following statement: “Please click on
the ‘I have reviewed the IRB consent form and would like to participate in this research’
button below”. The survey also included a few demographic questions such as age,
gender, nationality, and occupation.
The researcher recruited participants that were at least 18 years of age with no
other restrictions as to psychographic or demographic qualifiers. Recruitment included
soliciting friends, family, and personal business contacts of the primary researcher, as
well as reaching out to local organizations such as the Young Entrepreneurs Society and
local Home Owners Associations by contacting the director/manager of these
organizations. The researcher also employed the snowball technique upon completing
the interviews and focus groups with friends, family, and personal business contacts.
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The online method resulted in data transcripts and the offline method resulted in
voice transcripts that the researcher transcribed into text files. All of the electronic files
were named according to the date of the interview/focus group and password protected.
Qualitative research included one in-person focus group with four participants,
one online focus group with three participants, two online interviews, and one openended survey with 46 student respondents.
Lines of questioning. The specific questions for the focus groups and in-depth
interviews included: 1) what does the term, transparency, mean to you? 2) When is
transparency important? 3) and What does it mean for a company to be transparent?
The open-ended surveys included a scenario followed by two open-ended
questions in which respondents were asked to “Imagine you just heard the below
statement made by a CEO of a particular company. Please read the CEO’s statement then
answer the questions that follow”. The statement was: “The goal of this company is to be
transparent with our customers”. This scenario was based on recent comments made by
U.S. President, Barack Obama in which he communicated “transparency” as his goal for
government reform (Obama, 2010). The two questions included: 1) what do you think it
means for a company to be transparent with its customers? And 2) what specific things
could a company do to show its customers that it is transparent?
Sample. The sample for all qualitative research collectively was about 50% male
and ranged in age from 22 to 73 with a mean age of about 24 years old (excluding
outliers from the mean calculation).
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Theme inter-rater reliability. Theme identification and protocol coding was
employed for the qualitative quotes from the interviews, focus groups, and open-ended
surveys. First the researcher examined the transcripts identifying respondent quotes that
matched the emerging themes from the literature review (open/openness,
forthright/forthrightness, and sharing relevant information). A second pass through the
data was then conducted to identify any other common themes, of which there was one.
A fourth theme, “honest/honesty” seemed to appear in the data, and thus it was added to
the theme validation procedure. Finally, a fifth, “other” theme was added to the coding
procedure which allowed the independent judges to account for data that did not seem to
fit into the other themes. The quotes were then presented to independent judges for
theme validation. The judges were told to select only one theme for each quote.
The PRL reliability measure (Rust & Cooil, 1994) was calculated to assess the
inter-rater reliability of the qualitative judgments. The PRL reliability measure was
calculated by dividing the total number of agreements between each pair of judges by the
total number of potential agreements. In this case, there were three judges resulting in a
total of 3 potential agreements per item. Each judge evaluated 24 items for a total of 72
potential agreements. There were a total of 29 agreement pairs resulting in .40 proportion
of inter-judge agreement, which is low. For three judges and five categories, this
corresponds to a PRL reliability of .65 which indicates the inter-rater reliability is
approaching the minimal acceptability of .70 indicated as a “rule of thumb” for
exploratory work (Rust & Cooil, 1994). Disagreements were then resolved through
discussion. There were seven data strings for which the judges did not come to a
consensus. Agreement was reached through discussion for these items. The discussion
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revealed that there was confusion among the judges with regard to which theme several
of the quotes belonged. Recall that the experts were told to assign only one theme per
quote. Several of the quotes clearly belonged to at least two different themes. As an
example, this quote highlights both the “open” and the “forthright” themes:
“Transparency is being upfront and not feeling like you’re getting cheated, or
like a bait and switch; the product you’re buying is what you’re buying and price
isn’t going to go up. I would think it’s everything out on the table. Just open.”
(Female, 33 years old).

Findings from Qualitative Data
The following section presents the quotes that were coded and validated by
independent judges.
Focus groups and in-depth interviews. Specific questions for the focus groups and indepth interviews included: 1) what does the term, transparency, mean to you? 2) When is
transparency important? 3) and What does it mean for a company to be transparent?
Examples of responses coded as ‘openness’ include:
“Transparency is being upfront and not feeling like you’re getting
cheated, or like a bait and switch; the product you’re buying is
what you’re buying and price isn’t going to go up. I would think
it’s everything out on the table. Just open.” (Female, 33 years old).
“The word by itself is ‘see-through’…it’s like a glass building
where everything is see-through…” (Male, 44 years old).
“A company has nothing to hide…it’s the consumer’s ability to
know what they can expect from a company …” (Female, 50-59
years old).
“…shares of itself, open and forward thinking with its sharing of
its culture and how people work and who their employees are,
what they can offer better than someone else…” (Female, 60+
years old).
Examples of responses coded as ‘forthrightness’ include:
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“Transparency is upfront, state it” (Male, 38 years old).
“Straightforward about business and relationships between
customer and buyer” (Female, 30-39 years old).
“Transparency is the company takes it upon themselves to reveal
it” (Female, 33 years old).
Examples of responses coded as referring to sharing relevant information:
“…that’s a good point [that transparency is individual]…in what
area do we want to know more about, what’s sensitive to all of us?
There are buzz words for all of us where we want to know more in
terms of transparency…” (Male, 44 years old).
“It is important for companies to make relevant information
available” (Female, 30-39 years old).
There were three strings of data for which the judges agreed belonged in the “other”
category, which seems to be consistent with the current conceptualization of
transparency. They are:
“It’s taking responsibility for successes and failures” (Male, 40-49
years old).
“Transparency is individual… it comes down to each individual’s
view of the product and what they want” (Male, 38 years old).
“Transparency is knowledge-driven based on the individual and
how it affects them in their day-to-day lives” (Male, 38 years old).

The first item seems to be outside the scope of what the literature and other qualitative
research participants view as transparency. To some degree this response is related to
being forthright if “taking responsibility for successes and failures” is a proactive event.
It could also be related to the open dimension of transparency if one places emphasis on
taking responsibility for “failures”. Alternately, it’s possible that when a stakeholder
perceives a firm is taking responsibility for both successes and failures then this will
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result in increased perceptions of transparency. Finally, the last two statements are
probably most aligned with the “sharing relevant information” theme in that both
statements refer to transparency as a perception of individuals with regard to what is
relevant to them.
Open-ended surveys. The open-ended surveys included a scenario followed by
two open-ended questions in which respondents were asked to “Imagine you just heard
the below statement made by a CEO of a particular company. Please read the CEO’s
statement then answer the questions that follow”. The statement was: “The goal of this
company is to be transparent with our customers”. This scenario was based on recent
comments made by U.S. President, Barack Obama in which he communicated
“transparency” as his goal for government reform (Obama, 2010). The two questions
included: 1) what do you think it means for a company to be transparent with its
customers? And 2) what specific things could a company do to show its customers that it
is transparent?
Examples of responses coded as ‘openness’ include:
“For a company to be transparent it must be honest, open, and
ethical. The company must be willing to share all decision
information” (Male, 23 years old).
“To be transparent, it almost sounds as though they want to be seen
through. Therefore they want all of the different aspects in the
company to be seen by its customers…makes them seem to be
more open to outside view with nothing to hide” (Male, 21 years
old).
“To be transparent with one’s customers to me means to be as open
as possible” (Male, 24 years old).
"Be completely honest, no secrets from the consumers" (Female,
20) .
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Examples of responses coded as ‘forthrightness’ include:
“They were straight forward and truthful about the good and the
bad about the product purchased. There were no hidden tricks or
fine print” (Male, 22 years old).
“Honest and forthright” (Female, 24 years old).
“It means to be true to the customer and upfront” (Male, 22 years
old).
“The company was upfront and honest about their product or
service and what the customer expected the product would
perform, it did” (Male, 23 years old).
“If the company makes a decision then the customers know about
it” (Male, 22 years old).
"They did not give any false expectations. Gave them honest facts
about the product, possibly even subjective point of view. Didn't
hold back any vital information" (Male 22).
Another theme that emerged from the open-ended studies was that participants
seemed to include ‘honesty’ into perceptions of transparency. This is not surprising
based on the literature review that revealed honesty as a potential construct closely
related to transparency. An important note is that the judges were instructed to list only
one theme per data string. Perhaps more of the data would have been coded as “honesty”
if the judges were able to code data as belonging to more than one theme because some
responses fit a combination of categories including ‘open’ and ‘honesty’ and ‘forthright’
and honesty’. An example of data coded as “honesty” includes:

"He thinks the company was honest and open about their product. He
doesn't think they are trying to 'put one over on him' or sell him something
that was falsely represented" (Female 29).
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This theme of honesty also came up in the focus groups and interviews as well:

"It's being open and honest; open in that you know what kind of service
you're going to receive; and far as I'm aware, nobody really likes to call
India and get the runaround, "excuse me, what did you say? can you
repeat that again? No this is what I'm trying to say." (Male, 38 years old)
"Meaning straight forward and honest about business and relationships
between customer and buyer" (Female, 30-39 years old)
"Be completely honest, no secrets from the consumers" (Female, 20)
"They did not give any false expectations. Gave them honest facts about
the product, possibly even subjective point of view. Didn't hold back any
vital information" (Male 22)
"He thinks the company was honest and open about their product. He
doesn't think they are trying to 'put one over on him' or sell him something
that was falsely represented" (Female 29)
"They were straight forward and truthful about the good and the bad about
the product purchased. There were no hidden tricks or fine print" (Male,
22)

Even though many subjects viewed transparency and honesty as being closely related,
many of these same subjects seemed unsure whether the two were one and the same. For
example:
“Does transparency equal truth? I don't know and that's a very good
question. I would like it to, but I don't know if it does. I would hope it
would. What is that line from the movie, Something's Gotta Give where
Jack Nicholson says, ‘I told you some version of the truth’...I don't know
if that's acceptable or not for transparency.” (Female, 60+ years old)

We conceptualize transparency and honesty as two distinct constructs.
Transparency allows one to see things clearly and it encourages "honest behaviors".
However, this does not mean the two constructs are one and the same. As it facilitates
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honest behaviors, it is easy to see why many respondents talked about the two constructs
in the same breath and yet felt unsure if the two were the same. Honesty is referred to as
the degree to which what is said reflects the message sender’s true opinion (Pechmann,
1992) and may be assessments of truthfulness of an advertisement, person, or firm.
According to Plaissance (2007), “one can increase transparency but still provide half
truths…all deception lacks the element of transparency and lack of transparency is a
prerequisite for all deceptive acts” (Plaisance, 2007). When a firm is transparent then
firm behavior should naturally lead to increased honesty.
Summary of Qualitative Research
Conceptualization of the transparency construct was derived based on a review of
the literature, focus groups, interviews, and surveys. To our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to conceptualize transparency utilizing existing literature as a foundation with
qualitative research as a triangulation method for ecological validity.
Final Definition
Based on the emerging themes from the literature review, validation from the
qualitative theme validation, and following MacKenzie’s (2003) guidelines for excellent
construct definition, it seems the initial definition is still relevant. Transparency is
defined as: the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is forthright and
open regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSPARENCY
This chapter will address the following three questions: 1) when are perceptions
of transparency formed in the minds of consumers? 2) What triggers the salience of
transparency perceptions? And 3) what happens when transparency perceptions are
formed? These questions are important to address because they provide a contextual
understanding of when transparency may be especially salient to consumers and hence
relevant to firms. Grounded in Attribution (Weiner, 1986) and Systematic-Heuristic
Processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) Theories, this chapter will also discuss how
transparency may operate to impact important consequences such as reducing consumer
skepticism, and ultimately increasing positive attitudes toward the firm and purchase
intentions. The discussion in this chapter will generally follow Figure 1 in addressing the
above questions. Finally, this chapter will propose a theoretical model of antecedents and
consequences of transparency.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Processing Mechanisms Impacting Perceptions of Transparency
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When are perceptions of transparency formed in the minds of consumers?
As Figure 1 indicates, consumers most likely form perceptions of transparency
during some communication interaction with a firm. A communication interaction is
defined here as a communication event in which information is shared between a firm
and a consumer. The interaction can be between a consumer and any of a firm’s
boundary spanning employees or boundary spanning systems. Boundary spanning
employees include salespeople, customer service representatives, and human resources
personnel. Boundary spanning systems include a firm’s website, automated phone
messages, and email marketing messages.
We can find numerous examples of consumer-to-firm and firm-to-consumer
interactions. With regard to a consumer-firm interaction, a consumer may seek or request
information from a firm’s boundary spanner or system. For example, a consumer may
seek or request information from a salesperson while shopping in a store, from a
customer service representative over the phone, or by surfing the firm’s website.
Information sought might relate to the firm’s products or to the firm’s legal, ethical, and
operating practices. With regard to the firm’s products, a consumer might want to know
specific features, advantages, or benefits of a particular product. With regard to the
firm’s legal, ethical, and operating practices, a consumer may want to know from which
country materials are sourced for a particular product, the manufacturing processes of and
human labor conditions for the product, or to understand the business wealth and health
of a firm. With regard to a firm-consumer communication interaction, a firm may contact
a consumer with product updates, special promotions, and corporate happenings and may
do so by various means such as email, phone, text messaging, and mail. Providing
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information opportunities for the consumer such as maintaining a corporate website,
distributing news releases, or hosting product information seminars or manufacturing
plant tours, are also examples of a firm initiating communication interactions.
The next section discusses objectives for consumer-firm interactions and how the
way in which firms respond to meeting consumer-firm interaction objectives may impact
perceptions of transparency.
Communication interaction objectives. A consumer may initiate an interaction
with a firm to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty about a firm or its products. This is in
line with prior research indicating that uncertainty and ambiguity reduction are two
objectives for communication events (Daft and Lengel 1986). Uncertainty is the absence
of information whereas ambiguity is the absence of knowing what information is
important to the decision making process (Daft & Lengel, 1986). A consumer may seek
to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity by perusing a firm’s website or directly
communicating with the firm through email, instant chat, in person, or by phone and may
seek information about not only favorable aspects of the product or firm, but also
negative aspects of the product or firm. A consumer may want to know the weaknesses
of a product, better understand how a product works or how it’s made, or the reasons
behind a firm’s profit or loss prior to buying the firm’s product or stock.
A consumer who lacks certainty but has no ambiguity knows what information is
important in order to make an informed decision but currently doesn’t possess that
information (Daft & Lengel, 1986). For example, pertaining to company’s product
offerings, s/he may be uncertain about the benefits of a certain product, additional
surcharges, quality levels, and/or guarantees and assurances. Pertaining to the company
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itself, s/he may be uncertain about the company’s reputation, all the different ways the
company is bringing in revenue, the expertise of its staff, and/or which companies are
considered partnering companies, which are customers, and which are competitors.
According to Uncertainty Reduction Theory (Berger and Calabrese 1975), individuals
will increase information seeking behaviors as uncertainty increases. It is proposed that
one way transparency will become salient is when a firm helps or hinders a consumer’s
goal to reduce uncertainty through the firm’s willingness to provide relevant information
to consumers and by sufficiently answering consumers’ questions posed directly to them.
A consumer in an ambiguous communication event may have multiple
interpretations for the information or may lack interpretations altogether. In this
situation, a consumer doesn’t know what questions to ask because s/he is highly confused
and lacks understanding of the information provided (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Unlike
uncertainty reduction behaviors such as asking questions, the consumer must rely on the
firm to help him/her figure out what’s important to the decision making process since the
consumer doesn’t know what questions to ask. Thus it is up to the firm to proactively
provide relevant information to the consumer. It is proposed that transparency will
become salient when the information provided (or not provided) in an open and forthright
manner by a firm helps (or hinders) a consumer’s goal to reduce ambiguity and
uncertainty. Transparency implies the firm will be willing to go beyond simply
responding to questions asked by consumers to proactively providing information,
especially when the consumer lacks sufficient knowledge of the product or firm.
Ambiguity and uncertainty reduction were discussed as two primary objectives
for a consumer when interacting with a firm. However, the firm may have divergent
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goals for a communication interaction. The objective for the firm may be to increase
favorable attitudes toward the firm and ultimately increase sales, hence, rarely will a firm
want to help to reduce consumer ambiguity and/or uncertainty when it means it must go
out of its way or change its processes to do so, and probably especially when it has
negative implications for the firm. Therefore, there exists a gap in communication
objectives. The consumer wants to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, and the firm wants
to help reduce consumer ambiguity and uncertainty but only when it is favorable to the
firm to do so. This gap between what consumers want to know and what firms want to
tell (and how they tell it) is probably where perceptions of transparency become
activated.
The next section discusses the specific processing mechanism that elicits salience
of and impacts perceptions of transparency in a communication interaction.
Disconfirmation of Expectations and Transparency Salience
It is proposed that transparency perceptions become salient when expectations for
a communication interaction have been disconfirmed. Following is a discussion of the
conditions under which prior research suggests expectations are typically disconfirmed,
when transparency may become salient, and the process that makes this happen. The
discussions will follow Figure 1.
Disconfirmation of Expectations. As Figure 1 indicates, it’s likely that
consumers have certain latent expectations toward communicators regarding how they
will behave in a communication interaction, such as how transparent the firm is expected
to be. This is labeled “Latent Expectations for the Communication Outcome”. These
latent expectations can be both related and unrelated to transparency. Expectations refer
to anticipated behavior and are drawn from societal norms, industry norms, and an
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individual’s prior experiences (Burgoon, 1993). For example, a consumer may expect a
car salesman to lack transparency based on prior experience with car salesmen or based
on a perceived industry norm or heuristic that “car salesmen can’t be trusted”. These
expectations are called “latent” because the consumer is not yet cognitively evaluating
the communicator based on these expectations.
Communications literature suggests that latent expectations become salient when
expectations for a communication interaction are “sufficiently discrepant” so as to
reallocate attention from the topic at hand to characteristics of the communicator
(Burgoon, 1993). A communication outcome that is unexpected, negative, or thwarts the
consumer from attaining a desired goal may cause a disconfirmation of expectations
(Fein, 1996; Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985, 1986). Therefore latent transparency
expectations may become salient when 1) the communication interaction is sufficiently
discrepant from what the consumer expects or 2) when the transparent behavior is
unexpected, negative, or hinders the consumer from attaining a desired goal related to the
firm or its products. However, simply disconfirming expectations may not be enough to
make transparency salient. Based on prior research on expectations (Burgoon, 1993;
Oliver & Winer, 1987), a communication outcome must disconfirm expectations beyond
a certain threshold for transparency expectations to become salient. Sufficiently
discrepant (Burgoon, 1993) implies that for the transparency discrepancy to become
salient the discrepancy must be outside of some tolerable boundary, or outside the
consumer’s zone of tolerance or threshold for transparency. This is reflected via the
“Compare with thresholds” box in Figure 1. The consumer expectations literature
seconds these ideas that 1) expectations do not become salient and processed until
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disconfirmed and 2) there exists a “tolerable range” from which, outside this range,
causes ‘surprise’, orientation toward, and elaboration upon the discrepancy (Oliver &
Winer, 1987).
Figure 1 shows that latent expectations for a communication outcome and
perceptions of the communication outcome are used as inputs in determining an
expectation disconfirmation for the interaction. As Figure 1 indicates, expectations may
or may not be disconfirmed. If expectations have not been disconfirmed, then a
consumer may still form judgments and evaluations (i.e. consumer skepticism, trust,
attitudes, and purchase intention) toward the firm. However, they will be based on
previously formed perceptions of transparency, rather than on transparency perceptions
formed directly from the communication interaction; and this will occur via spontaneous
processing. Spontaneous processing is an automatic activation of attitudes from memory
without conscious effort (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In other words,
whatever attitudes the consumer held prior to the interaction about the firm, its products,
and/or toward advertisers in general, it will be those same attitudes that will be used in
impacting consumer skepticism, attitudes toward the firm, and ultimately whether or not
the consumer intends to purchase from the firm. According to dual processing theories,
spontaneous processing is expected to occur when intention to form an impression is
absent for a particular event (Uleman, 1999; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008), such
is the case when no expectations have been disconfirmed. When spontaneous processing
is at work, attitudes toward a target in a given situation are formed based more on
existing attitudes and less on situational information. This is indicated in Figure 1 by the
box labeled “Stored Attitudes Remain Unchanged to Impact Consequences”. In sum,
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spontaneous processing will occur when expectations have not been disconfirmed
resulting in stored attitudes impacting judgments.
When expectations have been disconfirmed the next process involves determining
what exactly about the interaction has disconfirmed expectations. This is represented
with the “Transparency expectation disconfirmation?” process diamond in Figure 1.
When expectation disconfirmations are unrelated to transparency then attitudes toward
whatever cue has disconfirmed the expectation will be used to impact consequences
toward the firm. This is represented via the “Non-Transparency Related Expectation
Disconfirmations Impact Consequences” box in Figure 1. Note that these two cases in
which either 1) expectations have not been disconfirmed, or 2) expectations have been
disconfirmed but the disconfirmation is unrelated to transparency, are outside of the
scope of this dissertation because the focal judgment is unrelated to transparency. Thus
further discussion of these process mechanisms will not be reviewed in further detail.
For those disconfirmations in which transparency is the cause of the
disconfirmation, the next process step is a comparison of the level of transparency
disconfirmation to some tolerable transparency threshold within the consumer. This is
represented by the “Compare with thresholds” process diamond in Figure 1. Inasmuch as
the transparency discrepancy falls outside of some acceptable threshold, the transparency
discrepancy should become salient and this is shown in Figure 1 via the “Active/salient
expectations related to transparency” box. This is consistent with literature that states
disconfirmations will become salient above a certain threshold or zone of tolerance
(Burgoon, 1993; Oliver & Winer, 1987). Inasmuch as transparency disconfirmations fall
within some acceptable threshold then the transparency disconfirmation will remain
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latent, and this is shown via the “Transparency cue unconsciously impacts consequences”
box in Figure 1.
Three types of information processing may operate to impact perceptions of firm
transparency and other distal consequences. The three types are nonconscious heuristic
route processing, conscious heuristic route processing, and conscious systematic route
processing. Following is a discussion of each and their impact on how perceptions are
processed to form perceptions of firm transparency.
Systematic-Heuristic Processing
Overview. The Systematic-Heuristic processing model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999),
a dual route processing theory, is one theory that can help explain how transparency
operates to impact and change consumer attitudes and behavioral responses. This theory
suggests that transparency may affect the amount and direction of attitude change in three
ways. First, transparency may have effects through systematic route processing in which
a consumer engages in effortful focusing and elaboration on transparency of the firm to
form attitudes. Second, transparency may have effects through heuristic route processing
in which a consumer uses contextual cues or heuristics related to transparency to form
attitudes, rather than engaging in an effortful elaboration of the message as in systematic
route processing. Third, the route that is the least commonly talked about is
nonconscious processing of heuristic cues which are used nonconsciously to form
attitudes. Each processing route can impact attitudes, however, attitudes formed based on
systematic route processing tend to be more enduring and stable as compared to those
formed based on heuristic route processing. Two major tenets of the SystematicHeuristic theory is that 1) consumers want to hold correct attitudes, however, 2) the
extent to which they are willing and able to engage in effortful elaboration depends on
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motivation and ability in a given context (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Systematic route
processing is said to occur when motivation and ability are high, whereas heuristic route
processing is said to occur when motivation and/or ability are low. Although both
heuristic and systematic processing may be used in conjunction to form attitudes, the
likelihood that heuristic route processing will occur is greater as motivation and ability
decrease in a given situation; and likewise, the likelihood that systematic route processing
will occur is greater as motivation and ability increase in a given situation. Thus,
motivation and ability are key determinants in predicting which processing route will be
used in a given situation. Figure 1 illustrates this point. The “Motivation &/or ability to
resolve discrepancy?” diamond indicates that one must be sufficiently motivated and/or
able to resolve the transparency disconfirmation.
Communication outcomes may be either congruent or incongruent for consumers
who come into the communication interaction with either positive or negative attitudes
toward the firm. Congruent outcomes include when 1) a disliked firm negatively
disconfirms expectations by being less transparent than expected or 2) a liked firm
positively disconfirms expectations by being more transparent than expected.
Incongruent outcomes include when 1) a disliked firm positively disconfirms
expectations by being more transparent than expected or 2) a liked firm negatively
disconfirms expectations by being less transparent than expected. In these four cases,
motivation to resolve transparency discrepancies may be impacted. Motivation to resolve
the discrepancy will be less with congruent outcomes compared to incongruent ones.
When incongruent outcomes occur, defense motivation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) may
‘kick in’ whereby existing attitudes are defended by either extending or shortening the
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information processing route. For example, if a liked firm negatively disconfirms
expectations or a disliked firm positively disconfirms expectations, a consumer may
attempt to keep his/her existing attitude by engaging in systematic processing hoping to
find evidence that is in sync with prior attitudes. On the other hand, for congruent
outcomes such as when a liked firm positively disconfirms expectations or a disliked firm
negatively disconfirms expectations, the firm’s behavior will reflect existing consumer
attitudes and so consumers may attempt to defend these existing attitudes by using less
information in the evaluation process, thus resulting in a shorter, heuristic, information
processing route. This is consistent with the Heuristic-Systematic Model which predicts
“defense-motivated individuals will process information selectively, in a way that best
satisfies defense concerns” (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). This explanation may help to
address why consumers respond to congruent outcomes by saying “that figures”, “I’m not
surprised”, or “that makes sense” without questioning the situational factors that may
have led to the outcome.
Conscious heuristic route processing. Without motivation and/or ability, the
consumer is likely to engage in a less effortful process in evaluating a firm’s
transparency, which may occur through conscious heuristic route processing.
“Conscious” implies that transparency expectations are active and salient at this
processing stage inasmuch as the expectation disconfirmation was outside of the zone of
tolerance. Both congruent and incongruent outcomes must be outside of the zone of
tolerance for transparency expectations to become active and salient. The impact of
conscious heuristic route processing on perceived transparency of the firm is indicated by
the “Transparency Cue Consciously Impacts Perceptions” box in Figure 1. A consumer
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may rely on previously formed attitudes that are used as cognitive elaboration short-cuts
to attitude formation. For example, one might apply the heuristic, “if the firm is making
me put in a lot of effort to get answers I need then it must not want to be transparent with
me” or “if the firm is providing me with information that could negatively impact its
sales then it really must want to be transparent”. Here the transparency cue is used in
conscious heuristic processing as the person is not asking why the firm provided them
with a lot of information or why the firm did not provide them with a lot of information.
The processing of attributions (the ‘why’ questions) is a key distinction between
conscious heuristic route processing and systematic processing (systematic processing is
discussed on page 83 and represented in Figure 1). Without effortful elaboration (of the
attributions), the valence of disconfirmation will also likely have a direct impact on
perceptions of firm transparency (without considering moderation of perceived motives
for firm transparency). For example, negative disconfirmations in which the firm is less
transparent than expected will likely result in negative transparency perceptions of the
firm. Likewise, positive disconfirmations in which the firm is more transparent than
expected will likely result in positive transparency perceptions of the firm.
Nonconscious heuristic processing. Unlike with conscious heuristic processing,
with nonconscious processing, transparency cues impact consequences (i.e. consumer
skepticism, trust, attitudes toward the firm, and purchase intention) directly without the
consumer being aware it was transparency that was the influencing factor (Chen &
Chaiken, 1999). Figure 1 indicates that when a transparency discrepancy is within a
certain threshold then the transparency cue (which caused the expectation
disconfirmation) will nonconsciously impact consequences. Here, it is posited that
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because transparency perceptions are still outside of awareness and have not been
activated, then nonconscious processing will impact consumer skepticism etc. directly
bypassing altogether the conscious process of making transparency evaluations. It is
suggested that the transparency cue will act as a prime residing below the surface of
consumer awareness to influence attitudes and behaviors (Bargh, 2002). Therefore there
are two major differences between conscious and nonconscious heuristic route
processing. First, consumers will be aware of the transparency cue’s effects with
conscious processing and unaware of transparency cue’s effects with nonconscious
processing. Second, the transparency cue will impact consequences mediated by
perceptions of firm transparency when processed consciously, whereas the transparency
cue will impact consequences directly when processed nonconsciously. This is
represented in Figure 1.
Systematic route processing. Systematic processing is a conscious process
inasmuch as extensive cognitive processing occurs (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). As
previously noted, when motivation and/or ability is sufficiently high, systematic
processing will be used to engage in a more effortful evaluation of the firm’s
transparency, which one type of effortful evaluation is making attributions about a firm’s
transparency and the motives for its behaviors. When expectations have been sufficiently
disconfirmed, then deliberative processing is activated and attitudes toward a target in a
given situation are formed based on a more deliberate evaluation of situational
information and less on chronic constructs. In other words, consumers engaged in
systematic route processing are more likely to scrutinize the situation and context in
which the firm has disconfirmed expectations. Prior research has found that consumers
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engaged in systematic route processing may engage in a causal search to understand why
expectations have not been met (Wong & Weiner, 1981) and/or to understand what the
motives are of the firm for acting a certain way (Friestad & Wright, 1994). A causal
search includes questioning what about the interaction is unexpected, negative, or
hindered goal achievement, as well as assessing who is responsible for the outcome,
what, if anything, could have been done differently, and the frequency with which the
outcome is expected to reoccur in the future (Weiner, 1985). This process is called
causal reasoning in which the consumer attempts to attribute the firm’s behavior to a
specific cause (Weiner, 1985). The attribution process helps consumers to form accurate
judgments and to assess appropriate avoidance or approach behaviors toward the firm in
the future (Weiner, 1986). Figure 1 illustrates the process of conscious systematic
processing which begins with the consumer having sufficient motivation and/or ability to
resolve the transparency discrepancy. The proposition that consumers will attempt to
resolve the transparency discrepancy via causal reasoning is indicated with the box
labeled “Attributions”. The proposition that consumers use attributions to form
perceptions of transparency is indicated by an arrow from “Attributions” to “Perceived
transparency of firm” in Figure 1.
The Systematic-Heuristic model was used to suggest three types of processing
which may impact perceptions of transparency and other consequences such as consumer
skepticism, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention. It was also argued that
consumers will engage in causal reasoning via attributions to make sense of, and resolve,
the expectation disconfirmation. Next is a more detailed review of Attribution Theory
and its implications on perceived firm transparency.
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Figure 1 shows how systematic processing by way of attributions will operate for
both positive and negative disconfirmations.
Attribution Theory, Persuasion Knowledge Model, and Motives
Attribution Theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980) and the Persuasion Knowledge
Model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) help to explain consumer reactions to marketer
behaviors, and in particular, moderating effects of transparency on consumer attitudes
and intentions. Attribution Theory presumes that consumers often seek to explain others'
behaviors by attributing the behavior to certain causes (Friestad & Wright, 1994; Kelley
& Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1985, 1986). Attribution Theory is the guiding theory for the
Persuasion Knowledge model which suggests that for a persuasion episode consumers
use what they know about the topic, persuasive tactics, and the actor to cope with and
react to persuasive attempts. Both Attribution Theory and the Persuasion Knowledge
Model suggest that people use what they know to make causal attributions about firm
behaviors. Additionally, both propose that causal attributions impact consumer attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors. One type of attribution that is investigated in the Persuasion
Knowledge Model literature is motives. For example, some researchers have found that
consumers tend to react more positively toward the firm when the firm’s behaviors are
attributed to other-serving motives rather than self-serving motives (Forehand & Grier,
2003). This suggests that consumers must perceive a firm’s transparency to be motivated
by other-serving motives such as helping customers, rather than self-serving motives such
as increasing sales for transparency, to have a maximum impact on reducing skepticism,
and increasing trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention.
The next section presents the hypothetical model of antecedents and consequences
of firm transparency.
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Proposed Theoretical Model
Ultimately it is proposed that transparency will impact attitudes toward the firm
and purchase intention. Also proposed are a few intermediary constructs by which
transparency influences attitudes toward the firm and purchase behavior, of which there
are two: consumer skepticism and trust. Figure 2 illustrates the proposed model.
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Figure 2: Proposed Theoretical Model
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Antecedents of Transparency
Consumer effort. Consumer effort is conceptualized as the amount of effort a
consumer perceives s/he has to exert in order to find and understand relevant information
that the firm shares with consumers. Findings from the literature review conducted in
this dissertation suggest that simply disclosing information is not enough to warrant
perceptions of transparency; rather it must be disclosed in a way that makes it easy for
consumers to find and learn. Firms must make it easy to learn about the company. For
example, authors note that information provided to stakeholders should be clear and easy
to understand (Blackshaw, 2008), comparable (Nielsen & Madsen, 2009), provided
without delay (Hofstede, 2003), and convenient and easy to retrieve (McKay, 2008).
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) publishes a reporting framework that helps
firms become more transparent. This framework provides guidelines for disclosing
information so as to be transparent. The GRI suggests reporting information that is
relevant, complete, accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a format and
language appropriate for the audience (Bainbridge, 2009; GRI, 2006). The qualitative
research from Chapter 3 included the following question “what stood out to you about
this website?”. Subjects made a few similar comments related to what and how
information was provided. Out of 59 respondents, more than half (32) mentioned at least
one of the information-related characteristics suggested by the GRI to impact
transparency. Specifically:


Seven respondents mentioned that information should be easy to find.



Eleven respondents mentioned that the information should be complete.



Nine respondents mentioned that the information shared should be clear,
concise, and/or with no “fine print”.
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Six respondents mentioned the information should be immediate/timely
and/or relevant.

Upon a close review of these characteristics, one commonality seems to exist.
Each may impact perceptions of transparency by way of reducing consumer effort. For
example, the more a firm discloses information that is ‘clear’, the less effort the consumer
will have to expend to understand it; and inasmuch as ‘clear’ information reduces
consumer ambiguity and uncertainty about the firm (or its products) then the more the
consumer should perceive the firm as transparent. The same logic can apply for the rest
of the disclosure characteristics as well and therefore the consumer effort construct
relates to consumer effort toward finding relevant information (is the information easily
accessible and complete?) and understanding the information provided (is it in a language
and format that is easily understood?). It is proposed that consumer effort negatively
impacts perceptions of transparency, such that as consumer effort goes up, perceptions of
firm transparency will go down.

H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a firm has a negative effect
on perceptions of transparency.

Reciprocity. Reciprocity is the extent to which a communication episode is
perceived to be reciprocal or allow for mutual conversation or mutual action (Johnson,
Bruner II, & Kumar, 2006). Many modes of communication (websites, toll free
numbers, instant chatting, etc.) enable reciprocal communication. Other features which
may elicit perceptions of reciprocity include contact information such as phone numbers,
email addresses, and mailing addresses, and feedback mechanisms such as virtual
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suggestion boxes, blogs, content search functionality, and frequently asked questions
(FAQs). Perceived reciprocity is proposed as an antecedent of transparency. Consider a
website that allows for no opportunity to communicate with the firm – no contact phone
numbers, email addresses, mailing addresses, chatting systems, or feedback mechanisms
are provided on the website. Now contrast this website with one that allows for multiple
opportunities to communicate with a firm. Should these two websites elicit different
transparency perceptions? Several transparency researchers (Hultman & Axelsson,
2007; Lazarus & McManus, 2006) have correlated reciprocity with transparency stating
that transparency is "about" two-way communication. For example, the AMA (2010)
cites that one way marketers can be more transparent with consumers is by being willing
to accept customer feedback. And yet other researchers state that transparency is about
having "dialogue" with stakeholders (Lazarus and McManus 2006), and "sharing
information" between partners (Hultman and Axelsson 2007) which suggests openness.
Accepting feedback, having dialogue, and sharing information requires that marketers
provide consumers with channels to communicate with them, which is reciprocity.
Therefore, reciprocity facilitates transparency and it is suggested that reciprocity
positively impacts perceptions of transparency. This may be especially true when
consumers do not have much prior experience related to the firm’s transparency.

H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on perceptions of
transparency.
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Information perceived as firm-damaging. Information perceived as firmdamaging is conceptualized here as the extent to which a consumer perceives that a firm
is willingly providing negative information about itself or about its products. It is
proposed that information provided by a firm that is considered by a consumer to be
potentially damaging to the firm will increase perceptions that the firm is transparent
(assuming that information reduces ambiguity and/or uncertainty and the firm is not
perceived as having any ulterior motives in providing the information). Consumers
probably expect firms to communicate favorable messages about its products or about it,
spin responses to consumer requests so as to create the most favorable impression
possible, and to communicate favorable messages and omit unfavorable ones. Therefore,
what happens when a firm communicates messages perceived as unfavorable to the firm?
Two-sided messages, in which both favorable and unfavorable aspects of a product are
communicated in advertising, are reported to increase source credibility, attitude toward
the brand, attitude toward the ad, and purchase intention (Eisend, 2006), and the effects
of source credibility are amplified when the negative information in the ad is perceived as
being shared voluntarily (Eisend, 2006). Two-sided ads generally are contrived to
persuade consumers to buy a firm’s products and thus are not really providing potentially
damaging information about a firm or a product, but research in this area may still lend
some support for the positive effects of communicating potentially damaging information
on transparency perceptions.
Suppose a consumer searching for store cleanliness on a fast food restaurant’s
corporate website finds that the restaurant has provided this information and it is quite
negative (i.e. 40% of the restaurants were given a rating of C or worse by the Health
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Department). Inasmuch as the unfavorable information is perceived as potentially
damaging to the firm (i.e. customers may not eat there anymore or may engage in
negative word of mouth to friends and family), consumers may perceive the firm to be
more transparent when providing unfavorable information as compared to favorable
information. This may be so because providing information that may have negative
consequences to the firm should be perceived as the firm being especially willing to be
open and forthright (transparent) with customers.

H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as firm-damaging has a
positive effect on perceptions of transparency.

Consequences of Transparency
Consumer skepticism . Skepticism refers to both a disposition (Campbell &
Kirmani, 2008) and an enduring and stable trait (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) that
reflects a consumer’s disbelief of marketer actions (Forehand & Grier, 2003). This
dissertation focuses on skepticism in terms of a trait which references a generalized and
stable level of doubt and uncertainty that exists within consumers. This presence of
doubt and uncertainty has been shown to exist even when consumers know that firms are
being honest (Darke & Ritchie, 2007). Thus skepticism levels are generally stable across
firms and across marketing messages. When skepticism is present, consumers are on
guard against firms’ persuasion attempts (Darke & Ritchie, 2007). Skeptical consumers
may be prone to disproving marketing messages by counter-arguing the favorable merits
of a marketing message with unfavorable ones. They may also be especially prone to
requiring evidence that a marketer’s claim is true.
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Consumers are generally skeptical of firms, business practices, and advertisers in
general (Darke & Ritchie, 2007) and they hold consistent, trait-like, internal active
attitude scripts such as: “I don’t trust marketers”, “I don’t believe what companies tell
me”, and “companies lie” to name a few, and these negative attitudes apply not only
toward the offending firm but also generalizes toward other firms. By being transparent,
firms may be able to reduce consumer skepticism by disconfirming “schemer schemas”
(Friestad & Wright, 1994) that consumers hold about marketers. To consumers
transparency suggests that a firm has nothing to hide. Similar to a glass building in
which everything inside of it is visible, a transparent firm openly shares information
about itself, whether good or bad, acting as an “advocate” (Urban, 2003) for its
customers. As a result, transparency should reduce disbelief and doubt. Transparency is
hypothesized to reduce consumer skepticism.

H4: Perceived transparency has a negative effect on consumer skepticism.
Trust. Trust is defined here as confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and
integrity (Ahearne et al., 2007; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Yim et al., 2008). Trust is a
key mediating variable (KMV) between firm actions and stakeholder actions (Morgan &
Hunt, 1994). Trust implies that one is willing to assume the risk that goes along with
taking action based on the reliance of another (Stanley, Meyer, & Topolnytsky, 2005).
Therefore a consumer that is trusting of a firm will be more likely to assume the risk
inherent in relying on a firm’s marketing messages as input in the purchase decisionmaking process. As previously noted, skeptical consumers are more likely to have a
generalized disbelief of marketer actions, and thus are less likely to trust firms’ marketing
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messages. Therefore, when skepticism is present, consumers increase the vigilance with
which consumers protect themselves from blindly trusting firms. When skepticism is
absent, consumers may decrease their protection mechanisms (such as counter-arguing
claims), and allow themselves to more ‘blindly’ trust a firm’s marketing messages.
Conceptual, empirical and practitioner literature suggests that trust may be a
consequence of transparency (Bryant, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al.,
2009; Rawlins, 2008). For example, Urban (2009) suggests that transparency impacts
trust, it’s important to building trust, and a “lack of transparency can be a ‘trust buster’”.
Others note that transparency is needed to create a sense of trustworthiness (Lazarus &
McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009) and “transparency is the necessary ingredient for
the development of trustworthy and accountable institutions” (Vaccaro & Madsen,
2009b).
Transparency may engender trust especially when it is seen to weaken a firm’s
persuasion abilities. According to the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad & Wright,
1994), both consumers and firms use their knowledge of each other, the situation, and
persuasion tactics to cope with and react to each other’s persuasive attempts. This is
much like what happens in a negotiation setting in which both negotiators use all the
information available to them about the other negotiator, his/her situation, and the
persuasion tactics being used to attain his/her goal.

Thus negotiation literature may

provide some insight into the relationship between transparency and trust. One study
shows in a negotiation context that being transparent (by disclosing potentially damaging
information to one’s negotiation power) impacts liking and trust for the negotiator
(Paese, Schreiber, & Taylor, 2003). The authors of this study note that the discloser
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“may have appeared to weaken his/her bargaining position for the sake of being honest”
(Paese et al., 2003).
Finally, in a study investigating consumer acceptance of start-up firms, DeKinder
and Kohli (2008) infer that consumers may interpret transparency as an indication of a
firm’s trustworthiness, especially in the absence of other referential information such as
prior experiences with the firm (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008). Formally:

H5: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on trust.

It is proposed that transparency will also have direct effects on attitudes toward
the firm and purchase intentions. This may be the case especially when transparency is
used to infer product quality. There will always be some level of uncertainty regarding
product quality until one actually tries the product and verifies the product quality for
him/herself (Dawar & Parker, 1994). Therefore transparency may be one signal used by
consumers to infer product quality. Other signals of unobservable product quality
include brand name, low short term introductory prices, high long term prices, warranties,
money back guarantees (Kirmani & Rao, 2000), firm reputation (Dawar & Parker, 1994),
and brand advertising (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986).
Researchers propose that product quality signaling refers to a “rational consumer
who expects a firm to honor the implicit commitment conveyed through a signal because
not honoring the commitment is economically unwise” (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).
Transparency as a signal suggests that a firm is open and forthright with regard to both
positive and negative information about itself and about its products. When firms adopt
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transparency into their culture it may force a higher standard of product quality because
the firm knows it will be required to communicate the quality level of its products if
prompted to do so; and communicating that the product is of poor quality risks a loss in
sales. With this in mind, consumers may infer that transparent firms hold themselves to a
higher standard of product quality and may base attitudes toward the firm and purchase
intention on transparency as a product quality signal. Following is a more detailed
discussion of the relationship between attitude toward the firm, purchase intention, and
transparency.
Attitude toward the firm. Attitude toward the firm is defined as a consumer’s
“overall global expression of favorable or unfavorable feelings” toward the firm and is
generally expressed in terms of liking/disliking and good/bad (Hair, Bush, & Ortinau,
2009).
The interaction between a firm and consumers can be characterized as one where
one side may attempt to persuade the other to achieve their goals while the other side uses
their knowledge of such tactics to accept or reject such attempts in an effort to get the
best possible outcome for themselves (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). This is very similar
to what happens in negotiations between two parties therefore negotiation literature may
aid in understanding the relationship between transparency and attitudes toward the firm.
Negotiation literature shows that negotiators who have “inside” information feel more
successful in negotiations compared to negotiators who do not have inside information
(Brodt, 1994). This is relevant because transparency ensures “inside” information is
made known for the consumer to see. Interestingly, this study also shows that the success
metric used by negotiators differs depending on whether the negotiator has the inside
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information or not. In particular, negotiators who do not have the inside information base
their success evaluation more on price (indicated by a significant negative correlation
between price and success evaluation, p<.01). On the other hand, negotiators who have
the inside information base their success evaluation more on some interpersonal standard
of fairness (indicated by a non-significant correlation between price and success
evaluation, p<.42) (Brodt, 1994). Transparent firms are those that share information that
ordinarily may not be shared. Firms that are transparent will allow consumers to see
processes behind the firm’s decisions. To some degree this indicates that firms may
benefit from being transparent via customers basing their attitudes on fairness standards
rather than on price alone which is important in creating value. Finally, this study also
shows that when buyers have inside information, both buyers and sellers shared feelings
of success (Brodt, 1994) making it a “win-win” for both parties. Paralleling the
negotiation literature findings, transparent firms are those that allow consumers to feel
successful in their interactions with firms by being open and forthright, and this may lead
to positive attitudes toward the firm.
Thus it is proposed (and illustrated in H6) that transparency has a direct effect on
attitudes toward the firm.

H6: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on attitudes toward the firm.
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Purchase Intention. According to Ajzen (1991), “intentions are assumed to
capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how
hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in
order to perform the behavior. Literature has shown that consumers’ behavioral
intentions are influenced by the evaluations that consumers make about firms (Fernandes
& Proenca, 2008; Gremler & Gwinner, 2000; Holzwarth, Janiszewski, & Neumann,
2006). Generally, positive evaluations should increase such behaviors, and likewise,
negative evaluations should decrease such behaviors (Ajzen, 1991).
Transparency implies that firms will go the “extra mile” to ensure consumers are
well-informed. Researchers have found that consumers reward firms for extra effort and
extra effort is a significant predictor of likelihood of patronage, attitude toward
salespersons, increased willingness to pay, and more positive overall ratings (Morales,
2005). Transparency is a positive evaluation of a firm which is hypothesized to increase
purchase intention. Thus it is proposed (and illustrated in H7) that transparency has a
direct effect on purchase intention over and above the mediating effects.

H7: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on purchase intention.

Mediators. It is proposed that consumer skepticism and trust mediate the
relationships of transparency and consumer’s attitude toward the firm and transparency
and purchase intention. This mediating relationship is in addition to the direct effects of
transparency on attitude and purchase intention. If a marketer can positively influence
consumer skepticism and trust, then this should have a positive effect on the perception

100

of the company and its products. It has been widely shown that attitudes toward
attributes of an object impact overall attitudes toward that object and subsequent
behavioral intentions toward the object (Ajzen, 1991). Generally, less skeptical
consumers should hold more favorable attitudes toward the firm and should be more
likely to want to purchase from it (Darke & Ritchie, 2007; DeCarlo, 2005; Friestad &
Wright, 1994; Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) . In an
environment where skepticism of marketing actions is prevalent, it is reasonable to
assume that consumers are more likely to want to buy from firms perceived to be
transparent and less likely to want to buy from firms lacking transparency, assuming
same situation and constraints on both firms. Transparency should instill confidence in
one’s decisions and thus enable him/her to make a purchase (Urban, Amyx, & Lorenzon,
2009). Likewise, consumers who perceive firms to be more trustworthy should hold
more favorable attitudes toward it and should be more likely to purchase from it.

H8: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated
by (a) consumer skepticism and (b) trust.
H9: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially mediated by (a)
consumer skepticism and (b) trust.

Finally, attitude toward the firm should have positive impact on purchase
intention. This relationship of attitudes impacting intentions are well established (Ajzen,
1991; Holzwarth et al., 2006).

H10: The impact of attitude toward the firm should positively impact purchase
intention.
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Moderating role of perceived motives. Finally, it is proposed that perceived
motives will moderate the relationships of transparency and skepticism and transparency
and trust. This dissertation proposes that transparency should have a fairly strong impact
in reducing consumer skepticism and increasing trust without considering the impact of
perceived firm motives. Taking into account perceived motives, the strength of the
relationships will be less when the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived as
firm-serving compared to when these motives are perceived as other-serving. These
effects are shown in Figures 3 and 4. For example, Figure 3 shows skepticism as a
function of transparency and the two lines sloping down and to the right have different
slopes under conditions of high perceived firm transparency. Conversely, Figure 4 shows
trust as a function of transparency and the two lines sloping up and to the right have
different slopes under conditions of high perceived firm transparency.
According to the literature stream grounded in the Persuasion Knowledge Model
(Friestad & Wright, 1994) when motives of a firm are salient to the consumer, the
consumer reacts with resistance, or coping behaviors, to what might be perceived as
persuasion attempts. Generally, the types of motives can be categorized as either firmserving or other-serving (Forehand & Grier, 2003). Firm-serving motives are those in
which a firm’s behaviors are perceived to benefit the firm. Other-serving motives are
those in which a firm’s behaviors are perceived to benefit others. Perceptions of firmserving motives have been found to decrease: perceptions of salesperson sincerity
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000), attitude toward a firm’s corporate social responsibility
efforts (Menon & Varadarajan, 1992), attitude toward the brand, firm, and communicator
(Wei et al., 2008), and purchase intention (Ashley & Leonard, 2009).
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Formally:
H11: The influence of transparency on (a) consumer skepticism and (b) and trust is
moderated by perceived motives.
Specifically, it is proposed that the impact of transparency on skepticism will be greater
with perceptions of other-serving motive attributions than with perceptions of firmserving motive attributions. Likewise, the impact of transparency on trust will be greater
with perceptions of other-serving motive attributions than with perceptions of firmserving motive attributions. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this interaction.

Figure 3: Interaction of Transparency and Motives on Consumer Skepticism
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Figure 4: Interaction of Transparency and Motives on Trust

Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses proposed in this chapter.
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Table 4: List of Hypotheses
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a firm has a negative effect on perceptions of
transparency.
H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on perceptions of transparency.
H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as firm-damaging has a positive effect on
perceptions of transparency.
H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on consumer skepticism.
H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on trust.
H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on attitudes toward the firm.
H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on purchase intention.
H8: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated by (a) consumer
skepticism and (b) trust.
H9: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially mediated by (a) consumer skepticism
and (b) trust.
H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on purchase intention.
H11: The influence of transparency on (a) consumer skepticism and (b) and trust is moderated by
perceived firm motives. Specifically, when the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived to be
firm-serving, the effect of transparency on skepticism will be less than when the motives are perceived
as other-serving. When the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived to be firm-serving, the
effect of transparency on trust will be less than when the motives are perceived as other-serving.

Chapter Summary
Following the flow of Figures of 1 and 2, this chapter addressed three questions.
First, when are perceptions of transparency formed in the minds of consumers? It was
proposed that perceptions of transparency are formed during a communication interaction
with firms in which a consumer has the goal to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty toward
the firm or its products. Several transparency cues were proposed as antecedents to
perceptions of transparency including consumer effort, reciprocity, and firm
communication of information perceived as firm-damaging.
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Second, what triggers perceptions of transparency to become salient? It was
proposed that expectation disconfirmations above a certain threshold activate
transparency perceptions. Below the threshold, transparency cues were proposed to
affect attitudes toward the firm and purchase intention by way of nonconscious heuristic
processing. Above the threshold, transparency cues were proposed to affect perceived
transparency of the firm in one of two possible ways. The first is by conscious heuristic
processing which was proposed to occur given no motivation or ability to resolve the
expectation disconfirmation. The second is by systematic processing which was
proposed to occur by way of attribution causal reasoning, given sufficient motivation or
ability to resolve the expectation disconfirmation.
The final question this chapter addressed was what are some consequences of
transparency? Several consequences of transparency were proposed. Transparency was
proposed to reduce consumer skepticism, and increase perceptions of trust, attitude
toward the firm, and purchase intention. Also introduced were motive attributions as a
moderator influencing the impact of transparency perceptions on consumer skepticism
and trust.
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CHAPTER 5: SCALE DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of Chapter 5 is to develop the transparency scale. There are two
main studies in this chapter with a few phases within each study. Study 1 consists of
three phases: 1) scale item generation and testing the face validity of those scale items to
be applied in the subsequent phase, 2) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the
underlying dimensions of transparency and to reduce the number of indicators, and 3)
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to validate the psychometric properties of the scale
developed through the EFA and to test its predictive and nomological validities. Study 2
is dedicated to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric
properties and validity.
The procedure for developing the transparency scale follows accepted scale
development procedures found in marketing and psychology literatures (Churchill, 1979;
Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Spector, 1992; Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann, 2003;
Walsh & Beatty, 2007). Subjects for all of the studies are undergraduate business
students. Subjects were not permitted to participate in more than one data collection
therefore all of the subjects were unique across each data collection, and this includes the
data collections for the pretests.
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Study 1
Phase 1
Phase 1 included scale item generation and initial purification of scale items.
Procedure. First a pool of scale items were drawn from the literature review,
focus groups, interviews, and open-ended surveys. The literature and transcripts from the
qualitative research were coded into themes. The theme coding procedure and associated
theme validation procedure is discussed in detail in chapter 3. The preliminary pool of
items included 34 statements intended to reflect the transparency definition.
This initial set of items was reviewed for readability and clarity by four
independent judges (Marketing Ph.D. students). Each judge was provided with the
definition of transparency and was asked to rate each scale item as either “clearly
representative”, “somewhat representative”, or “not representative” of the transparency
definition provided. This process is consistent with other scale development research
(Bruner & Kumar, 2007; Walsh & Beatty, 2007).
A scale item was either deleted or modified based on feedback if it was not
consistently rated “clearly representative”. There were several cases in which a scale item
was rated by half of the judges as “clearly representative” and by the other half of the
judges as “somewhat representative”. In total there were six scale items that were either
deleted or modified based on these criteria. The scale item, “This company explains its
decisions to me” is one example in which the judges were split between “somewhat
representative” and “clearly representative”. One judge commented:
“A company may be transparent but not have the resources to explain
its decisions to customers”.
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The item was modified to explicitly reflect a willingness to explain decisions: “This
company is willing to explain its decisions to me”. The scale item, “I know what to
expect when I deal with this company” is an example of one that was deleted from the
set. One judge commented:
“The company could be transparent and it would not guarantee that
you would know what to expect during your interactions,
transparency would help though.”
The judges had two additional tasks. Judges were also asked to identify items
which were unclear or ambiguous and to provide suggestions for improving the scale
item’s clarity. The judges provided a few suggestions. For example, two judges
commented regarding the scale item, “When the company makes a decision, I know
about it”:
“Could ‘I know about it’ be understood as it's the stakeholder's
responsibility to go find the info?”
“The information may be out there for major decisions but it is
unrealistic to think that consumers can or should know all of the
decisions that are made.”
The scale item was modified to: “When the company makes decisions, it affords me the
opportunity to know about it”. There was also a scale item that asked subjects to respond
to a company’s “behavior” (“This company tries to hide its bad behavior”). Given
concern that this term would cause confusion with subjects, “behavior” was changed to
“the things that it does” (“This company tries to hide the bad things that it does”).
Finally, judges were asked to provide additional scale items that they believed
would represent the transparency definition if they thought of any while participating in
the content validitation of the pool of scale items. Items were suggested to measure the
“relevant” aspect of transparency behaviors: “The company shares information about
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itself that is important to me, rather than just any random information” and “I feel that the
information the company shares with me is useless to me” (reverse code). Both items
were added to the pool.
Results. Although most scale development studies have a much larger pool of
items, a pool of 20-30 items is appropriate when the construct is narrowly defined and the
final scale is expected to have no more than 10 scale items (Netemeyer, Bearden, &
Sharma, 2003). Table 5 provides the final set of 31 transparency scale items which
reflect a reflective construct in relation to its indicators (scale items). Conceptualization
of the construct in relation to its indicators is that of a reflective model in which the
direction of causality is from the construct to the item (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff,
2003; MacKenzie, 2003). A construct is reflective when “indicators are manifestations of
the construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003) such as personality and attitude constructs
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001) and formative when indicators “are observed
variables that are assumed to cause the latent variable (Bollen & Lennox, 1991;
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001) such as the index of sustainable economic welfare
and the quality-of-life index (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). Other indications
that a construct should be reflective include: “indicators should be interchangeable and
have similar content (share a common theme), “dropping an indicator should not alter the
conceptual domain of the construct”, and indicators are expected to covary” (Jarvis et al.,
2003). Formative constructs are described as having the opposite defining characteristics
to those described above for reflective constructs.
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Table 5: Study 1, Scale Items Subjected to EFA
Name
TRANSP1
TRANSP2
TRANSP3
TRANSP4
TRANSP5
TRANSP6
TRANSP7
TRANSP8
TRANSP9
TRANSP10
TRANSP11
TRANSP12
TRANPS13
TRANSP14
TRANSP15
TRANPS16
TRANSP17
TRANSP18
TRANSP19
TRANSP20
TRANSP21
TRANSP22
TRANSP23
TRANSP24
TRANSP25
TRANSP26
TRANSP27
TRANSP28
TRANSP29
TRANSMNP_OPN
TRANSMNP_FRT

Scale Item
This company is candid.
This company is straightforward in telling me what I want to know.
This company tries to hide the bad things it does. (R)
This company tries to hide the good things that it does. (R)
Generally, this company tries to hide the things that it does. (R)
This company gives me false expectations. (R)
This company is clear with me.
This company readily admits failures.
This company is willing to share its failures with me.
This company is willing to share information with me even when it may make
the company look bad.
This company is genuine with me.
This company exposes itself to criticism.
This company beats around the bush when communicating with me. (R)
This company faces problems without hesitation.
This company puts everything "out on the table" for all to see.
This company provides me with a learning opportunity about itself.
I envision this company as a glass building in which everything inside is visible
for all to see.
This company enables me to know what it's doing.
This company allows its customers to see how it's doing.
When the company makes decisions, it gives me the ability to know about it.
This company helps me understand why it behaves the way it does.
This company is willing to explain its decisions to me.
This company is willing to tell me how it really feels about the products it sells.
This company is willing to share bad things about itself or about its products.
This company is willing to share just about any information I request from it.
I feel as if this company doesn't mind me seeing what's going on behind its
closed doors.
This company wants me to understand what it is doing.
This company shares information about itself that is important to me, rather than
just any random information.
I feel that the information this company shares with me is useless to me. (R)
This company is open with me.
This company is forthright with me.
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Phase 2
Phase 2 served to reduce the number of items, provide an initial structure to the
scale, and assess internal consistency through EFA. Generally, factor analysis requires a
minimum of 5-10 observations per variable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham,
2006a) but this varies depending on degrees of freedom and desired power and
significance levels (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).
Method. The data collection lasted five days. Students of a large Basic
Marketing course were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the
teacher’s assistant. There were 263 completed surveys. Students received extra credit
for participating in the study.
Procedure. Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions, high or low transparency. They responded to an online survey in which they
were asked to think about a company they are familiar with or have interacted with in the
past and, in particular, focus on a company that they thought was open and forthright (not
open and not forthright) with them during some interaction with the company.
Definitions for ‘open’ and ‘forthright’ were provided to ensure respondents understood
the task. Subjects in the ‘open and forthright’ condition were told:
“Open is defined as: 1.Not closed. 2. Accessible or available. 3. Exposed
to general view. 4. Uncovered. 5. Open to or in full view of all. 6.
Relatively free of obstructions to sight.
Forthright is defined as: 1. Going straight to the point; 2. Direct. 3. Being a
straight shooter. 4. To face a problem squarely and directly. 5. Directly
and frankly. 6. Without hesitation.”
Subjects in the ‘not open and not forthright’ condition were told:
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“NOT Open is defined as: 1.Closed. 2. Unaccessible or unavailable. 3. Not
exposed to general view. 4. Covered. 5. Not open to or in full view of all.
6. Not free of obstructions to sight.
Not Forthright is defined as: 1. Not going straight to the point; 2. Indirect,
roundabout. 3. Not being a straight shooter. 4. To not face a problem
squarely and directly. 5. Indirectly and not frankly. 6. With hesitation.”
Subjects were required to provide the name of the company, a description of its
products/services, and a detailed example or reason as to why this company fits the
criteria. Respondents were then exposed to the 31 transparency scale items. The 31 scale
items were presented in blocks of 5-7 scale items to break up the long list of items. The
blocks were randomized and the scale items within each block were randomized.
The EFA was conducted with the SAS program, version 9.2, utilizing the PROC
FACTOR syntax. This study utilized common factor analysis which derives underlying
latent constructs from only shared variance. Common factor analysis is also more
appropriate when variable reduction is a goal. Iterated Principal Axis factor analysis was
utilized to reduce the number of scale items and assess the underlying structure of the
variables. The prior communality estimates (h2) were estimated from the squared
multiple correlations (R2) between each variable and all other variables by including the
PRIORS = SMC syntax. With this procedure 1s on the diagonal of the correlation matrix
are replaced with the communality estimates. The unrotated solution was used. All
variables loaded significantly onto just one factor (see Table 5).
Results. The variables that were subjected to EFA correspond to those in Table 5.
The mean and standard deviations for those variables are also listed in Table 6. The
variables denoted with an “R” (i.e. TRANSP3R) are reverse-items therefore the scores
for these items have been adjusted.
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Table 6: Study 1, Variable Item Means and Standard Deviations
Variable
TRANSP1
TRANSP2
TRANSP3R
TRANSP4R
TRANSP5R
TRANSP6R
TRANSP7
TRANSP8
TRANSP9
TRANSP10
TRANSP11
TRANSP12
TRANSP13R
TRANSP14
TRANSP15
TRANPS16
TRANSP17
TRANSP18
TRANSP19
TRANSP20
TRANSP21
TRANSP22
TRANSP23
TRANSP24
TRANSP25
TRANSP26
TRANSP27
TRANSP28
TRANSP29R
TRANSMNP_OPN
TRANSMNP_FRT

Mean
4.28
4.54
4.14
5.62
4.75
4.43
4.48
3.70
3.70
3.72
4.43
4.21
4.35
4.37
4.13
4.58
3.78
4.45
4.66
4.20
4.25
4.25
4.79
3.69
4.19
4.10
4.54
4.50
4.81
4.39
4.45

Standard Deviation
1.64
2.07
1.82
1.38
1.74
2.14
2.10
1.74
1.75
1.78
2.07
1.60
2.12
1.83
2.10
1.90
2.01
1.93
1.87
1.78
1.96
1.96
1.95
1.76
1.88
2.02
2.01
1.91
1.75
2.18
2.16

The first step was to ensure the appropriateness of the data for EFA. Three
assessments were completed which included 1) reviewing the correlation matrix for
multicollinearity among variables, 2) checking the Measure of sampling adequacy for the
entire correlation matrix as well as for individual variables, and 3) assessing normality
through kurtosis and skewness.
Regarding multicollinearity, although some degree of correlation is ideal for
factor analysis, overly high correlations may indicate redundancy in variables making it
difficult to assess the unique contribution of a single variable (Hair et al., 2006a). One
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such pair of variables that was highly correlated was TRANS_OPN (“This company is
open with me”) and TRANS_FRT (“This company is forthright with me”) (r = .93, p<
.0001). The decision was made to leave both variables in the data analysis at this stage
because these variables have extremely high content validity.
The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) tests the appropriateness of factor
analysis by assessing the degree of inter-correlations among variables (Hair et al., 2006a).
The rule of thumb for this measure is .50 or greater for the overall MSA value as well as
for each variable and the MSA values are described as follows: 0 - .50 = unacceptable,
.51 – 60 = miserable, .61 - .70 = mediocre, .71 - .80 = middling, and .81 – 1 = meritorious
(Kaiser, 1970). The overall MSA value for this data was .97 indicating the data is
“meritoriously” appropriate for factor analysis. Each individual variable’s MSA value
was also assessed. The “mediocre” threshold of .70 was applied in assessing variables
for possible deletion. For individual MSA values, the variable with the lowest MSA
should be deleted first and the factor analysis rerun until all variables meet the prespecified threshold (Hair et al., 2006a). There was one variable that did not meet the
threshold TRANSP4R (“Company tries to hide the good things it does”) (MSA = .56).
This variable was deleted and the analysis was rerun. After rerunning the EFA without
TRANSP4R, the overall MSA was .97 and all other variables had meritorious MSA
values of at least .93 indicating it was appropriate to move to the next step in the factor
analysis process.
Finally, normality was assessed by evaluating the kurtosis and skewness of each
variable. Generally, variables with kurtosis > 2 and skewness >1 are considered to be
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non-normally distributed. All variables in this data set fell within the acceptable range
for kurtosis and skewness indicating normal distribution.
The second step was to examine the factor loadings. Based on a power level of
80%, n = 250, and significance level of .05, factor loadings +/- .35 are considered
significant (Hair et al., 2006a), however a more stringent criteria of .70 was applied as the
cut-off for retaining variables to meet practical significance. Loadings of +/- .70 indicate
a “well-defined structure” and are “the goal of any factor analysis” (Hair et al. page 128).
Four variables (TRANSP1 = .53, TRANSP12 = .42, TRANSP14 = .64, and TRANSP29R
= .61) did not meet the .70 pre-specified cut-off and were deleted. Two variables
(TRANSP8 = .69 and TRANSP10 = .69) were close enough to the cut-off and were
retained for further analysis. Finally, there were no significant cross-loadings indicating a
rotated solution was not required.
The third step included an assessment of the communalities. The communality
estimate is the amount of variance explained for each variable in the factor solution. A
rule of thumb is to delete those variables in which the factor structure explains less than
50% (Hair et al., 2006a), but for more practical significance, a more stringent threshold of
.60 was applied. Four variables (TRANSP1 = .32, TRANSP12 = .42, TRANSP14 = .52,
and TRANSP29R = .49) did not meet the threshold of at least .60. Note that these same
variables also did not meet the .70 factor loading threshold of .70. They were deleted
from further analysis. One variable (TRANSP8 = .59) was close enough to the cut-off
that it was retained for further analysis. Note that this variable was also close to the .70
factor loading cut-off.
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The fourth step was to derive an appropriate number of factors. This step was
conducted after deleting the variables that did not meet the criteria outlined in steps 1, 2,
and 3 and after the EFA re-run. Eigenvalues and scree plots were assessed. A priori it
was thought that either one factor or two factors representing “open” and “forthright”
may emerge, however the interpretation of the data was not guided by this notion. Table
7 provides the factor pattern loadings.
All variables loaded significantly onto one factor. However, the eigenvalues
indicated the data may represent two factors based on the eigenvalue greater than 1
criterion. The eigenvalues were 17.01 and 1.01 with these factors explaining 88.32% and
5.24% of the total retained variance respectively. The third factor had an eigenvalue of
.55 and explained 2.85% of the retained variance. According to Hair et al. (2006; page
120), there is no threshold for the total amount of variance extracted by all factors. The
number of factors extracted in the natural sciences should often explain at least 95% of
the retained variance and stop with those factors explaining 5% or less of the retained
variance. However it is common for the total retained variance extracted by all factors to
be closer to 60% in the social sciences and still be considered satisfactory.
The scree plot indicates potential cut-offs at one, two, or six factors. There is a
significant drop from factor one to factor two as the eigenvalues would indicate and there
is a smaller drop after factors two and six, at which the scree plot plateaus.
Based on the eigenvalue greater than 1 rule of thumb, a two factor solution is
appropriate. However, because all variables loaded significantly onto one, it would be
difficult and arbitrary to determine the appropriate variables to assign to each of the two
factors. Therefore the decision was made to move forward with a one factor solution,
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rather than a multi-factor solution, for two main reasons. First, all variables loaded
significantly onto one factor with no significant cross-loadings, indicating a one factor
solution is ideal. Second, one eigenvalue contributed to a significant portion of the
variance and the second factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 barely reaches this
threshold (factor 2 = 1.01). The scree plot shows a significant drop from factor 1 to
factor two.
Table 7: Study 1, EFA Factor Pattern Loadings
Factor Pattern Loadings
TRANSP2

Factor 1
0.88

Factor 2
-0.07

Factor 3
-0.04

Factor 4
0.01

Factor 5
-0.09

TRANSP3R

0.72

-0.24

0.22

0.16

0.04

TRANSP5R

0.72

-0.51

0.10

0.28

0.20

TRANSP6R

0.81

-0.32

0.07

0.01

-0.08

TRANSP7

0.90

-0.10

-0.02

-0.10

-0.13

TRANSP8

0.68

0.23

0.21

0.05

0.08

TRANSP9

0.74

0.27

0.28

-0.01

0.10

TRANSP10

0.68

0.34

0.27

-0.03

0.05

TRANSP11

0.89

-0.07

0.04

-0.08

-0.11

TRANSP13R

0.73

-0.29

0.04

-0.03

0.01

TRANSP15

0.85

0.14

-0.16

0.28

-0.17

TRANPS16

0.80

0.03

-0.16

-0.12

0.12

TRANSP17

0.82

0.22

-0.13

0.27

-0.18

TRANSP18

0.86

0.09

-0.17

0.03

0.06

TRANSP19

0.79

0.03

-0.13

0.06

0.11

TRANSP20

0.81

0.04

-0.26

-0.01

0.16

TRANSP21

0.85

-0.01

-0.13

-0.03

0.03

TRANSP22

0.86

0.10

-0.13

-0.08

0.07

TRANSP23

0.76

-0.02

-0.07

-0.04

0.03

TRANSP24

0.75

0.27

0.19

0.07

0.00

TRANSP25

0.79

0.16

-0.04

-0.07

-0.01

TRANSP26

0.81

0.11

-0.01

0.07

-0.02

TRANSP27

0.86

-0.03

-0.06

-0.17

0.06

TRANSP28

0.82

-0.02

0.01

-0.10

0.08

TRANSPOPN

0.90

-0.14

0.09

-0.18

-0.15

TRANSPFRT

0.90

-0.16

0.13

-0.14

-0.15
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The fifth and final step was to assess the convergent validity of the one factor
model by assessing its factor loadings, variance extracted, and reliability. Convergent
validity is the extent of shared variance among a construct’s set of indicators and thus
convergent validity exists when the indicators are highly correlated (Netemeyer et al.,
2003) Evidence of convergent validity exists when: 1) ideally all variables have factor
loadings greater than .7, 2) average variance extracted exceeds .5, and 3) reliability
exceeds .7 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006c). First, as Table 7 indicates,
the factor loadings ranged from .68 to .90 with all but two meeting the ideal threshold of
.7. Second, average variance extracted (AVE) was .65. AVE is the average of the sum of
the squared factor loadings and is an indication of the amount of shared variance between
the measures compared to the error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006c;
Netemeyer et al., 2003). The AVE of .65 suggests there is more shared variance than
error for the variables which is above the reasonable threshold of .50 for newly developed
scales (Netemeyer et al., 2003). Finally, two internal reliability measures are commonly
used to assess convergent validity, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha which assesses the
degree of inter-item correlations, and composite reliability which assesses the variance
extracted compared to the error in the model. The generally agreed upon lower limit for
Cronbach’s alpha is .70 and the rule of thumb for inter-item correlations is that they
should exceed .30 (Hair et al., 2006a). Coefficient alpha for this scale is .98 with itemtotal correlations ranging from .67 to .89. The composite reliability measure is computed
from the squared sum of factor loadings and the sum of the error variance. Like
Cronbach’s alpha, the ideal estimate value is .7 or greater to provide sufficient evidence
of convergent validity. The composite reliability estimate is .97 for these scale items.

119

The data analysis proceeded to phase 3, confirmatory factor analysis, since the
construct reliability exceeded minimum thresholds and provided evidence for convergent
validity of the scale items derived from EFA.
Phase 3
The purpose of phase 3 was to confirm the model derived through EFA and to test
its validity. A second sample of student subjects was utilized.
Method. The data collection lasted five days. Students of a large, online Basic
Marketing course were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the
teacher’s assistant. There were 316 completed surveys. Students received extra credit
for participating in the study.
Procedure. The study’s design was identical to that of phase 2. Participants in
the study were randomly assigned to either the high transparency or low transparency
condition. Data for all variables from phase 2 were again collected in phase 3.
Additional constructs were also included in the survey to test for convergent,
discriminant, and nomological validity. These constructs included communication
openness to test for discriminant validity with a known and similar construct in the
marketing literature, and skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase
intention to test for both discriminant and nomological validities with the dependent
variable constructs within the proposed theoretical model (Figure 2).
The 26-variable transparency model that emerged through EFA was assessed for
fit through CFA using the PROC CALIS procedure in SAS. The chi-square was 1263.30
(p<.0001) on 299 degrees of freedom (df). Significant chi-square values indicate the
model does not perfectly fit the data based on comparing the actual and estimated
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covariance matrices. However, significant chi-squares are typically expected, especially
for N>250 and m (number of variables in the model) > 12 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson,
& Tatham, 2006b). Additional fit indices were inspected. Based on the rules of thumb
for a sample of this size (N>250) and m between 12 and 30, the model fit indices
generally indicated a very poor fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .05, GFI
= .73), parsimony (e.g. RMSEA = .10), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .88, and NFI
= .85). Although the SRMSR, which assesses the degree of residuals between the actual
and reproduced covariance matrix, fits within the recommended threshold, all other
indices do not. Ideally for this sample size and number of variables, SRMR should be
below .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1998), RMSEA should be below .07, and incremental indices
such as CFI and NFI should be above .92 (Hair et al., 2006b). To diagnose the problem
of poor fit, path estimates, residuals for variable pairs, and Lagrange Multiplier
modification indices were assessed.
First path estimates were assessed. A few path estimates (TRANSP3R = .64,
TRANSP5R = .64, TRANSP8 = .60, and TRANSP13R = .68) fell below the ideal
threshold of .70. These four items were deleted and the analysis was rerun. All path
estimates were above the .70 threshold.
Next, standardized residuals were assessed. Residuals measure the difference
between the observed covariance terms and the expected covariance terms (Hair et al.,
2006c). The standardized residual output in SAS provides pairs of variables that have the
highest residuals. Variable pairs with standardized residuals between |2.5| and |4.0|
should be investigated as potential candidates for deletion from the model (Hair et al.,
2006c). Additionally, an “ideal” fitting model will have few residuals above |2.58|
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(Hatcher, 1996). There were 10 variable pairs well above the |4.0| threshold. Table 8
provides the rank order of the 10 largest standardized residual pairs.
Table 8: Study 1, Rank Order of the 10 Largest Standardized Residuals

Rank Order of the 10 Largest Asymptotically
Standardized Residuals
Var1
TRANSPFRT

Var2
TRANSPOPN

Residual
11.02

TRANSP24

TRANSP9

8.51

TRANSP10

TRANSP9

8.34

TRANSP17

TRANSP15

7.68

TRANSP6R

TRANSP3R

7.41

TRANSP5R

TRANSP3R

7.05

TRANSP7

TRANSP2

6.95

TRANSP13R

TRANSP6R

6.46

TRANSP6R

TRANSP5R

6.25

TRANSP20

TRANSP19

5.77

Variables were dropped one at a time and the model was re-specified after each variable
dropped. A total of 15 variables were dropped. The model fit on the remaining seven
variables will be discussed in the Results section.
Results. Following is a discussion of the fit for the seven variable transparency
model. The chi-square was 12.90 (p=.53) on 14 degrees of freedom (df). Other fit indices
were also inspected. Given the sample size (N = 316) and the number of observed
variables (m = 7), the model fit indices generally indicated a very good fit to the data
based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .01, GFI = .99), parsimony (e.g. RMSEA = .001,
probability of close fit = .95), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = 1, and NFI = .99).

1

Note the RMSEA 90% lower confidence limit is .00 and the RMSEA 90% upper
confidence limit is .05.
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Table 9 provides the factor loadings, t-values, reliability, and fit statistics for the
seven variable transparency scale that emerged through CFA testing.
Table 9: Study 1, Factor Loadings for Seven Item Transparency Scale
Factor
Loading

t value
(Std. error)

0.77

31.33 (.02)

This company provides me with a learning
opportunity about itself.

0.71

24 (.03)

This company enables me to know what it's
doing.

0.84

43.55 (.02)

This company is willing to explain its
decisions to me.

0.84

43.74 (.02)

This company is willing to share just about
any information I request from it.

0.77

30.43 (.02)

Alpha = .93, CR = .94, AVE = .65
TRANSP10

TRANPS16
TRANSP18
TRANSP22
TRANSP25
TRANSP27

This company is willing to share information
with me even when it may make the company
look bad.

This company wants me to understand what it
is doing.

0.81
36.71 (.02)
TRANSP_OPN
This company is open with me.
0.9
63.69 (.01)
Chi-Square (14, n = 316) = 12.90 (p=.53), SRMSR = .01, GFI = .99, RMSEA = .00,
CFI = 1, NFI = .99

Tests of validity. The seven item scale that emerged through CFA was then tested
for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities.
The transparency scale was tested for convergent validity by assessing factor
loadings, variance extracted, and reliability. The factor loadings ranged from .71 to .90
and AVE, the average of the sum of the squared factor loadings, was .65 which is well
above the .50 recommended threshold. Finally, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and
composite reliability (CR) were both assessed as Cronbach’s alpha may understate
reliability (Hair et al., 2006c). Coefficient alpha for this scale is .93 with item-total
correlations ranging from .69 to .85. The formula for calculating composite reliability is:
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The composite reliability estimate is .94 for these scale items.
Discriminant validity was assessed at two levels, first between transparency and
communication openness, and second, between transparency and the other constructs in
the proposed model that are dependent on transparency. First, because perceived
transparency is a new construct being proposed, discriminant validity was assessed
between transparency and communication openness (COMOP). Communication
openness was discussed in Chapter 2 as a similar, yet distinct construct, and CFA will
help clarify this notion. Second, discriminant validity was assessed between constructs in
the theoretical model. These constructs include transparency, skepticism (SKEP),
attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST).
Prior to testing for discriminant validity, all scale items for the constructs were
first subjected to individual EFA and internal reliability analyses even though these scales
have been widely used in prior literature.

This is to ensure each of the scales exhibit

good psychometric properties, and this includes convergent validity, uni-dimensionality,
and internal consistency. One scale in particular, communication openness, was
especially important to assess for reliability because it was originally developed by its
authors to measure two-way mutual communication between buyer and supplier in a
business-to-business context (Smith & Barclay, 1997a). Thus this measure was revised
and adapted to fit the context of the current study. The skepticism scale used in this
research was adapted from the skepticism toward television advertising scale (Boush,
Friestad, & Rose, 1994). Items were modified to reflect state-based skepticism toward a
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particular firm, rather than a generalized predisposition of skepticism toward television
advertising. The trust scale was adapted from literature that conceptualizes this construct
as confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Ahearne et al., 2007;
Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Yim et al., 2008). The attitude toward the firm scale was
adapted from literature that investigates favorable/unfavorable attitudes toward brands
(Batra & Ray, 1986; Thomson, MacInnis, & Park, 2005). Finally, purchase intention was
adopted from literature which conceptualized this construct as a willingness to buy from
a particular company (Holzwarth et al., 2006). Appendix A provides the scale items used
to measure each construct.
For the EFA, those variables meeting a factor loading threshold of at least .40
were retained which exceeds the minimum loading for significance (p<.05) for this
sample size and a power level of 80%. For internal reliability analyses, Cronbach’s
coefficient alpha and the item-to-total correlations were assessed. Those variables
meeting at least .50 for item-to-total correlations and at least .30 for inter-item
correlations were retained. All variables were measured with 7-point Likert-type scales
with the exception of those for attitude toward the firm which were measured with 7point bipolar scales. Three of the five items were retained for the communication
openness scale. All three items were retained for the skepticism scale. Four of the five
items were retained for the trust scale. All six items were retained for the attitude toward
the firm scale. All three items were retained for the purchase intention scale.
Three steps were taken to test for discriminant validity between transparency and
communication openness. First, AVE for the transparency scale was compared to the
square of the correlation estimate for the two constructs. The AVE is the average squared
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factor loading for the construct. AVE for the two constructs should be greater than the
square of correlations between those two constructs as an indication of discriminant
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The square of the correlation (R2 =.55) was less than
the average variance extracted estimate for the two constructs (transparency = .65 and
communication openness = .56).
Second, a two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model with
transparency and communication openness scale items constrained to one factor
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The overall model fit assessed by chi-square should be
better with the two-factor model as an indication of discriminant validity. The chi-square
for the one-factor model was 136.14 (p<.001) and was 93.23 (p<.001) for the two-factor
model, indicating a significant improvement in fit when separating the two constructs.
The chi-square difference test with one degree of freedom was significant at p<.0005.
Other fit indices such as the standardized RMSR (.03 vs. .05), RMSEA (.07 vs. .09), and
CFI (.97 vs. .92) also showed improvement with the two constructs separated rather than
in unity.
Finally, the confidence interval for the correlation between the two constructs was
evaluated. If the confidence interval does not include one then this is an indication of
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The 95% confidence interval around
the correlation between the two factors (r = .74) did not include 1.0 (lower bound = .68
and upper bound = .78). In sum, there is sufficient evidence for discriminant validity
between transparency and communication openness taking into account AVE, chi-square
tests for one and two factor models, and the confidence interval around the correlation.
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Next, AVE, chi-square tests, and confidence intervals around correlations were
assessed to investigate discriminant validity between transparency and: skepticism
(SKEP), attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST). The
AVE for the four constructs were .56 (COMOP), .92 (TRST), .82 (SKEP), .89 (ATT),
and .92 (PI). As previously mentioned, the AVE for TRANSP was .65. Transparency
does not show good discriminant validity from two constructs, trust and attitude toward
the firm, based on comparing AVE with the squared correlations for these variable pairs.
The squared correlation was .74 for transparency and trust and .67 for transparency and
attitude toward the firm, both of which are greater than .65 which is the AVE for
transparency. This will be discussed further at the end of this section. Table 10 provides
the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct.
As a second test of discriminant validity between transparency and the other
constructs, two-factor models were compared to one-factor models for transparency and
each of the other constructs. The chi-square tests were performed on one pair of factors at
a time (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) resulting in five separate constrained model versus
unconstrained model chi-square tests (TRANSP-SKEP, TRANSP-TRST, TRANSP-ATT,
and TRANSP-PI). Each of the five comparison tests showed improved chi-squares with
the two-factor models. All chi-square differences had one degree of freedom and the
difference was significant at p<.0001. For example, the chi-square for the one-factor
model for transparency and trust was 309.43 (p<.001) compared to 93.48 (p<.001) for the
two-factor model. The one-factor model for transparency and attitude toward the firm
was 530.50 (p<.0001) compared to 167.84 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model. The fit
indices also showed improvement with the two-factor models. For example, standardized
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RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI for transparency and trust for the one-factor model were .05,
.14, and .93 respectively compared to .02, .06, and .99 for the two-factor model. The
standardized RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI fit indices for the one-factor model for
transparency and attitude toward the firm were .07, .15, and .91 respectively compared to
.02, .07, and .98 for the two-factor model. Table 11 provides the chi-square and fit
indices for the one and two-factor models for transparency and each of the constructs in
the model.
Finally, the confidence intervals were assessed. None of the confidence intervals
around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors included 1.0.

Table 10: Study 1, Psychometric Properties of Constructs Used in Validity Testing
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations
COMOP
0.74

TRST
0.86

SKEP
-0.68

ATT
0.82

PI
0.74

COMOP

TRANSP
0.65
0.55

0.56

0.71

-0.55

0.71

0.63

TRST

0.74

0.50

0.92

-0.73

0.91

0.87

SKEP

0.46

0.30

0.53

0.82

-0.73

-0.65

ATT

0.67

0.50

0.83

0.53

0.89

0.88

PI

0.55

0.40

0.76

0.42

0.77

0.92

TRANSP

Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal.
Correlations significant at p<.01.
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Table 11: Study 1, One-Factor vs. Two-Factor Discriminant Validity Tests
TWO FACTOR MODELa

ONE FACTOR MODEL

93.23 (p<.001)

136.14 (p<.001)

Standardized RMSR

0.03

0.05

RMSEA

0.07

0.09

CFI

0.97

0.92

67.78 (p<.0005)

499.12 (p<.001)

Standardized RMSR

0.03

0.07

RMSEA

0.06

0.2

CFI

0.99

0.82

93.48 (p<.001)

309.43 (p<.001)

Standardized RMSR

0.02

0.05

RMSEA

0.06

0.14

CFI

0.99

0.93

TRANSP-COMOP
Chi Square

TRANSP-SKEP
Chi Square

TRANSP-TRST
Chi Square

TRANSP-ATT
Chi Square

167.84 (p<.0001)

530.50 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.02

0.07

RMSEA

0.07

0.15

CFI

0.98

0.91

75.77 (p<.001)

636.92 (p<.001)

Standardized RMSR

0.03

0.11

RMSEA

0.06

0.23

TRANSP-PI
Chi Square

a

CFI
0.99
All Chi-Square differences have 1 d.f. and p<.0001.

0.81

To summarize the findings of the discriminant validity tests for transparency and
the other constructs, TRANSP-TRST and TRANSP-ATT variable pairs did not pass the
AVE discriminant validity test. However, other tests such as the chi-square test and the
confidence interval test for correlations illustrated sufficient discriminant validity. While
all three tests of discriminant validity are recommended, researchers must also consider
which type of latent constructs are being tested: exogenous, endogenous, or a mix of both
(Shiu, Pervan, Bove, & Beatty, 2010). Shiu et al. (2010) suggest that AVE is more
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important than confidence intervals and chi-square tests when testing exogenous
constructs and especially as a part of testing multi-dimension scales. On the other hand,
confidence intervals and chi-square tests are more important when testing a combination
of exogenous and endogenous constructs in SEM causal modeling. The authors argue
that discriminant validity testing using confidence intervals and chi-square differences is
necessary in SEM causal modeling to ensure multicollinearity of constructs will not cause
erroneous regression coefficient estimates and standard error estimates. They state “the
information of whether a pair of constructs has (or has not) failed the F&L [Fornell and
Larker; AVE] test does not alter the probability of rejecting the null hypotheses regarding
the (lack of) significance of specific regression paths associated with the constructs”
(Shiu et al. page 498). This suggests that, while AVE is an important determination of
discriminant validity between transparency and communication openness (two exogenous
constructs), on the other hand, confidence intervals and chi-square tests are better
diagnostics for discriminant validity between transparency (an exogenous construct in the
model) and skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention
(endogenous constructs in the model). Since confidence interval and chi-square testing
indicated that the constructs in the model were sufficiently different from each other to be
distinct, the decision was made to proceed with testing the nomological validity of the
transparency scale.
Nomological validity is the extent to which a construct fits into a theoretical
network (Hair et al., 2006c). The network of interest is depicted in Figure 5. Confidence
in the transparency scale should increase if the correlations between the measure and
other related constructs in the network behave as expected. As a stronger test of
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nomological validity, relationships between variables can be evaluated via path estimates
in a structural equation model rather than evaluating relationships between variables via a
correlation matrix. The transparency scale was tested with three proposed outcomes,
including skepticism, trust, and attitude toward the firm, in a structural equation model so
that the size and magnitude of the path estimates could be investigated. This dissertation
suggested in chapter three that transparency will decrease skepticism and increase trust
and attitude toward the firm. The standardized direct effects of transparency with all of
the dependent variables was significant and in the predicted direction (SKEP = -.54,
p<.0001; TRST = .85, p<.0001; ATT = .89, p<.0001). The direction of the relationships
between the exogenous construct (TRANSP) and the endogenous constructs (SKEP,
TRST, ATT) was as predicted indicating sufficient nomological validity. The scale
items, factor loadings, and t values are presented in Table 12 and a structural view is
presented in Figure 5.
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Table 12: Study 1, Nomological Validity Testing
Variable Name

Description

Factor
Loadings

t values
(Std. error)

0.73

27.04 (.03)

0.68

21.61 (.03)

0.81

40.03 (.02)

0.79

35.15 (.02)

0.74

27.96 (.03)

0.79
0.92

36.58 (.02)
94.54(.01)

Transparency
TRANSP10

This company is willing to share information with me
even when it may make the company look bad.

TRANPS16

This company provides me with a learning opportunity
about itself.

TRANSP18

This company enables me to know what it's doing.

TRANSP22

This company is willing to explain its decisions to me.

TRANSP25

This company is willing to share just about any
information I request from it.

TRANSP27

This company wants me to understand what it is doing.

TRANSP_OPN
Skepticism
SKEP1

SKEP2
SKEP3
Trust in firm
TRST1
TRST3
TRST4
TRST5
Attitude toward
the firm
ATT1
ATT2
ATT3
ATT4
ATT5
ATT6

This company is open with me.
This company cares more about getting me to buy its
product/service than it does about what's good for me.

0.81

39.09 (.02)

This company tries to trick customers into buying
something.
This company tries to manipulate customers.

0.95
0.95

100.3 (.01)
101.3 (.01)

This company can be trusted.
This company is truthful.

0.97
0.97

217.4 (.004)
264.3 (.003)

0.96

173.3 (.005)

0.95

148.1 (.01)

0.96
0.96
0.93
0.93
0.92
0.95

198.2 (.004)
202.5 (.004)
121.9 (.01)
114.9 (.01)
96.23 (.01)
157.9 (.01)

This company can be counted on to do what’s right.
I have confidence in this company as an organization.

Bad: Good
Unfavorable: Favorable
Disagreeable: Agreeable
Unpleasant: Pleasant
Negative: Positive
Dislike this company: Like this company
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Figure 5: Study 1, Phase 3 Nomological Model Tested
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To summarize Study 1, scale item generation and initial purification was
conducted in phase 1. This included generating 34 items from the literature review
(Chapter 2) and through qualitative research (Chapter 3). Independent judges
participated in a judgment task to assess face and construct validity of the items. The
judges also assisted with enhancing clarity and readability of the items. Phase 1 resulted
in 31 items being retained for phase 2.
EFA was conducted in phase 2 with the purpose of variable reduction and
identification of the underlying latent factors. Variables were deleted if they did not meet
predetermined thresholds for MSA, factor loadings, and communalities. The 26 variable,
one factor solution was then tested for convergent validity by way of AVE, Cronbach’s
coefficient alpha, construct reliability, item-to-total correlations, and intra-correlations.
Phase 2 resulted in 26 items being retained for phase 3.
CFA was conducted in phase 3 with the purpose of additional scale refinement
and assessment of its validity. The 26-variable model was a very poor fit to the data.
Path estimates, residuals, and modification indices were assessed to determine which
variables could be deleted from the model. In all, 19 items were deleted through 15
iterations of deleting one variable at a time and re-specifying the model. A sevenvariable model resulted and it was a good fit to the data. The seven-variable model was
then evaluated for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities. Overall, the
model exhibited these validities. Next is a discussion of Study 2.
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Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 is to confirm the factor structure of Study 1, and further
assess reliability and validity of the scale. Furthermore, by using scenarios which
specifically manipulate levels of transparency, Study 2 should provide stronger evidence
of nomological validity such that a change in the dependent variables (SKEP, TRST,
ATT, and PI) is more likely to be a result of changing levels of transparency rather than
some other underlying construct not being measured.
Method. Undergraduate business students were recruited to participate in the
study via an email distributed by the instructors. There were 299 completed surveys.
Students received extra credit for participating in the study.
Procedure. As in Study 1, data was collected via online questionnaires.
However, the stimulus was different from that in Study 1. In Study 1, subjects were
asked to recall a firm that they thought was open and forthright (or not open and not
forthright depending on the condition for which they were assigned). Subjects then
answered the survey questions based on the firm that they recalled. In Study 2, rather
than a recall task, subjects were assigned randomly to one of two transparency
conditions.
Specifically, subjects were first presented with a welcome page thanking them
for participating and communicating what they will do during this experiment. This was
followed by the IRB Informed Consent waiver. Subjects were then presented with the
following directions: “You will now be presented with a scenario in which you are to
imagine you will soon fly to visit a friend. Please read the scenario carefully. Proceed to
the scenario when you're ready”. Subjects were then presented with the high or low
transparency manipulation:
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Set up for both manipulations:
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in
the near future. Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the
airlines that flies direct from your hometown airport to the airport that
is nearest him/her. You hadn’t flown this airline before.
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is
given priority for this particular airline. You went to ABC’s website
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying
on this airline.
High transparency
ABC airlines provided whatever information you wanted to know on
the website. The company also provided a way to reach the company
in case you needed additional information on this subject.
Low Transparency
ABC airlines did not provide any information you wanted to know on
the website. The company also did not provide a way to reach the
company in case you needed additional information on this subject.

After the scenario subjects were exposed to the survey which consisted of a series
of scale items to measure communication openness, transparency, skepticism, trust,
attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention. Table 12 provides the scale items for
each construct. Qualitative data was also collected. Subjects were asked to list what
specific information they would want to know if they were actually learning about an
airline. This qualitative data was collected to better understand appropriate
manipulations of variables in subsequent studies. The findings from this qualitative data
are reviewed as a part of the Study 3, Phase 1 discussion.
The transparency scenarios were first pretested with a separate sample of
undergraduate marketing students (n=41). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
two conditions. The same scenarios described above were used in the pretests and
transparency was measured using the seven item scale that resulted from Study 1. The
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manipulation of high and low transparency levels had a strong effect and they worked as
intended. The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with an independent samples
t test. On average, subjects exposed to the high transparency manipulation (n = 24)
experienced significantly higher perceived firm transparency (M = 4.98, SE = .18) than
the subjects (n = 17) exposed to the low transparency manipulation (M = 1.58, SE = .17),
t (39) = -13.37, p<.0001).
Results.

The seven item transparency scale was subjected to a CFA. The chi-

square was 53.50 (p<.0001) with 14 degrees of freedom. Given the sample size (N =
299) and the number of observed variables (m = 7), the model fit indices generally
indicated an excellent fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .01, GFI = .95)
and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .98, and NFI = .98). However, the model fit indices
indicated a “questionable” fit (MacCallum et al., 1996) to the data based on parsimony fit
indices (e.g. RMSEA = .10, probability of close fit = .003). In particular, MacCallum et
al. (1996) suggest models are questionable with RMSEA values greater than .10. With
regard to appropriate RMSEA values, researchers suggest that RMSEA values less than
.08 are reasonable (Hair et al., 2006b; Hu & Bentler, 1998; MacCallum et al., 1996). The
standardized residuals indicated that some improvement in the model could be made.
There were several pairs of variables for which residuals were between |2.50| and |4.0|,
indicating the model fit could improve by deleting at least one item. In all, upon close
examination, three items (TRANSP10, TRANSP22, AND TRANSP25) were deleted
from the model based on residuals and lower factor loadings compared to the others.
Additionally, these three items are related to the firm sharing information, which, based
on the conceptual definition of transparency, is an antecedent of transparency. The
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model fit improved significantly. The chi-square was 1.84 (p = .17) with 1 degree of
freedom. Given the sample size (N = 299) and the number of observed variables (m = 4),
the model fit indices indicated an excellent fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR
= .003, GFI = .99), incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .99, and NFI = .99), and parsimony fit
indices (e.g. RMSEA = .05, probability of close fit = .32). Finally, the four item model
had no residuals approaching |2.50| (range = .52 to -1.33). Table 13 provides the factor
loadings, t-values, reliability, and fit indices for the four item transparency scale.
Table 13: Study 2, Factor Loadings for Transparency Scale
Alpha = .97, CR = .97, AVE = .82

t value

Factor
Loading

(Std. error)

TRANPS16

This company provides me with a learning
opportunity about itself.

0.91

87.17 (.01)

TRANSP18

This company enables me to know what it's
doing.

0.96

158.7 (.006)

TRANSP27

This company wants me to understand what
it is doing.

0.95

136.8 (.007)

TRANSP_OPN

This company is open with me.

0.94

120.0 (.008)

Chi-Square (1, n = 299) = 1.84 (p=.17), SRMSR = .003, GFI = .99, RMSEA = .05,
CFI = .99, NFI = .99

Tests of validity. The four item scale that emerged through CFA was then tested
for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities.
The transparency scale was tested for convergent validity by assessing factor
loadings, variance extracted, and reliability. The factor loadings ranged from .91 to .96
which is higher compared to the range of factor loadings from Study 1 (.71 to .90).
Average variance extracted was .89, also well above the scale’s AVE from Study 1 (AVE
= .65). Finally, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was .97 and composite reliability (CR) was
.99, again above the alpha (.93) and CR (.94) from Study 1.
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Following the same process outlined in Study 1, discriminant validity was
assessed at two levels, first between transparency and communication openness, and
second, between transparency and the other constructs in the proposed model that are
dependent on transparency. Additionally, like Study 1, prior to testing for discriminant
validity, all scale items for the constructs were first subjected to individual EFA and
internal reliability analyses to ensure each of the scales exhibit good psychometric
properties, and this includes convergent validity, uni-dimensionality, and internal
consistency. The same scale items were used from Study 1. All scales exhibited
excellent internal reliability, convergent validity, uni-dimensionality, and internal
consistency (see Tables 14 and 15).
Table 14: Study 2, EFA Factor Loadings for Constructs Used in Validity Testing
Variable

Description

Factor Loadings

Communication Openness (Cronbach's Alpha = .85)
COMOP2

This company and I talk candidly with each other.

0.81

COMOP3
COMOP5

This company and I provide each other with timely information.
This company is responsive to my needs for information.

0.94
0.88

Skepticism (Cronbach's Alpha = .87)
SKEP1
This company cares more about getting me to buy its
product/service than it does about what's good for me.

0.81

SKEP2

This company tries to trick customers into buying something.

0.94

SKEP3

This company tries to manipulate customers.

0.93

Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .95)
TRST1

This company can be trusted.

0.93

TRST3
TRST4

This company is truthful.
This company can be counted on to do what’s right.

0.94
0.93

TRST5

I have confidence in this company as an organization.

0.94

Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .98)
ATT1
ATT2

Bad: Good
Unfavorable: Favorable

0.95
0.95

ATT3

Disagreeable: Agreeable

0.94

ATT4
ATT5

Unpleasant: Pleasant
Negative: Positive

0.94
0.96

ATT6

Dislike this company: Like this company

0.95
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Three steps were performed to test for discriminant validity between transparency
and communication openness. First, confirmatory models for transparency and
communication openness scales were performed to get the average variance extracted for
the two constructs in order to compare the AVE for the transparency scale to the square
of the correlation estimate for the two constructs. The AVE for the two constructs should
be greater than the square of correlations between those two constructs as an indication of
discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The square of the correlation (R2 =.67)
was less than the average variance extracted for transparency (AVE = .89) but not for
communication openness (AVE = .67).
Second, a two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model with
transparency and communication openness scale items constrained to one factor
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The chi-square for the one-factor model was 134.04
(p<.001) and was 62.86 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model, indicating a significant
improvement in fit when separating the two constructs. The chi-square difference test
with one degree of freedom was significant at p<.0001. Other fit indices such as the
standardized RMSR (.03 vs. .05), RMSEA (.12 vs. .18), and CFI (.98 vs. .95) also
showed improvement with the two constructs separated rather than in unity.
Finally, the confidence interval for the correlation between the two constructs was
evaluated. If the confidence interval does not include one then this is an indication of
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The 95% confidence interval around
the correlation between the two factors (r = .82) did not include 1.0 (lower bound = .78
and upper bound = .86). In sum, based on the findings from both Study 1 and Study 2,
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there is sufficient evidence to confirm discriminant validity between transparency and
communication openness taking into account AVE, chi-square tests for one and two
factor models, and the confidence interval around the correlation.
Next, AVE, chi-square tests, and confidence intervals around correlations were
assessed to investigate discriminant validity between transparency and: skepticism
(SKEP), attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST). The
AVE for the four constructs were .67 (COMOP), .83 (TRST), .73 (SKEP), .88 (ATT),
and .92 (PI). As previously mentioned, the AVE for TRANSP was .89. Transparency
shows good discriminant validity between it and the other variables, based on comparing
AVE with the squared correlations for these variable pairs. This is an improvement in
discriminant validity compared to Study 1 (recall transparency did not exhibit
discriminant validity with trust and attitude toward the firm through the AVE method).
Table 15 provides the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each
construct.
Similar to Study 1, as a second test of discriminant validity between transparency
and the other constructs, two-factor models were compared to one-factor models for
transparency and each of the other constructs. The chi-square tests were performed on
one pair of factors at a time (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) resulting in five separate
constrained model versus unconstrained model chi-square tests (TRANSP-SKEP,
TRANSP-TRST, TRANSP-ATT, and TRANSP-PI). Each of the five comparison tests
showed improved chi-squares with the two-factor models (Table 16). All chi-square
differences had one degree of freedom and the difference was significant at p<.0001. For
example, the chi-square for the one-factor model for transparency and trust was 393.13
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(p<.0001) compared to 69.60 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model. The one-factor model
for transparency and attitude toward the firm was 590.87 (p<.0001) compared to 99.54
(p<.0001) for the two-factor model. Consistent with Study 1, the fit indices showed
improvement with the two-factor models. For example, standardized RMSR, RMSEA,
and CFI for transparency and trust for the one-factor model were .08, .26, and .88
respectively compared to .02, .09, and .98 for the two-factor model. The standardized
RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI fit indices for the one-factor model for transparency and
attitude toward the firm were .05, .20, and .86 respectively compared to .01, .08, and .99
for the two-factor model. Table 16 provides the chi-square and fit indices for the one and
two-factor models for transparency and each of the constructs in the model.
Finally, the confidence intervals were assessed. As with Study 1, none of the
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors
included 1.0.
Table 15: Study 2, Psychometric Properties of Constructs Used in Validity Testing
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations
TRANSP
COMOP
TRST
SKEP

TRANSP
0.82

COMOP
0.83

TRST
0.79

SKEP
-0.49

ATT
0.86

PI
0.79

0.69

0.64

0.76

-0.44

0.81

0.73

0.62

0.58

0.82

-0.55

0.86

0.82

0.24

0.19

0.30

0.7

-0.58

-0.53

ATT

0.74
0.66
0.74
0.34
0.85
0.88
0.62
0.53
0.67
0.28
0.72
PI
0.90
Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on
diagonal.
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Table 16: Study 2, One-Factor vs. Two-Factor Discriminant Validity Tests
TWO FACTOR MODEL a

ONE FACTOR MODEL

62.86 (p<.0001)

134.04 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.03

0.05

RMSEA

0.12

0.18

CFI

0.98

0.95

28.18 (p<.01)

490.66 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.02

0.16

RMSEA

0.06

0.34

CFI

0.99

0.79

69.60 (p<.0001)

393.13 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.02

0.08

RMSEA

0.09

0.26

CFI

0.98

0.88

TRANSP-COMOP
Chi Square

TRANSP-SKEP
Chi Square

TRANSP-TRST
Chi Square

TRANSP-ATT
Chi Square

99.54 (p<.0001)

590.87 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.01

0.05

RMSEA

0.08

0.23

CFI

0.99

0.88

28.12 (p<.0001)

584.42 (p<.0001)

Standardized RMSR

0.01

0.07

RMSEA

0.06

0.37

CFI

0.99

0.81

TRANSP-PI
Chi Square

To summarize the findings of the discriminant validity tests for transparency and
the other constructs, Study 2 provided even stronger evidence of discriminant validity
compared to Study 1. Whereas in Study 1 TRANSP-TRST and TRANSP-ATT variable
pairs did not pass the AVE discriminant validity test, in Study 2 this test was passed.
Like the process in Study 1, to investigate nomological validity, the transparency
scale was tested with three proposed outcomes, including skepticism, trust, and attitude
toward the firm, in a structural equation model so that the size and magnitude of the
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direct causal relationships could be investigated. Study 1 showed that transparency had a
significant direct effect on all of the dependent variables (SKEP = -.54, p<.0001; TRST =
.85, p<.0001; ATT = .89, p<.0001). Study 2 confirmed these findings (SKEP = -.55,
p<.01; TRST = .85, p<.01; ATT = .90, p<.01). The SEM model testing the nomological
validity for Study 2 is presented in Figure 6 and the scale items, factor loadings, and t
values are presented in Table 17.

Table 17: Study 2, Nomological Validity Testing
Variable Name

Description

Factor
Loadings*

t values
(Std. error)

0.91

86.15 (.01)

0.95

153.17 (.01)

0.95
0.94

134.23 (.01)
124.34 (.01)

Transparency
TRANPS16

This company provides me with a learning opportunity
about itself.

TRANSP18

This company enables me to know what it's doing.

TRANSP27

This company wants me to understand what it is doing.

TRANSP_OPN
Skepticism
SKEP1

SKEP2
SKEP3
Trust in firm
TRST1
TRST3
TRST4
TRST5
Attitude toward
the firm
ATT1
ATT2
ATT3
ATT4
ATT5
ATT6

This company is open with me.
This company cares more about getting me to buy its
product/service than it does about what's good for me.

0.65

18.55 (.03)

This company tries to trick customers into buying
something.
This company tries to manipulate customers.

0.94
0.94

65.04 (.01)
65.10 (.01)

This company can be trusted.
This company is truthful.

0.92
0.92

88.33 (.01)
84.37 (.01)

0.88

61.41 (.01)

0.92

88.33 (.01)

0.94
0.95
0.93
0.93
0.94
0.95

127.08 (.01)
137.55 (.01)
103.29 (.01)
103.59 (.01)
133.08 (.01)
153.77 (.01)

This company can be counted on to do what’s right.
I have confidence in this company as an organization.

Bad: Good
Unfavorable: Favorable
Disagreeable: Agreeable
Unpleasant: Pleasant
Negative: Positive
Dislike this company: Like this company

*All factor loadings are significant at p<.0001.
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Figure 6: Study 2, Nomological Validity Testing
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To summarize Study 2, the purpose of Study 2 was to confirm the factor structure
of Study 1, and further assess reliability and validity of the scale. Study 2 provided
stronger evidence of nomological validity by using scenarios manipulating levels of
transparency rather than allowing subjects to think about a firm they’ve interacted with in
the past. Generally, the findings of Study 2 mirror those of Study 1 and since the
transparency manipulation was better controlled for confounding constructs compared to
Study 1, the findings are more likely to be a result of changing levels of transparency
rather than some other underlying construct not being measured.
Chapter Summary
Two studies were conducted to develop the transparency scale. Study 1 was
dedicated to scale development and validation for the transparency construct. The scale
development procedure followed the guidelines as set forth by Churchill (1979) and
Gerbing and Anderson (1988). Study 1 consisted of three phases: 1) scale item
generation and testing the face validity of those scale items to be applied in the
subsequent phase, 2) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the underlying
dimensions of transparency and to reduce the number of indicators, and 3) confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) to validate the psychometric properties of the scale developed
through the EFA and to test its predictive and nomological validities. Study 1 resulted in
a seven-item, one factor psychometrically sound transparency scale. Study 2 was
dedicated to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric
properties and validity. The findings from Study 2 further validated the transparency
scale from Study 1 and provided further evidence of its psychometric and validity
properties.
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CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESIS TESTING: METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS
& RESULTS

This chapter focuses on testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and
illustrated in Figure 2 via two data collections. The first data collection (Study 3; study
numbers continue from the previous chapter) serves to test the complete proposed model
in Chapter 4 using scenarios as the stimuli. The second data collection (Study 4) tests the
model using scenarios with a slightly more ecologically valid manipulation of the
constructs. It tests the full model across two different stimuli which combine two oftenused corporate marketing communications methods, email and a website.
Study 3
The purpose of Study 3 is to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 using
scenarios. The complete proposed model was tested with a 2 (consumer effort: low, high)
x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high)
between subjects design using pretested scenarios as the stimuli. The airline context for
the scenarios remained the same as in previous studies.
Pretest of Scenarios. The scenarios manipulating each of the three antecedents
were first pretested with separate samples of undergraduate marketing students in a
between-subjects design. Table 18 provides the manipulations for the high and low
conditions for the three antecedents. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions (high/low) for either consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, or perceived
firm-damaging information.
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Prior to testing the effectiveness of the manipulations, scale items for the three
constructs were first subjected to individual EFA and internal reliability analyses to
ensure the measures were one-dimensional and internally consistent. Although the
sample sizes were extremely small for factor analysis (consumer effort: n = 14; firm
reciprocity: n = 16; negative information: n = 20), research indicates that “if components
possess four or more variables with loadings above .60, the pattern may be interpreted
whatever the sample size used” (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988).
For perceived consumer effort, all four factor loadings ranged from .71 - .97. All
variables loaded onto one factor which explained 89% of the retained variance.
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .91 and item-to-total correlations ranged
from .70 - .93. Thus the perceived consumer effort scale shows adequate onedimensionality and internal consistency.
For perceived firm reciprocity, all four factor loadings ranged from .71 – 1.0. All
variables loaded onto one factor which explained 100% of the retained variance.
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .95 and item-to-total correlations ranged
from .71 - .96. Thus the perceived reciprocity scale shows adequate one-dimensionality
and internal consistency.
For perceived firm-damaging information, a two-factor solution resulted from
EFA. Upon close examination of the two factors, only one factor represented the
conceptualization of the construct. The definition provided in Chapter 4 was “the extent
to which a consumer perceives that a firm is willingly providing negative information
about itself or about its products that could be harmful to its sales or reputation”. Upon
close examination, the first factor (“This company shares unbiased information about
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itself or its products”, “This company provides information that could be harmful to its
reputation”, and “This company provides information that could be harmful to its sales”)
closely represented the conceptualization of the construct and were kept. Both of the
reverse coded items, which loaded onto the second factor (“This company provides only
favorable information about itself or its products” and “This company seems willing to
share only the good things about itself or its products”) were removed due to low factor
loadings and because they did not best represent the conceptual definition compared to
the first factor. The two reverse coded items loading onto one factor (and with low factor
loadings) is not surprising as reverse coded items can be problematic in factor analysis
(Herche & Engelland, 1996). The remaining variables loaded onto one factor, with factor
loadings of .88 for both items. This factor explained 100% of the retained variance.
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .87 and item-to-total correlations was .78.
Next, the scenarios were checked to ensure subjects perceived the scenarios as
intended. All three manipulation checks worked as intended. The effectiveness of the
manipulations was tested with an independent samples T test. Levene’s test was nonsignificant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups
for each manipulation check were roughly equal. On average, subjects exposed to the
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 8) experienced higher perceived
consumer effort (M = 5.78, SE = .37) than the subjects (n = 6) exposed to the low
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 2.58, SE = .57). This difference was
significant t (12) = -4.92, p<.0001. On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived
reciprocity manipulation (n = 6) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 5.21, SE
= .32) than the subjects (n = 10) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity manipulation
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(M = 1.80, SE = .38). This difference was significant t (14) = -6.14, p<.0001. On
average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n =
10) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 6.25, SE = .24) than the
subjects (n = 10) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M =
2.85, SE = .48). This difference was significant t (18) = -6.37, p<.0001.
Finally, three two-way factorial ANOVAs were performed as a test to ensure the
three manipulated constructs did not influence each other. For each ANOVA, one of the
three manipulated constructs was defined as the measured dependent variable, and the
other two were defined as independent variables each with two groups (high/low). An
interaction term was also defined between the two categorical independent variables in
each model. For all three models, the independent variables had neither main nor
interaction effects with the dependent variables. For the model with negative information
as the dependent variable and perceived firm effort and perceived firm reciprocity as the
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm
effort, F (1,43) =.02, p = .89, and perceived firm reciprocity, F (1,43) = 1.24, p = .27. For
the model with perceived firm reciprocity as the dependent variable and perceived firm
effort and negative information as the two independent variables, there was a nonsignificant main effect of both perceived firm effort, F (1,43) = .00, p = .96, and negative
information, F (1,43) = .20, p = .24. For the model with perceived firm effort as the
dependent variable and perceived firm reciprocity and negative information as the two
independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm
reciprocity, F (1,43) = .78, p = .69, and negative information, F (1,43) = .76, p = .39.
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Test of the Model
Method. The data collection lasted seven days. Undergraduate business students
were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the instructors.
There were 305 completed surveys. Students received extra credit for participating in the
study.
Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, data was collected via online questionnaires.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios designed to manipulate the
high and low levels of perceived consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, and
perceived firm-damaging information. The manipulations were designed based on the
conceptual definitions of the three constructs. Table 18 provides the scenarios
manipulating each of these variables at two levels (high/low).
Table 18: Study 3, Manipulations for Antecedents of Transparency
Variable

Low

High

Consumer Effort

The website was organized very
intuitively and ABC Airlines made it
very easy to find whatever information
you were looking for on its website.
Also, the information was easy to
understand with the writing style and
language that ABC used.

The website wasn’t organized very
intuitively and ABC Airlines didn’t
make it very easy to find whatever
information you were looking for on
its website. Also, the information
provided wasn’t easy to understand
with the writing style and technical
language that ABC used.

Reciprocity

The airline didn’t provide a way to
contact it.

The airline provided a “Contact Us”
page inviting you to contact them by
filling out a quick web form or you
could contact the company by phone
(toll-free), email, physical mail,
and/or by instant messenger.

Firm-Damaging
Information

The airline provided pricing for its
flights and an overview of the pros of
flying with ABC airlines.

The airline provided pricing details
for not only ABC flights but also its
competitors. Additionally, the
company provided an overview of
the pros and cons of flying with
ABC airlines.
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The set up remained the same for each manipulation:
Set up for all 8 conditions:
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in
the near future. Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the
airlines that fly into the airport that is nearest to him/her. You hadn’t
flown this airline before.
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is
given priority for this particular airline. You went to ABC’s website
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying
on this airline.
The scenario’s set-up paragraph was then followed by the manipulations of the three
antecedents. For example, below is the full manipulation for the low consumer effort by
high reciprocity by high firm-damaging information:
“Please imagine that…
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in
the near future. Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the
airlines that fly into the airport that is nearest to him/her. You hadn’t
flown this airline before.
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is
given priority for this particular airline. You went to ABC’s website
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying
on this airline.
The next page provides additional information regarding what you
learned when you went to ABC Airlines' website”.
“There were a few things you noticed while surfing ABC’s website:
The website was organized very intuitively and ABC Airlines made it very easy to
find whatever information you were looking for on its website. Also, the information
was easy to understand with the writing style and language that ABC used.

The airline didn’t provide a way to contact it.
The airline provided a “Contact Us” page inviting you to contact them by
filling out a quick web form or you could contact the company by phone (tollfree), email, physical mail, and/or by instant messenger.
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The airline provided pricing details for not only ABC flights but also its
competitors. Additionally, the company provided an overview of the pros and
cons of flying with ABC airlines.
You will be asked to recall these on the next page.”
Subjects were exposed to the survey after the scenario which included a series of
scale items to measure transparency, skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and
purchase intention to test H1 – H10. Finally, subjects were exposed to the scale items
intended to measure perceived firm motive to test H11a and H11b. The scale items for
perceived firm motive were adapted from an altruistic attribution scale intended to
measure a consumer’s perception that a firm’s behavior is motived by either self-interest
or other-interest (i.e. “society”) (Alcañiz, Cáceres, & Pérez, 2010). This scale is
consistent with this dissertation’s conceptualization of perceived firm motives. Recall
that perceived firm motives was conceptualized as the extent to which firm transparency
is perceived as either other-serving (benefiting others besides the firm) or firm-serving
(benefiting the firm). It was proposed that transparency should have a stronger impact in
reducing skepticism and increasing trust when consumers perceive the firm’s
transparency as other-serving compared to when consumers perceive the firm’s
transparency as firm-serving. The motive scale items followed one of two directions to
answering the questions depending on how the subject responded to the scale item, “this
company is transparent”. For example, for those subjects who selected either ‘somewhat
disagree’, ‘disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’, the direction was:
“You previously answered either ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘disagree’, or
‘strongly disagree to the statement: ‘ABC Airlines is transparent’. Why
do you think ABC Airlines had this level of transparency on its website?”
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For those subjects who selected either ‘somewhat agree’, ‘agree’, or ‘strongly agree’, the
direction was:
“You previously answered either ‘somewhat agree’, ‘agree’, or ‘strongly
agree’ to the statement: ‘ABC Airlines is transparent’. Why do you think
ABC Airlines had this level of transparency on its website?”
Responses were excluded from the analysis for those subjects who answered ‘neither
agree nor disagree’ to the statement ‘this company is transparent’. There were 94
subjects who were excluded from the analysis due to answering the item ‘this company is
transparent’ with ‘neither agree nor disagree’. Of the 214 subjects remaining for the
SEM analysis, 62% were 21 and under, 33% were 22 to 34 years old, 3% were 35 to 44
years old, and 2% were 45 to 54 years old. Each set-up was then followed by the
perceived firm motives scale. Example scale items included “This firm… had bad
intentions toward customers/good intentions toward customers”, and “This firm
had…bad motives that might hurt customers/good motives that might help customers”.
Finally, subjects were exposed to the scales measuring transparency’s
antecedents. The measures for perceived consumer effort were adapted from
product/information search literature (Srinivasan & Ratchford, 1991) and an example
included “It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time searching on this company’s
website for information that I wanted to know about this company”. The measures for
perceived reciprocity were adapted from the interactivity literature (Liu, 2003) and an
example scale item included the following item “The company makes it difficult to offer
feedback to it”. The measures for firm-damaging information were based on this
dissertation’s conceptual definition and an example included “This company provides
only favorable information about itself or its products”. The final scale items for each of
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the three antecedents of transparency and the motive moderator are listed in Table 20.
All variables were measured with 7-point Likert-type scales.
Results. Four procedures were conducted as a part of testing the full proposed
model. First, EFAs were conducted on all of the scales to ensure uni-dimensionality.
Second, the manipulations were checked to ensure the scenarios were perceived as
intended. Third, all scales in the model were tested through a measurement model to
ensure the scales exhibited adequate validities and the overall measurement model
exhibited adequate model fit indices. Fourth, the full structural model was tested.
For the EFAs, one reverse-scale item measuring perceived firm-reciprocity (“I
feel like this company only wants to talk TO me rather than WITH me”) was dropped for
having a communality estimate of .34 which is far below the .50 recommended threshold
(Hair et al., 2006a). The remaining scale items for all constructs were subjected to
individual EFAs. All scales loaded onto a single factor and internal reliability ranged
from .88 (perceived firm-damaging information) to .98 (attitude toward the firm) for all
constructs.
For the manipulation checks, all three manipulation checks worked as intended.
The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with a t test. Levene’s test was nonsignificant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups
for each manipulation check were roughly equal. On average, subjects exposed to the
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 121) experienced higher perceived
consumer effort (M = 5.56, SE = .13) than the subjects (n = 92) exposed to the low
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 3.32, SE = .16). This difference was
significant t (213) = 10.84, p<.0001. On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived
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reciprocity manipulation (n = 96) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 4.70, SE
= .18) than the subjects (n = 117) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity manipulation
(M = 2.21, SE = .11). This difference was significant t (213) = 11.33, p<.0001. On
average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n =
142) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 4.06, SE = .12) than the
subjects (n = 71) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M =
3.05, SE = .16). This difference was significant t (213) = 5.02, p<.0001.
For the measurement model, all items were constrained to the constructs in which
they were intended to measure. The chi-square was 910.18 (p <.0001) with 524 degrees
of freedom. Given the sample size (N = 214) and the number of observed variables (m =
35), the model fit indices indicated a somewhat adequate fit to the data based on absolute
(e.g. SRMSR = .04) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .95 and NFI = .89). However,
the model fit indices indicated a less than adequate fit to the data based on parsimony fit
indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .06 and probability of close fit = .01). The fit indices indicated
the model could be improved. One item at a time was deleted from the model to improve
model fit based on investigating the residuals for pairs of variables and the fit indices.
For the final model, the chi-square was 291.91 (p<.0001) with 216 degrees of freedom
and 24 variables. The model fit indices indicated a much better fit to the data based on
absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .02 and GFI = .90) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .99 and
NFI = .95). The model fit indices also indicated an excellent fit to the data based on
parsimony fit indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .04 and probability of close fit = .86). The means
and other statistics for all scales in the model are presented in Table 19. The final scale
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items from the measurement model are provided in Table 19 along with their factor
loadings.
Table 19: Study 3, Means for Final Scales
Scale
Transparency
Effort
Reciprocity
Negative
Information
Skepticism
Trust
Attitude
Purchase Intention
Motive

Mean
3.86
4.59
3.33
3.73

Std Dev
1.82
1.86
1.99
1.47

Mode
2
6
1
5

Range
6
6
6
6

3.73
3.92
3.56
3.81
4.23

1.54
1.49
1.42
1.92
1.56

2
4
5
1
4

6
6
5
6
6

Table 20: Study 3, Factor Loadings for Measurement Model
Variable
Name

Factor
Loadings

Description

t value
(Std. error)

Consumer Effort (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .95, AVE = .89 )
EFFORT1

It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time
searching this company's website for information that
I wanted to know about this company.
0.92
EFFORT2
It seems I would have to put in a lot of effort to learn
about this company.
0.89
EFFORT3
It seems this company shares information about itself
in such a way that I would have to try hard to learn
about it.
0.86
Perceived Firm Reciprocity (Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR =.91 , AVE = .92)

55.54 (.02)
45.23 (.02)

38.52 (.02)

RECIPR1

This company seems to facilitate two-way
communication between itself and customers.
0.98
27.72 (.03)
RECIPR2
This company affords me the opportunity to
communicate with it.
0.85
23.29 (.04)
Perceived Firm-Damaging Information (Cronbach's Alpha = .86, CR = .86, AVE = .82)
NEGINFO3

This company seems to provide information that
could be harmful to its reputation.
0.75
NEGINFO4
This company seems to provide information that
could be harmful to its sales.
0.82
NEGINFO6
This company seems to provide negative information
about itself or its products.
0.89
Perceived Firm Transparency (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .93, AVE = .90
TRANSP16
TRANSP18
TRANSP27

This company provides me with a learning
opportunity about itself.
This company enables me to know what it's doing.
This company wants me to understand what it is
doing.
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20.25 (.04)
25.33 (.03)
31.50 (.03)

0.89

50.71 (.02)

0.89

50.95 (.02)

0.93

70.03 (.01)

Variable
Name

Factor
Loadings

t value
(Std. error)

0.83

27.06 (.03)

0.87

30.92 (.03)

Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR = .90, AVE = .91)
TRST1
This company can be trusted.

0.94

56.54 (.02)

TRST3

0.87

40.80 (.02)

Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .95, CR = .96, AVE = .94)
ATT1
Bad: Good
0.93
ATT2
Unfavorable: Favorable
0.95

85.21 (.01)

ATT3

0.94

89.21 (.01)

Description

Skepticism (Cronbach's Alpha = .83, CR = .84, AVE = .85)
SKEP1
This company cares more about getting me to buy its
product/service than it does about what's good for me.
SKEP2

This company tries to trick customers into buying
something.

This company is truthful.

Disagreeable: Agreeable

107.4 (.01)

Purchase Intention (Cronbach's Alpha = .96, CR = .96, AVE = .95)
PI1

I would be willing to buy from this company.

0.97

145.1 (.01)

PI2

I will take this company into consideration the next
time I buy a product/service like this.
I can imagine buying this company's product/service.

0.93

82.08 (.01)

0.95

104.8 (.01)

0.95

88.04 (.01)

0.87

45.68 (.02)

0.91

60.53 (.02)

PI3

Perceived Firm Motive (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .94, AVE = .91)
MOTIVE1
MOTIVE2
MOTIVE3

Bad intentions toward customers…Good intentions
toward customers
Intended to take advantage of customers…Not
intended to take advantage of customers
Bad motives that might hurt customers…Good
motives that might help customers

Chi-Square (216, n = 214) = 291.91 (p<.0001), SRMSR = .02, GFI = .90, RMSEA = .04,
CFI = .98, NFI = .95

Tests of validity. Next, the constructs in the measurement model were then tested
for convergent and discriminant validities prior to testing the full structural model. All
scales exhibited adequate convergent validity. The factor loadings ranged from .75 to
.97. Average variance extracted ranged from .82 to .95 which is above the recommended
threshold of .50 (Hair et al., 2006c). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha ranged from .85 to .96
and composite reliability (CR) ranged from .84 to .96. Cronbach’s alpha, composite
reliability, and average variance extracted are provided in Table 21.
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Discriminant validity was assessed between transparency and all of the other
constructs in the proposed model. AVE and confidence intervals around correlations
were assessed. The AVE for the constructs in the model were .90 (TRANSP), .91
(TRST), .85 (SKEP), .94 (ATT), and .95 (PI). Transparency shows good discriminant
validity between it and the other variables. The square of the correlations were less than
the average variance extracted for all variable pairs indicating each of the constructs
exhibit discriminant validity from the other constructs in the model. Table 21 provides
the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct. The
confidence intervals were assessed as a second test of discriminant validity. None of the
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors
included 1.0.
Table 21: Study 3, Psychometric Properties of Constructs
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations
TRANSP TRST SKEP ATT
PI
EFFORT RECIPR NEGINFO

MOTIVE

TRANSP

0.90

0.70

-0.57

0.81

0.81

-0.60

0.42

0.23

0.81

TRST

0.49

0.91

-0.64

0.74

0.75

-0.48

0.39

0.25

0.79

SKEP

0.33

0.41

0.85

-0.66

-0.61

0.48

-0.32

-0.33

-0.73

ATT

0.65

0.55

0.44

0.94

0.86

-0.67

0.50

0.24

0.83

PI

0.65

0.57

0.38

0.73

0.95

-0.60

0.45

0.27

0.81

EFFORT

0.36

0.23

0.23

0.44

0.36

0.89

-0.30

-0.09*

-0.57

RECIPR

0.18

0.15

0.11

0.25

0.20

0.09

0.92

0.12

0.47

NEGINFO

0.05

0.06

0.11

0.06

0.07

0.01

0.01

0.82

0.28

MOTIVE

0.65

0.63

0.53

0.68

0.65

0.32

0.22

0.08

0.91

Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal.
* Correlations are not significant at p<.05. All other correlations significant at p<.05.
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Test of Hypotheses. All hypotheses were tested through a structural equation
model2. Recall that the model proposed in this dissertation includes a moderating
variable which requires creating a construct in the SEM to represent the interaction term
between Transparency and Motives. The constrained and unconstrained methods for
creating the interaction term were investigated. The technique used for creating the
transparency and motive interaction construct in the model followed the unconstrained
method advocated and tested by Marsh et al. (Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004). Marsh and
colleagues found that a simpler, unconstrained path method resulted in just as good, if not
better, fit indices as compared to the more complex and constrained path method
approach advocated by Kenny and Judd, Ping, and others (Kenny & Judd, 1984; Ping Jr,
1996). In the constrained path approach for a structural equation model with X, Z, and
XZ constructs, path estimates and error terms for X and Z are constrained to the values
associated with them in the initial measurement model. The indicators for XZ are created
by taking the cross product of each of the indicators from X and Z. Thus XZ would have
four indicators if X and Z both have two indicators (X1*Z1, X2*Z2, X1*Z2, and X2*Z1)
and XZ would have nine indicators if X and Z both have three indicators. The main
concern with this method is that the indicators violate the assumption of multivariate
normality, causing “erroneous” standard errors and chi-square statistics, even when the
indicators are in mean-deviation form (Marsh et al., 2004).
Another advantage to the Marsh et al. (2004) approach is the use of a “matchedpair” strategy for creating the indicators of the interaction term. With this method, only

2

Since the data was collected via an experimental design, the author also conducted supplemental analysis
including ANOVA and MANOVA to investigate the effects the manipulated variables on the other
independent variables in the model. The detailed analysis and findings is presented in Appendix B
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three indicators are necessary to create XY when X and Y each have three indicators
(X1*Y1, X2*Y2, and X3*Y3). This is a better approach to the all possible cross-product
combinations method (Kenny & Judd, 1984) which requires the XY to include all
possible cross-product combinations, which introduces convergence and non-estimation
problems (Marsh et al., 2004). Overall, the advantage to using the unconstrained,
matched-pair strategy is that it is much simpler for researchers to use, it provides a more
robust method in terms of non-normality, and ultimately provides for similar or better fit
indices when data strays from normality (Marsh et al., 2004).
To create the SEM model to test the hypotheses, consistent with Marsh et al.
(2004), first, all of the indicators were transformed into mean-deviation form via Z
scores. Skewness was < 1 and kurtosis was < 2 for all indicators indicating the data does
not stray too far from non-normality. Second, each of the three indicators for the
transparency and motive interaction construct were created by taking the product of one
transparency indicator and one motive indicator. It does not matter which items from
each scale are combined together so long as the constructs are one-dimensional (Marsh et
al., 2004). In keeping with previous research, the items combined were taken
sequentially from each construct (Marsh et al., 2004). In particular, the first transparency
scale item was combined with the first motive scale to create the first
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY16*MOTIVE1). The second transparency
scale item was combined with the second motive scale item to create the second
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY18*MOTIVE2). Finally, the third
transparency scale item was combined with the third motive scale item to create the third
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY27*MOTIVE3). Both the motive and the
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motive*transparency interaction construct were placed in the model as exogenous
constructs.
The full structural equation model is presented in Figure 7 along with the
standardized results for linear equations and their standard errors. The chi-square was
573.22 (p <.0001) on 297 degrees of freedom. The model fit indices indicated an
adequate fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .07 and GFI = .89),
parsimonious (e.g. RMSEA = .07), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .96 and NFI =
.91). As Figure 7 illustrates, all paths were significant with the exception of the paths
from the two proposed interaction effects and the path from skepticism to purchase
intention. First is a discussion of the hypotheses predicting direct effects, followed by a
discussion of the hypotheses predicting mediation and moderation. Table 22 provides a
summary of the results for the test of hypotheses based on the structural equation model.
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Figure 7: Study 3, Full Test of the Proposed Model

163

The direct effect hypotheses predicting consumer effort (H 1), firm reciprocity
(H2), and negative information (H3) as antecedents of transparency are all supported
indicating they had a significant direct effect on transparency (EFFORT = -.52, p<.01;
RECIPR = .38, p<.01; NEGINFO = .15, p<.01). The hypotheses predicting transparency
having direct effects on skepticism (H4), trust (H5), attitude toward the firm (H6), and
purchase intention (H7) are supported (SKEP = -.20, p<.01, TRST = .24, p<.01, ATT =
.65, p<.01, PI = .39, p<.01).
The hypotheses predicting mediation (H8a,b and H9a,b) required a multi-step
process. For mediation to occur, the independent variable must have significant effects
on both the mediating and dependent variables, and the mediating variable must have
significant effects on the dependent variable. In the multi-step process, first it is
necessary to show that the independent variable has significant effects on the mediating
and dependent variables (without the path from the mediator to the dependent variable in
the model). Then it is necessary to show that the effect of the independent variable on the
dependent variable decreases when the path from the mediator to the dependent variable
is introduced into the model (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For full mediation, the path from
the independent variable to the dependent variable will become non-significant once the
mediating path is introduced into the model. For partial mediation, the path from the
independent variable to the dependent variable may still be significant when the
mediating path is introduced but the effect must be reduced. For partial mediation it is
important to interpret the size of the indirect (or mediating) effect. To calculate the
indirect effect size, the path estimate from the independent variable to the mediator is
multiplied by the path estimate from the mediator to dependent variable. A small effect
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size is .01 - .08, a medium effect size is .09 - .25, and a large effect size is at least .25
(Cohen, 1988). Additionally, Hair et. al. (2006) note that effect sizes below .08 “do not
add to substantive conclusions” and should not be interpreted.
H8a, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is
partially mediated by skepticism, is supported. In the model without the mediating path
of skepticism to attitude, both paths from transparency to skepticism (β = -.28) and from
transparency to attitude (β =.70) were significant (p<.01). In the model with the
mediating path, all three paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency
to attitude path was reduced from .70 to .65 supporting partial mediation by skepticism.
A bootstrap analysis was conducted which revealed that the 95% confidence interval for
the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.04, .15), which suggested a significant
indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
H8b, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is
partially mediated by trust, is supported. In the model without the mediating path of trust
to attitude, both paths from transparency to trust (β = .30) and from transparency to
attitude (β =.73) were significant (p<.01). In the model with the mediating path, all three
paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was
reduced from .73 to .65 supporting partial mediation by trust. The bootstrap analysis
revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero
(.12, .25), indicating a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
H9a, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially
mediated by skepticism, is not supported. The mediating path from skepticism to
purchase intention was not significant in the structural model. According to Baron and
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Kenny (1986), the path from the mediator to the dependent variable must be significant in
order to test its mediating effects. As a result, skepticism is not a mediating variable
between transparency and purchase intention since the path from skepticism to purchase
intention was non-significant.
H9b, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially
mediated by trust, is supported. In the model without the mediating path of trust to
purchase intention, both paths from transparency to trust (β = .27) and from transparency
to purchase intention (β =.41) were significant (p<.01). In the model with the mediating
path, all three paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to
purchase intention path was reduced from .41 to .39 supporting partial mediation by trust.
The bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the
indirect effect excluded zero (.14, .32), suggesting a significant indirect effect (Preacher
& Hayes, 2004).
Regarding the moderating hypotheses, it was proposed that the impact of
transparency on skepticism will be greater with perceptions of other-serving motive
attributions than with perceptions of firm-serving motive attributions. Likewise, the
impact of transparency on trust will be greater with perceptions of other-serving motive
attributions than with perceptions of firm-serving motive attributions. The moderating
hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency
on skepticism (H11a) is not supported (β = .08, p>.05). The hypothesis predicting that
perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency on trust (H11b) is also not
supported (β = -.01, p>.10). A post-hoc analysis of the linear correlations between
transparency and skepticism and transparency and trust at high (firm-serving) motives
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and low (other-serving) motives was performed to better understand the interaction of
transparency and motives. For both firm and other-serving motives, transparency was
correlated with skepticism and trust in the predicted directions. As hypothesized in
Chapter 4, the strength of the relationships is less when the motives for being transparent
are perceived to be more firm-serving motives than other-serving motives. However, the
correlation between transparency and skepticism for subjects who perceived firm-serving
motives was non-significant (r = -.09, p = .45) while the correlation between transparency
and skepticism for subjects who perceived other-serving motives was significant (r =-.29,
p<.01). Both of the correlations between transparency and trust for subjects who
perceived firm-serving motives and for those who perceived other serving motives were
significant (firm-serving: r = .46, p<.0001 and other-serving: r = .49, p<.0001) and in the
predicted direction. One possible explanation for motives not being a moderator of the
effects of transparency on skepticism and trust in the structural equation model is that
motives are less important in the overall evaluation process of firms by stakeholders.
What may matter most is whether or not a firm is or isn’t transparent rather than why a
firm is or isn’t transparent. A second possible explanation is that transparency motives
were not salient enough to subjects as they responded to the survey since the scale items
for perceived motives were presented after the scale items for skepticism, trust, attitude,
and purchase intention. A final possible explanation is that the right moderating motives
were not captured in the scale items.
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Table 22: Study 3, Results for Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a
firm has a negative effect on perceptions of
transparency.

Finding
Supported

H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on
perceptions of transparency.

Supported

H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as
firm-damaging has a positive effect on perceptions of
transparency.

Supported

H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on
consumer skepticism.

Supported

H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
trust.

Supported

H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
attitudes toward the firm.

Supported

H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
purchase intention.

Supported

H8a: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the
firm is partially mediated by consumer skepticism.

Supported

H8b: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the
firm is partially mediated trust.

Supported

H9a: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is
partially mediated by consumer skepticism.

Not Supported

H9b: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is
partially mediated by trust.

Supported

H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on
purchase intention.

Supported

H11a: The influence of transparency on consumer
skepticism is moderated by perceived firm motives.
H11b: The influence of transparency on trust is
moderated by perceived firm motives.

Not Supported

Not supported

To summarize Study 3, the purpose of Study 3 was to test the hypotheses
presented in Chapter 4 using scenarios in an airline context as stimuli and a structural
equation model as the analysis method. The complete proposed model was tested with a 2
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(consumer effort: low, high) x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging
information: low, high) between subjects design. Of the three antecedents, consumer
effort had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency (β = -.52, p<.01),
followed by perceived firm reciprocity (β = .38, p<.01), and negative information (β =
.15, p<.01). This provides some insight into helping firms prioritize their transparency
strategy with customers. The findings here would suggest that firms with limited
resources should first start with making it easy for customers to learn about the company
and its products as those efforts will have the highest impact on perceptions of firm
transparency. Interestingly, of the three antecedents, negative information has the least
impact on transparency, which is probably good news for firms as they would most likely
be most resistant to sharing negative information about itself compared to other methods
of transparency. Study 3 also revealed that transparency has significant direct impact on
reducing skepticism (β = -.20, p<.01), and increasing trust (β = .48, p<.01), attitude
toward the firm (β = .65, p<.01), and purchase intention (β = .39, p<.01); and these
impacts are of substantial magnitude. Overall, Study 3 has shown that transparency is an
important construct for firms in gaining more favorable attitudes and purchase intention
from stakeholders.
Next is Study 4, which tests the full structural equation model incorporating both
a fictitious email and website into the stimuli design. A more diverse sample in terms of
age will also be used in Study 4 in addition to testing the model with different marketing
communications stimuli.
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Study 4
The purpose of Study 4 is to further test the proposed model in a slightly more
ecologically valid setting with a more diverse sample. The scenarios used in Study 3
were modified to develop 8 new airline scenarios for a 2 (consumer effort: low, high) x 2
(perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high) between
subjects design. In these new scenarios, ABC Airlines introduced a new in-flight service
by sending out an email communication to its customers. The airline then referred
customers to its website for additional information about the new in-flight service.
Test of the Model
Method. The data collection lasted 14 days. A more diverse age range of
participants were solicited for participation including students and non-students.
Undergraduate business students were recruited to participate in the study via an email
by the instructors. Students received extra credit for participating in the study. The nonstudents were recruited to participate in the study via an email and social media
(Facebook and Linked In) notifications by the researcher to a convenience sample. There
were 341 completed surveys.
Procedure. As in Studies 1, 2 and 3, data was collected via online questionnaires.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios designed to manipulate the
high and low levels of perceived consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, and
perceived firm-damaging information. The manipulations were designed based on
scenarios of Study 3 and the conceptual definitions of the three constructs.
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The experiment required subjects to first read an introduction about ABC Airlines
in which they were asked to imagine they recently purchased an airline ticket to fly ABC
Airlines.
Introduction for all manipulations:
“ABC Airlines is sending out an email to all of its customers to announce
a new in-flight service that it will offer on all of its planes. One of the
ways that ABC Airlines is marketing this new service is by sending out
emails to all those customers who recently booked a flight. Please
imagine you are one of these customers.”

Subjects were then asked to read an email from ABC Airlines to its customers in which
the airline was introducing a new in-flight service. The email was addressed to the
subject by name in the salutation of the email. The name was auto-populated from a
previous page in which subjects were asked to provide their first name. Therefore if the
subject said his name was “John” then the email started with “Dear John”. This part of
the email was created to stimulate interest in the email and add personalization to it so as
to increase ecological validity. Following the salutation, each email consisted of the
same first paragraph for all manipulations:
“Thank you for recently booking a flight with ABC Airlines! We thought
we’d share with you an exciting new in-flight service that will be
available on your next flight. This new in-flight service will allow
passengers the option to connect to different websites via APPS right
from the touchscreen located at each seat. We've provided a list of
features on our website at www.abcairlines.com.”

The second paragraph was intended to manipulate perceived firm reciprocity by
manipulating the number of different ways ABC Airlines offered its customers a way to
communicate with it. For example, the high reciprocity condition included the following
verbiage:
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“Would you like to contact us? We can address your questions and
comments by email (newfees@abcairlines.com) or you can speak to a
representative by calling our toll-free number (888-931-1ABC). You may
also chat with us instantly online by visiting our website
(www.ABCairlines.com\instantchat).”

Whereas the low reciprocity condition included the following verbiage:
“Would you like to contact us? We can address your questions and
comments by email (newfees@abcairlines.com).”

Following the reciprocity manipulation was verbiage constant to all manipulations:
“We know you have many choices from which to choose for your next air
travel. We appreciate your business and look forward to flying with you
soon.
Sincerely,
ABC Airlines”
Finally, the email included a ‘P.S’ section intended to manipulate perceived firm
damaging information. In the low firm-damaging information, it was suggested that
ABC Airlines provided on their website pros of flying with them and flight pricing:
“P.S.
You may also visit our website for:
- A letter from the CEO summarizing the past year’s successes.
- An overview of the pros of flying with ABC Airlines.
- Flight prices for our flights.”
In the high condition, it was suggested that ABC Airlines provided on their website pros
and cons of flying with them and flight pricing for both ABC and its competitors:

-

“P.S.
You may also visit our website for:
A letter from the CEO summarizing the past year’s successes (and failures
too) for the company.
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-

An overview of the pros and cons of flying with ABC Airlines. The
overview provides what our customers like and dislike about our services.
Flight prices for not only our flights but also our competitors. We’ll let
you know when we’re not the cheapest flight available.”

After reading the email, subjects were then asked to proceed to the company’s website to
learn more about the new in-flight service:
“Click the >> button for more information on the company's website about
this new in-flight product.”
The website stimuli were intended to manipulate perceived consumer effort. The website
was non-descript with the exception of an ABC Airlines logo at the top of each web page.
The same content which discussed additional features of the in-flight service was
provided for both high and low conditions:
“Some applications (APPS) that will be available include those from
social media, news, and entertainment sites.
Other features include:





Unlimited access to any of the offered APP sites during your flight.
The ability to use all of the features within each APP. For example,
in the Facebook APP you will be able to post status updates, send
emails, etc. just as you would from your computer.
A modest cost of $3.99, which is less than purchasing in-flight WiFi.
Availability by the time you are scheduled to fly with ABC
Airlines.”

However, for the low perceived consumer effort condition, the content was presented in
bullet form, on a single page, and in a larger, more readable font (as seen above). For the
high perceived consumer effort condition, the content was presented in paragraph form,
across several web pages (to mimic search and click behaviors on a real website), in
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small font (to mimic ‘fine print’), and presented at the very bottom of the web page (to
mimic search and scroll behaviors on a real website).
Finally, subjects completed the survey after subjects were presented with the web pages
for the new in-flight service.
Procedure for test of full model. Four procedures were conducted as a part of
testing the full proposed model. First, EFAs were conducted on all of the scales to ensure
uni-dimensionality. Second, the manipulations were checked to ensure the scenarios
were perceived as intended. Third, all scales in the model were tested through a
measurement model to ensure the scales exhibited adequate validities and the overall
measurement model exhibited adequate model fit indices. Fourth, the full structural
model was tested.
For the EFAs, each scale loaded onto a single factor and internal reliability ranged
from .78 (skepticism) to .93 (attitude toward the firm, purchase intention, trust) for all
constructs.
For the manipulation checks, all three manipulation checks worked as intended.
The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with a t test. Levene’s test was nonsignificant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups
for each manipulation check were roughly equal. On average, subjects exposed to the
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 149) experienced higher perceived
consumer effort (M = 4.29, SE = .12) than the subjects (n = 149) exposed to the low
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 3.89, SE = .11). This difference was
significant t (296) = 2.47, p<.05. On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived
reciprocity manipulation (n = 145) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 4.93,
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SE = .10) than the subjects (n = 155) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity
manipulation (M = 4.49, SE = .09). This difference was significant t (298) = 3.11, p<.01.
On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n
= 150) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 4.04, SE = .09) than the
subjects (n = 145) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M =
3.26, SE = .10). This difference was significant t (293) = 5.78, p<.0001.
Three two-way factorial ANOVAs were also performed as a test to ensure the
three manipulated constructs did not influence each other. For each ANOVA, one of the
three manipulated constructs was defined as the measured dependent variable, and the
other two were defined as independent variables each with two groups (high/low). An
interaction term was also defined between the two categorical independent variables in
each model. For all three models, the independent variables had neither main nor
interaction effects with the dependent variables. For the model with negative information
as the dependent variable and perceived firm effort and perceived firm reciprocity as the
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm
effort, F (1,327) =.52, p = .47, and perceived firm reciprocity, F (1,327) = .19, p = .67.
For the model with perceived firm reciprocity as the dependent variable and perceived
firm effort and negative information as the two independent variables, there was a nonsignificant main effect of both perceived firm effort, F (1,333) = 2.8, p = .12, and
negative information, F (1,333) = .26, p = .61. For the model with perceived firm effort
as the dependent variable and perceived firm reciprocity and negative information as the
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm
reciprocity, F (1,330) = .04, p = .84, and negative information, F (1,330) = 1.13, p = .29.
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Like Study 3, the motives scale items were presented to subjects who responded
to the statement, ‘this company is transparent” with either a ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’. Subjects who
responded to this statement with ‘neither agree nor disagree’ were removed from the
analysis of the measurement and structural model. There were 100 subjects who were
excluded from the analysis due to answering the item ‘this company is transparent’ with
‘neither agree nor disagree’. Of the 201 subjects remaining for the SEM analysis, 32%
were 21 and under, 45% were 22 to 34 years old, 9% were 35 to 44 years old, 6% were
45 to 54 years old, 5% were 55 to 64 years old, and 3% were 65 and older. The goal for
Study 4 (to test the model with a sample that has a more diverse age range compared to
Study 3) was accomplished. The sample for Study 4 is much more diverse compared to
that of Study 3. For Study 3, 62% of the sample was 21 and under, compared to Study 4
which had only 32% of the sample 21 and under. Table 23 provides a comparison of the
age ranges between Studies 3 and 4.
Table 23: Studies 3 and 4, Age Range of Study Participants
Study 3
Percent

Study 4
Percent

21 and under

62%

32%

22 to 34

33%

45%

35 to 44

3%

9%

45 to 54

2%

6%

55 to 64

0

5%

65 and over

0

3%

Age Range

For the measurement model, all items were constrained to load on the constructs
they were intended to measure. The chi-square was 270.93 (p <.0001) with 216 degrees

176

of freedom. Given the sample size (N = 189) and the number of observed variables (m =
24), the model fit indices indicated a good fit based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .03 and
GFI = .89) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .98 and NFI = .93). The model fit indices
indicated a very good fit to the data based on parsimony fit indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .04
and probability of close fit = .90). The means for each of the scales is provided in Table
24. The final scale items from the measurement model are provided in Table 25 along
with their factor loadings.
Table 24: Study 4, Means for Final Scales
Scale

Mean
4.05

Std. Dev.
1.52

Minimum
1

Maximum
7

Reciprocity

4.78

1.38

1

7

Negative Information

3.78

1.35

1

7

Transparency

5.29

1.30

1

7

Skepticism

3.31

1.46

1

7

Trust

4.71

1.31

1

7

Attitude

4.50

1.10

1

6

Purchase Intention

4.89

1.43

1

7

Motive

4.95

1.43

1

7

Effort

Table 25: Study 4, Factor Loadings for Measurement Model
Variable
Name

Description

Factor
Loadings

t value
(Std. error)

0.89

42.13 (.02)

0.93

51.21 (.02)

0.84

31.46 (.03)

0.93

28.81 (.03)

0.78

19.56 (.04)

Consumer Effort (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .95, AVE = .89 )
EFFORT1

EFFORT2
EFFORT3

It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time searching
this company's website for information that I wanted to know
about this company.
It seems I would have to put in a lot of effort to learn about
this company.
It seems this company shares information about itself in such
a way that I would have to try hard to learn about it.

Perceived Firm Reciprocity (Cronbach's Alpha = .82, CR =.91 , AVE = .86)
RECIPR1
RECIPR2

This company seems to facilitate two-way communication
between itself and customers.
This company affords me the opportunity to communicate
with it.
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(table 25 continued)
Variable
Name

Factor
t value
Loadings (Std. error)
Perceived Firm-Damaging Information (Cronbach's Alpha = .84, CR = .91, AVE = .80)
Description

NEGINFO3

This company seems to provide information that could be
harmful to its reputation.
0.89
NEGINFO4 This company seems to provide information that could be
harmful to its sales.
0.84
NEGINFO6 This company seems to provide negative information about
itself or its products.
0.68
Perceived Firm Transparency (Cronbach's Alpha = .87, CR = .95, AVE = .87)
TRANSP16

25.27 (.03)
22.55 (.04)
14.25 (.05)

0.82

28.29 (.03)

TRANSP18

This company provides me with a learning opportunity about
itself.
This company enables me to know what it's doing.

0.93

58.46 (.02)

TRANSP27

This company wants me to understand what it is doing.

0.87

39.77 (.02)

0.78

20.90 (.04)

0.86

27.22 (.03)

Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .97, AVE = .95)
TRST1
This company can be trusted.

0.96

81.38 (.01)

TRST3

0.94

69.99 (.01)

Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .97, AVE = .92)
ATT1
Bad: Good

0.91

56.98 (.02)

ATT2

Unfavorable: Favorable

0.95

80.69 (.01)

ATT3

Disagreeable: Agreeable

0.90

51.04 (.02)

Skepticism (Cronbach's Alpha = .79, CR = .88, AVE = .82)
SKEP1
This company cares more about getting me to buy its
product/service than it does about what's good for me.
SKEP2

This company tries to trick customers into buying something.

This company is truthful.

Purchase Intention (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .96, AVE = .90)
PI1

I would be willing to buy from this company.

0.93

63.12 (.01)

PI2

I will take this company into consideration the next time I
buy a product/service like this.
I can imagine buying this company's product/service.

0.89

47.96 (.02)

0.87

40.91 (.02)

0.90

44.11 (.02)

0.86

35.19 (.02)

0.87

37.21 (.02)

PI3

Perceived Firm Motive (Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR = .95, AVE = .88)
MOTIVE1
MOTIVE2
MOTIVE3

Bad intentions toward customers…Good intentions toward
customers
Intended to take advantage of customers…Not intended to
take advantage of customers
Bad motives that might hurt customers…Good motives that
might help customers

Chi-Square (216, n = 169) = 270.93 (p<.0001), SRMSR = .03, GFI = .89, RMSEA = .04,
CFI = .98, NFI = .93
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Tests of validity. Next, the constructs in the measurement model were tested for
convergent and discriminant validities prior to testing the full structural model. All scales
exhibited adequate convergent validity. The factor loadings ranged from .68 to .96.
Average variance extracted ranged from .80 to .95 which is above the recommended
threshold of .50 (Hair et al., 2006c). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha ranged from .79 to .93
and composite reliability (CR) ranged from .87 to .97. Cronbach’s alpha, composite
reliability, and average variance extracted are provided in Table 26.
Discriminant validity was assessed between transparency and all of the other
constructs in the proposed model. AVE and confidence intervals around correlations
were assessed. The AVE for the constructs in the model were .87 (TRANSP), .95
(TRST), .82 (SKEP), .92 (ATT), .90 (PI), .89 (EFFORT), .86 (RECIPR), .80
(NEGINFO), and .88 (MOTIVE). Transparency shows good discriminant validity
between it and the other variables. The square of the correlations were less than the
average variance extracted for all variable pairs indicating each of the constructs exhibit
discriminant validity from the other constructs in the model. Table 26 provides the
Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct. The
confidence intervals were assessed as a second test of discriminant validity. None of the
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors
included 1.0.
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Table 26: Study 4, Psychometric Properties of Constructs
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Correlations
TRANSP

TRST

SKEP

ATT

PI

EFFORT

RECIPR

NEGINFO

MOTIVE

TRANSP

0.87

0.69

-0.49

0.69

0.69

-0.49

0.55

-.02*

0.64

TRST

0.48

0.95

-0.59

0.75

0.68

-0.44

0.56

.00*

0.74

SKEP

0.24

0.35

0.82

-0.68

-0.59

0.44

-0.35

.08*

-0.59

ATT

0.48

0.56

0.46

0.92

0.73

-0.49

0.52

-0.08*

0.70

PI

0.48

0.46

0.35

0.53

0.90

-0.41

0.58

-.07*

0.67

EFFORT

0.24

0.19

0.19

0.24

0.17

0.89

-0.38

.08*

-0.47

RECIPR

0.30

0.31

0.12

0.27

0.34

0.14

0.86

-.08*

0.56

NEGINFO

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.80

-.07*

MOTIVE

0.41

0.55

0.35

0.49

0.45

0.22

0.31

0.00

0.88

Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal.
* Correlations are not significant at p<.05. All other correlations significant at p<.05.

Test of Hypotheses. All hypotheses were tested through a structural equation
model3.
The full structural equation model is presented in Figure 8 along with the
standardized results for linear equations and their standard errors. The chi-square was
457.52 (p <.0001) on 297 degrees of freedom. The model fit indices indicated an
adequate fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .05), parsimonious (e.g.
RMSEA = .05 and probably of close fit =.26), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .96
and NFI = .90). As Figure 8 illustrates, all paths were significant with the exception of:
the path from negative information to transparency, the paths from the two proposed
interaction effects, and the paths from skepticism and trust to purchase intention.
Compared to Study 3, the model from Study 4 has two additional paths that are non-

3

Since the data was collected via an experimental design, the author conducted ANOVA and MANOVA
analyses to better understand the impact of the manipulations on the dependent variables in the model.
This analysis is presented in Appendix C.
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significant (from negative information to transparency and from trust to purchase
intention). The different findings between Studies 3 and 4 are most likely attributed to
the difference in sample and to the difference in stimuli.
First is a discussion of the hypotheses predicting direct effects, followed by a
discussion of the hypotheses predicting mediation and moderation. Table 27 provides a
summary of the results for the test of hypotheses based on the structural equation model.
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Figure 8: Study 4, Full Test of the Proposed Model
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The direct effect hypotheses predicting consumer effort (H 1) and firm reciprocity
(H2) as antecedents of transparency are supported indicating they had a significant direct
effect on transparency (EFFORT = -.30, p<.01; RECIPR = .62, p<.01). Compared to
Study 3, the path estimate for effort on transparency has decreased (Study 3, EFFORT =
-.52, p<.01) whereas the path estimate for reciprocity on transparency has increased
(Study 3, RECIPR = .38, p<.01). The hypothesis predicting negative information (H3) as
an antecedent of transparency is not supported (β = .04, p>.05), which is in contrast to a
significant path estimate in Study 3 (Study 3, NEGINFO = .15, p<.05).
The hypotheses predicting transparency having direct effects on skepticism (H 4),
trust (H5), attitude toward the firm (H6), and purchase intention (H7) are supported (SKEP
= -.25, p<.01, TRST = .47, p<.01, ATT = .27, p<.01, PI = .39, p<.01). The major
difference in these path estimates between Studies 3 and 4 is that the path estimate from
transparency to attitude has been significantly reduced (Study 3, ATT = .65, p<.01).
The hypotheses predicting mediation (H8a,b and H9a,b) required the same multistep procedure (Baron & Kenny, 1986) as in Study 3. H8a, which predicts the impact of
transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated by skepticism, is supported.
In the model without the mediating path of skepticism to attitude, both paths from
transparency to skepticism (β = -.30) and from transparency to attitude (β =.30) were
significant (p<.01). In the model with the mediating path, all three paths were significant
(p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was reduced from .30 to .27
supporting partial mediation by skepticism. The bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95%
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.14, .27), which
suggested a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
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H8b, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is
partially mediated by trust, is supported. In the model without the mediating path of trust
to attitude, both of the paths from transparency to trust (β = .47) and from transparency to
attitude (β =.40) were significant (p<.01). In the model with the mediating path, all three
paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was
reduced from .40 to .27 supporting partial mediation by skepticism. The bootstrap
analysis showed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect
excluded zero (.24, .43), which suggested a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes,
2004).
H9a, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially
mediated by skepticism, and H9b, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase
intention is partially mediated by trust, are not supported. The mediating paths from
skepticism to purchase intention and trust to purchase intention were not significant in the
structural model. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the path from the mediator to
the dependent variable must be significant in order to test its mediating effects. As a
result, neither skepticism nor trust is a mediating variable between transparency and
purchase intention.
The moderating hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the
relationship of transparency on skepticism (H11a) is not supported (β = .07, p>.10). The
hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency
on trust (H11b) is also not supported (β = -.04, p>.10). The unsupported moderating
hypotheses in this study are consistent with the findings from Study 3. A post-hoc
analysis of the linear correlations between transparency and skepticism and transparency
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and trust at high (firm-serving) motives and low (other-serving) motives was investigated
to better understand the interaction of transparency and motives. For both firm and otherserving motives, transparency was correlated with skepticism and trust in the predicted
directions. As hypothesized in Chapter 4, the strength of the relationships is less when
firm-serving motives are perceived compared to other-serving motives. Unlike in Study
3 where the correlation between transparency and skepticism for subjects who perceived
firm-serving motives was non-significant (r = -.09, p = .45), in Study 4 the correlation
was significant (r = -.24, p<.01). The correlation between transparency and skepticism
for subjects who perceived other-serving motives was also significant (r = -.62, p<.001).
Both of the correlations between transparency and trust for subjects who perceived firmserving motives and for those who perceived other serving motives were significant
(firm-serving: r = .66, p<.0001 and other-serving: r = .71, p<.0001) and in the predicted
direction.
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Table 27: Study 4, Results for Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a
firm has a negative effect on perceptions of
transparency.

Finding
Supported

H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on
perceptions of transparency.

Supported

H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as
firm-damaging has a positive effect on perceptions of
transparency.

Not Supported

H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on
consumer skepticism.

Supported

H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
trust.

Supported

H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
attitudes toward the firm.

Supported

H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on
purchase intention.

Supported

H8a: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the
firm is partially mediated by consumer skepticism.

Supported

H8b: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the
firm is partially mediated trust.

Supported

H9a: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is
partially mediated by consumer skepticism.

Not Supported

H9b: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is
partially mediated by trust.

Not Supported

H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on
purchase intention.

Supported

H11a: The influence of transparency on consumer
skepticism is moderated by perceived firm motives.
H11b: The influence of transparency on trust is
moderated by perceived firm motives.

Not Supported

Not supported

To summarize Study 4, the purpose of Study 4 was to test the hypotheses
presented in Chapter 4 using slightly more ecologically valid scenarios with a more
diverse sample. The complete proposed model was tested with a 2 (consumer effort: low,
high) x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high)
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between subjects design with stimuli that incorporated a mix of marketing
communications methods (an email and a website). Unlike Study 3 where consumer
effort had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency (β = -.52, p<.01),
followed by perceived firm reciprocity (β = .38, p<.01), and negative information (β =
.15, p<.01), this finding was not replicated in Study 4. Perceived firm reciprocity (β =
.62, p<.01) had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency, followed by
perceived consumer effort (β = -.30, p<.01). Negative information had a non-significant
impact on transparency (β = .04, p>.10). One possible explanation to account for the
non-significant relationship of negative information on transparency is that this older
sample may require a stronger indication that firms are willing to provide negative
information in order to impact transparency. The negative information manipulation
included ABC Airlines providing both ‘pros and cons’ of its services. Perhaps providing
both pros and cons suggested to this sample that ABC Airlines wanted to provide
information in a purposeful way such that good information would cancel out the bad
information. It is possible this older sample would perceive firm transparency if ABC
Airlines only provided the cons rather than providing both pros and cons.
Study 4 also revealed that transparency has significant direct impact on reducing
skepticism (β = -.25, p<.01), and increasing trust (β = .47, p<.01), attitude toward the
firm (β = .27, p<.01), and purchase intention (β = .39, p<.01); and these impacts are of
substantial magnitude. Overall, Study 4 has shown that transparency is an important
construct for firms in gaining more favorable attitudes and purchase intention from
stakeholders.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter focused on testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and
illustrated in Figure 2 via two data collections. The first data collection (Study 3; study
numbers continue from the previous chapter) served to test the complete proposed model
in Chapter 4 using scenarios as the stimuli. The second data collection (Study 4) tested
the model with a slightly more ecologically valid manipulation of the constructs. It also
tested the full model across two different stimuli which combined two often-used
corporate marketing communications methods, email and a website.
Overall, Studies 3 and 4 resulted in confirming the significant impact that
perceived firm transparency has on stakeholder attitudes and purchase intention. These
studies also provided two key ways in which firms can increase perceptions of
transparency: 1) by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company, and 2) by
providing multiple ways to communicate with the company. The third antecedent,
providing information perceived as firm-damaging may impact perceptions of
transparency, but additional research is required to provide conclusive findings since
Studies 3 and 4 show divergent findings.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
General Discussion
In the last few years alone, calls for transparency by consumers have grown
louder. No longer are consumers willing to sit back and allow firms to make ‘closed
door’ decisions that benefit the company (and its executives) at the expense of
consumers, society, and the environment. Firms who are proactive have begun to heed
these calls and making transparency a central and key part of the value proposition they
offer to the marketplace. The experiences of some of these early adopters of the idea of
being transparent with one’s customers has been very positive from the firm’s
perspective, especially in terms of customer appreciation, increased sales, profits, and
loyalty. A good example of a firm that places transparency as one of its key values is
Zappos.com.
Zappos.com, is one business that understands the value of transparency.
Zappos.com, an online shoe and handbag retailer operates with transparency in mind, and
it is one of the company’s 10 “core family values”. The company notes that
“Fundamentally, we believe that openness and honesty make for the best relationships
because that leads to trust and faith” (Zappos.com, 2012). And the company acts on this
core value. As one example, on April 26, 2010, Zappos.com launched a live webcast of
its internal “All Hands” quarterly employee meeting. The live broadcast included several
hours of video to include pre-meeting, meeting, and happy hour activities. On the
Zappos.com blog, an employee blogger wrote: “We invited the world to tune in live to
our 'internal' meeting. For those who know the basics of how Zappos.com is run, you
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probably know that we're all about transparency so it only made sense to invite anyone
and everyone to sit in on our largest meeting of the quarter” (Zappos.com, 2010). The
company took this effort of transparency further by posting a copy of the webcast on its
website as permanent archived material for all to see. As another example of the ways
Zappos.com exhibits transparency, the company’s CEO, Tony Hsieh, created a special
website, called Zappos Insights, where visitors can learn not only about the company but
also about how to recreate the Zappos transparency culture. As this dissertation shows,
Transparency is rewarded with decreased skepticism, and increased trust, attitude toward
the firm, and purchase intention. In the case of Zappos, the company has been rewarded
for its transparency. Zappos.com, Inc. was recognized in 2009, 2010 and 2011 by
FORTUNE Magazine as one of the "100 Best Companies to Work For", was one of only
40 U.S. companies named a J.D. Power 2011 Customer Service Champion, and was
valued at $1.2 B in 2009 when it was acquired by Amazon.com (in part for its best-inclass culture).
From an academic perspective, this dissertation begins to answer the call for a
greater understanding of transparency. The American Marketing Association (AMA) has
called for increased transparency noting firms should create a “spirit of openness” (AMA,
2010). This dissertation advanced the marketing literature for this construct by drawing
from other streams including finance, accounting, information technology, political
science, management, public health, and communications to provide a succinct definition
for this construct.
Not all firms have heeded the calls for greater transparency and this dissertation
sheds some light on the favorable impacts of what transparency can offer them. The
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overwhelming lack of firms listening to these calls for transparency has resulted in the
rise of consumer activist organizations to restore the balance of information symmetry
(and thus power between firms and their stakeholders). One such organization,
Adbusters.org, is a non-profit, anti-consumerist global organization with the mission “to
change the way information flows, the way corporations wield power, and the way
meaning is produced in our society” (Adbusters, 2012). This organization was born from
the lack of citizens having the same access to information flows as businesses.
Adbusters.org wants “folks to get mad about corporate disinformation, injustices in the
global economy, and any industry that pollutes our physical or mental commons”. One
way that Adbusters.org tries to restore the balance of information asymmetry is by
exposing “corporate propaganda” through global media campaigns and encouraging
consumers to move from “spectator” to “participant” through activism (Adbusters, 2012).
Firms that do not heed the call for transparency risk attention from such groups as
adbusters.org and others.
Financial institutions, government, and big businesses that do not listen to the call
for increased transparency are subject to paying a steep price. As this dissertation shows,
transparent firms decrease skepticism, and increase trust, attitude toward the firm, and
purchase intention. Those perceived as non-transparent firms may be at risk of
becoming the focus of an attack from activist organizations (and consequently risk
negative publicity resulting from that attack). One such activist organization is the global
movement, Occupy, in which concerned citizens have revolted through peaceful
demonstrations and media campaigns at the lack of information symmetry and the power
that big business has over government. The movement cites its first principle of
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solidarity as “Engaging in direct and transparent participatory democracy” (Occupy,
2011) as one way to avert major financial and societal crises. The Occupy movement (of
which the originating idea came from Adbusters.org through voicing the idea of such a
movement in its magazine) has targeted Wall Street, government, big business, and
educational institutions for improved transparency. In November 2011, Occupy focused
on Harvard as one firm deserving of its attention for its lack of transparency regarding its
investment strategies (Devaney, 2011).
The work completed in this dissertation is an important first step toward providing
evidence to marketers that being open and forthright with stakeholders provides
measureable, favorable impact to the firm. Specifically, this research accomplished the
first major milestone in the marketing literature toward understanding transparency. This
research is important because it sheds light on a construct that has become extremely
relevant and important in today’s business environment. Coupled with technological
advances that allow individuals tremendous access to information about firms from
various sources other than the firm, and the actions of firms that has led to the financial
meltdown, there is a genuine felt need among consumers that firms should be more
transparent. However, there are a lot of interpretations to the word transparency and this
thesis consolidates and makes sense of the differing opinions as to what transparency
means and its implications.
In particular, this dissertation focused on understanding perceived firm
transparency, developing a measure of transparency, and empirically testing antecedents
and consequences of transparency. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative
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research, perceived firm transparency was shown to reduce stakeholder skepticism, and
increase stakeholder trust, favorable attitudes, and purchase intention.
This section is organized as follows. First, drawing from the work conducted in
Chapters 2 and 3, is a discussion of what it means for a firm to be perceived as
transparent. Second, drawing from the work conducted in Chapter 6, is a discussion of
the implications of consumer perceptions of firm transparency. Third is a discussion of
the managerial implications and specifically what managers can do to influence
perceptions of transparency. Fourth is a discussion of the limitations of the research
conducted in this dissertation. Fifth and finally is a discussion of important future
research based on the initial transparency findings of this dissertation.
The Meaning of Firm Transparency
Prior to the work conducted in this literature, there was no unitary agreement as to
what it meant for a firm to be transparent. The definition provided here, the extent to
which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is forthright and open regarding matters
relevant to the stakeholder, provides a solid foundation from which both academics and
practitioners can advance transparency theories and propose other antecedents and
consequences of perceived firm transparency beyond those investigated here. At its core,
transparency means that a firm is perceived to be open and forthright with stakeholders,
granting access to, at a minimum, information that allows stakeholders to better
understand the company, its products, and reasons for certain actions and decisions. A
firm that makes a conscious decision to be transparent believes stakeholders will reward
the behavior of providing an ‘insider’ view into the company. This dissertation shows
that firms are rewarded by stakeholders when they perceive a firm is being transparent;
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and those rewards come in the form of decreased skepticism and increased favorable
attitudes toward the firm, trust, and purchase intention.
Transparency also provides firms with an opportunity to represent themselves as
having human qualities and as ‘real people’ rather than strictly persuasion agents.
Transparency offers firms a way to interact with stakeholders removing unnecessary
strong-arming and excessive persuasion tactics. Interestingly, this dissertation showed
that a firm’s motives for being transparent do not affect the favorable impacts
transparency has on trust and skepticism. That is, transparency will decrease skepticism
and increase trust regardless of whether a firm’s motive for being transparent is perceived
as being for self-serving reasons (i.e. as method to persuade consumers into buying
something) or for other-serving reasons (i.e. as a method to help consumers make more
informed choices). This is a favorable finding for firms because it shows that it is better
to be transparent than not, even if their actions are perceived to be motivated by pressure
from competitors or customers. The findings here suggest there are no additional benefits
to the firm to change their perceptions (through targeted messaging or otherwise) to
persuade them that the firm is being transparent for other-serving motives.
Implications of Firm Transparency
The approach-avoidance model (Knowles & Linn, 2004) of persuasion implies
there are two ways that firms can create change with the target of persuasion. The
approach or “Alpha” strategy creates change by increasing the attractiveness of the offer
to the target of persuasion. For Alpha strategies to create change, the message or offer
must be compelling enough to outweigh the resistance to change. Alpha strategies are
those that make messages more persuasive which include tactics such as: providing extra
incentives (such as bonus offers), increasing source credibility, and emphasizing product
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scarcity, to name a few. However, these strategies can be ineffective when consumers
are aware of them because they may use their persuasion knowledge to avoid such
persuasive tactics (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). Additionally, since Alpha strategies are
implemented with the goal of selling something rather than building relationships and
creating customers for life, companies implementing Alpha strategies are at risk of
unsatisfied customers who will not buy from them again, and many other potential
negative consequences.
The literature is much less robust in terms of Omega strategies compared to Alpha
strategies (Knowles & Linn, 2004). The target of persuasion must be receptive to the
message in order to invoke change; Omega strategies increase such receptivity. The
avoidance or “Omega” strategy creates change by decreasing resistance and increasing
receptivity toward the persuasive message. Omega strategies include such tactics as
directly addressing concerns, building confidence that it’s ok to remove resistance to the
message, and redefining the relationship as a dyadic, cooperative interaction and
conversation rather than a one-way persuasive message (Knowles & Linn, 2004). This
dissertation showed that transparency, in which firms are open and forthright with
stakeholders, are more likely to do all of these things – directly address concerns, remove
resistance to the message, and redefine the relationship as cooperative rather than
antagonistic – compared to firms that are lacking transparency. A transparent firm is
capable of decreasing resistance toward the message by redefining the relationship as
more consultative and less persuasion-oriented by making it easy for consumers to learn
about it (H1) and by providing ways for stakeholders to have two-way conversations
(H2). A transparent firm decreases resistance in other ways as well such as by decreasing
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skepticism (H4) and increasing trust (H5). With transparency most likely comes other
benefits to the firm beyond what was investigated in this dissertation including more
satisfied customers with a potentially high lifetime value, positive word of mouth, and
many other favorable consequences to the firm, to customers, and to society at large.
This dissertation found that consumers reward transparent firms in four ways.
First, transparent firms are rewarded with a reduction in skepticism toward the firm’s
actions. Consumers engaged with transparent firms are less skeptical and less on guard
of persuasion attempts. Transparency implies that the firm has nothing to hide (or at least
will provide consumers with an acceptable level of opportunity to learn about it).
Reduced skepticism has an added benefit such that when consumers are less skeptical,
they are more open to listening to the firm’s messages, and less inclined to resist it.
Second, transparent firms are rewarded with increased trust. Consumers engaged with
transparent firms are more trusting of them. This means that consumers are more willing
to rely on what the firm says as being true and, consequently, more willing to take the
firm’s marketing messages into consideration in their decision-making processes. Thus,
while transparency decreases consumers’ persuasion defenses, at the same time
transparency also makes them more vulnerable and open to the firms’ marketing
persuasion messages. Third, transparent firms are rewarded with more favorable
attitudes. Consumers engaged with transparent firms have favorable attitudes toward
them – and attitude toward the firm has a direct and significant impact on purchase
intention. Thus, transparent firms are rewarded with increased purchase intention.
Transparency implies that firms will go the “extra mile” to ensure consumers are wellinformed (by providing information meaningful to the consumer and reciprocal
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communication opportunities), and this research shows that a firm’s extra effort is
rewarded with in-kind purchase intention behaviors from consumers.
From a more global perspective, transparency has the potential to build goodwill
and redefine the interaction between firm and stakeholders as cooperative rather than
antagonistic. Over time, the level of skepticism and distrust should decrease as more
firms engage in transparency efforts. And, as more firms see the favorable impact of
transparency, this should stimulate even more firms to be more transparent.
Transparency brings with it a higher standard of decision making taking into account that
transparent firms are those that communicate with stakeholders and offer insights about
decision-making strategies. Transparent firms are those that recognize decisions will be
exposed and thus, it is wise to make the best decisions balancing what is best for both the
firm and its stakeholders.
Managerial Implications
There are several other key implications of this research for managers. First, this
research shows that there is an alternate, more ethical strategy divergent from covert and
sneaky marketing by which to engage stakeholders. This research should provide enough
evidence of the benefits of perceived firm transparency for managers to consider
implementing transparency processes and tactics within the firm. Beyond impacting
trust, skepticism, and attitudes toward the firm is the idea that transparency can bring
more global benefits to the firm. From a marketing strategy perspective, transparency
may provide a competitive advantage to firms when industry transparency is low and
when it is difficult for stakeholders to make quality assessments of the firm’s
product/service. From a supply chain perspective, transparency affords firms an
opportunity to build lasting relationships with all businesses in its supply chain and
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partner to develop the best quality products. From an internal perspective, transparency
provides an opportunity to attract and retain the best quality employees, and build high
levels of moral and employee engagement. From a legal perspective, transparency allows
firms to stay unregulated and out of the eye of the Federal Trade Commission and other
policy makers looking out for the best interest of consumers and of society at large.
Finally, transparency affords firms an opportunity to attract better quality investment
opportunities, gain a better reputation, and a legacy for being an equitable brand.
Specifically, this research provides a few ways that managers can implement
transparency tactics. One way that managers can increase perceptions of transparency is
by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company and its products. From a
website perspective, small changes to the content layout may increase perceptions of
transparency. For example, in Study 4, the low effort web pages were designed with the
content in bullet form (rather than in paragraph form), on a single page (rather than
multiple pages), and in a larger easy-to-read font (12 point font rather than 8.5 point
font). With regard to font size, managers may even want to consider adding the ability
for web visitors to set their own font size. Although this was not tested as a part of the
effort manipulation here, it is reasonable to suggest this would favorably impact
perceptions of transparency.
An alternate way that managers can increase perceptions of firm transparency is
by offering stakeholders multiple options for reciprocal communication. For example, in
Study 4, the high reciprocity emails communicated to email recipients that they could
contact the company by email, by toll-free phone, and/or by instant chat. Most managers
already have multiple contact methods in place for stakeholders. Therefore managers can
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quickly and simply increase perceptions of transparency with stakeholders by promoting
that these multiple contact methods exist by adding the methods to emails, web pages,
phone answering machines, advertisements, etc.
Interestingly, this dissertation found a non-significant impact of firm-damaging
information on perceived firm transparency in Study 4, but not in Study 3. Recall that
firm-damaging information was manipulated in Study 4 by stating at the bottom of ABC
Airlines’ email that subjects can find on the company’s website: a letter from the CEO
summarizing the company’s successes (and failures), an overview of the pros and cons of
fling with ABC Airlines, and pricing information for both ABC Airlines and its
competitors. One potential reason for the non-significant finding is that what was
presented as firm-damaging information was expected by subjects to be included on the
website and thus the act of providing this information was not perceived as a transparent.
Perhaps it is necessary for stakeholders to perceive information that is provided by a firm
as unusual or unexpected in order for it to impact perceptions of firm transparency (or
even for transparency to become salient). Therefore rather than the information being
perceived as ‘firm-damaging’, what may matter instead is the perception that the
information shared by the firm is unique and or unexpected. This is consistent with the
discussion on disconfirmation of expectations in Chapter 4 in which it was suggested that
expectations may need to be disconfirmed in order for firm actions to make salient
perceptions of firm transparency. On the other hand (also as discussed in Chapter 4), it is
possible that providing successes and failures, pros and cons, and competitor pricing was
unexpected by subjects, but not sufficiently discrepant outside of a certain boundary or
threshold for transparency.
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Limitations
The major limitation of this research is the use of scenarios. Although the
scenario used in Study 4 is slightly more ecologically valid, the findings may not
accurately represent attitudes and behaviors in a real-world context. For example, Study
4 instructs subjects that they will view a company’s website, but instead they viewed a
‘stripped’ version of a webpage which excluded graphic design and extraneous content,
which is what would be expected on a real website. The lack of graphical appeal may
have impacted subjects’ responses. Future research should include testing the model in
the context of a real website. A second major limitation is the use of student subjects.
The scale and model were fully tested using student subjects (with the exception of Study
4). Therefore it would be inappropriate to generalize the findings of this dissertation to a
wider age (and education) demographic. A third limitation is the use of one primary
industry (the airline industry) with which to test the scale and theoretical model.
Although multiple industries were used in
Future Research
The literature stream following the work in this dissertation has the potential to be
plentiful. In addition to testing the model with different samples, within different
industries, and across additional marketing communications media, there are numerous
questions that stem from this research:
1. When is transparency most important?
2. When is transparency most naturally valued?
3. Can consumers be induced to care about transparency?
4. Can a highly non-transparent firm change to become perceived as more
transparent (and have resulting effects on consumer skepticism, trust, attitude
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toward the firm and purchase intention) or will such behavior be discounted?
What will it take for a highly non-transparent firm to become perceived as
transparent?
5. What are the negative consequences of transparency to firms?
6. What are the negative consequences of transparency to consumers?
7. Will transparency increase (rather than decrease) consumer ambiguity and
uncertainty in some circumstances?

Finally, additional research is warranted to better understand the relationship of
perceived firm-damaging information on transparency. Studies 3 and 4 resulted in mixed
findings. Study 3 showed a small impact on transparency and Study 4 showed a nonsignificant impact on transparency. Future research should provide some clearer
direction on what specific information may be perceived as negative and how to best
frame that information in the context of other positive information within the marketing
medium.

201

REFERENCES
Adbusters. 2012. About Adbusters.
Ahearne, M., Jelinek, R., & Jones, E. 2007. Examining the Effect of Salesperson Service
Behavior in a Competitive Context. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 35(4): 603-616.
Ajzen, I. 1991. The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational behavior and human
decision processes, 50(2): 179-211.
Alcañiz, E. B., Cáceres, R. C., & Pérez, R. C. 2010. Alliances Between Brands and
Social Causes: The Influence of Company Credibility on Social Responsibility
Image. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2): 169-186.
Allen, D. 2008. The Trouble with Transparency. Journalism Studies, 9(3): 323-340.
AMA. 2010. Statement of Ethics, Vol. 2010: American Marketing Association.
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. 1989. Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial
Channel Dyads. Marketing Science, 8(4): 310-323.
Anderson, J., & Narus, J. 1990. A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm
Working Partnerships. The Journal of Marketing, 54(1): 42-58.
Anonymous. 2002. Come Clean, Stay Clean to Weather a Crisis, PR News, Vol. 58: 1.
Ashley, C., & Leonard, H. 2009. Betrayed by the Buzz? Covert Content and ConsumerBrand Relationships. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 28(2): 212-220.
Bainbridge, D. 2009. Chapter 9: Transparency, Rebuilding the American Economy with
True Cost Accounting: 80-90: Rio Redondo Press.
Baker, S. 2008. The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan: A
Virtue Ethics Construct of Opposing Archetypes of Public Relations and
Advertising Practitioners. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 23: 235-253.
Bargh, J. 2002. Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences on Consumer Judgment,
Behavior, and Motivation. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(2): 280-285.
Baron, R., & Kenny, D. 1986. The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6): 1173-1182.
Bart, Y., Shankar, V., Sultan, F., & Urban, G. 2005. Are the Drivers and Role of Online
Trust the Same for All Web Sites and Consumers? A Large-Scale Exploratory
Empirical Study. Journal of Marketing, 69(4): 133-152.
Batra, R., & Ray, M. L. 1986. Affective Responses Mediating Acceptance of
Advertising. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(2): 234.
Blackshaw, P. 2008. The Six Drivers of Brand Credibility, Marketing Management, Vol.
May-June 2008: 51-54.
Bollen, K., & Lennox, R. 1991. Conventional Wisdom on Measurement: A Structural
Equation Perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 110(2): 305-314.
Boush, D., Friestad, M., & Rose, G. 1994. Adolescent Skepticism Toward TV
Advertising and Knowledge of Advertiser Tactics. Journal of Consumer
Research, 21(1): 165-175.
Brodt, S. E. 1994. " Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58(2): 172-202.
Bruner, G., & Kumar, A. 2007. Gadget Lovers. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 35(3): 329-339.
202

Bryant, A. 2010. He's Not Bill Gates, or Fred Astaire, The New York Times, February
14, 2010 ed.: 4. New York.
Burgoon, J. 1993. Interpersonal Expectations, Expectancy Violations, and Emotional
Communication. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 12(1-2): 30.
Campbell, M., & Kirmani, A. 2000. Consumers' Use of Persuasion Knowledge: The
Effects of Accessibility and Cognitive Capacity on Perceptions of an Influence
Agent. Journal of Consumer Research, 27(1): 69-83.
Campbell, M., & Kirmani, A. 2008. I Know What You’re Doing and Why You’re Doing
It: The Use of the Persuasion Knowledge Model in Consumer Research. In C.
Haugtvedt, P. Herr, & F. Kardes (Eds.), Handbook of Consumer Psychology:
549–575. New York: Psychology Press.
Chaudoir, S., & Fisher, J. 2010. The Disclosure Processes Model: Understanding
Disclosure Decision Making and Postdisclosure Outcomes Among People Living
with a Concealable Stigmatized Identity. Psychological Bulletin, 136(2): 236256.
Chen, S., & Chaiken, S. 1999. The Heuristic-Systematic Model in Its Broader Context,
Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology: 73-96. New York: The Guilford
Press.
Christensen, L. 2002. Corporate Communication: The Challenge of Transparency.
Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 7(3): 162-168.
Churchill, G. 1979. A Paradigm for Developing Better Measures of Marketing
Constructs. Journal of Marketing Research, 16(1): 64-73.
CI. 2006. Branding the Cure: A Consumer Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility, Drug Promotion and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe: 1-51:
Consumers International.
CI. 2010. Transparency
http://www.consumersinternational.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=95358:
Consumers International.
Cohen, J. 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Cowley, E., & Barron, C. 2008. When Product Placement Goes Wrong: The Effects of
Program Liking and Placement Prominence. Journal of Advertising, 37(1): 8998.
Cozby, P. 1973. Self-Disclosure: A Literature Review. Psychological Bulletin, 79(2): 7391.
Cutler, C. 2008. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. In P. Saundry (Ed.), Vol. 2010: The
Encyclopedia of Earth.
Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. 1986. Organizational Information Requirements, Media
Richness and Structural Design. Management Science, 32(5): 554-571.
Darke, P., & Ritchie, R. 2007. The Defensive Consumer: Advertising Deception,
Defensive Processing, and Distrust. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(1): 114127.
Dawar, N., & Parker, P. 1994. Marketing Universals: Consumers' Use of Brand Name,
Price, Physical Appearance, and Retailer Reputation as Signals of Product
Quality. The Journal of Marketing, 58(2): 81-95.

203

Dawkins, C., & Fraas, J. 2008. An Exploratory Analysis of Corporate Social
Responsibility and Disclosure in Annual Reports. Business & Society, doi:
10.1177/0007650308324047.
DeCarlo, T. E. 2005. The Effects of Sales Message and Suspicion of Ulterior Motives on
Salesperson Evaluation. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(3): 238-249.
DeKinder, J., & Kohli, A. 2008. Flow Signals: How Patterns over Time Affect the
Acceptance of Start-Up Firms. Journal of Marketing, 72(5): 84-97.
Devaney, E. 2011. Occupy Harvard Protesters Make Their Demands, Call for More
Transparency and New Custodial Worker Contracts: New England Post.
Diamantopoulos, A., & Winklhofer, H. 2001. Index Construction with Formative
Indicators: An Alternative to Scale Development. Journal of Marketing
Research, 38(2): 269-277.
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. 1997. An Examination of the Nature of Trust in BuyerSeller Relationships. the Journal of Marketing: 35-51.
Eggert, A., & Helm, S. 2003. Exploring the Impact of Relationship Transparency on
Business Relationships A Cross-Sectional Study Among Purchasing Managers in
Germany. Industrial Marketing Management, 32(2003): 101-108.
Eisend, M. 2006. Two-Sided Advertising: A Meta-Analysis. International Journal of
Research in Marketing, 23(2): 187-198.
Eisingerich, A., & Bell, S. 2008. Perceived Service Quality and Customer Trust: Does
Enhancing Customers' Service Knowledge Matter? Journal of Service Research,
10(3): 256.
Fazio, R., Sanbonmatsu, D., Powell, M., & Kardes, F. 1986. On the Automatic Activation
of Attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2): 229-238.
Fein, S. 1996. Effects of Suspicion on Attributional Thinking and the Correspondence
Bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6): 1164-1184.
Fernandes, T., & Proenca, J. 2008. The Blind Spot of Relationships in Consumer
Markets: The Consumer Proneness to Engage in Relationships. Journal of
Marketing Management, 24(1-2): 153-168.
Fernando, A. 2007. Transparency Under Attack, Communication World 9-11.
Ferrell, O., & Gresham, L. 1985. A Contingency Framework for Understanding Ethical
Decision Making in Marketing. The Journal of Marketing, 49(3): 87-96.
Florini, A. 2007. Introduction: the Battle Over Transparency. In A. Florini (Ed.), The
Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World: 1–16: Columbia University
Press.
Forehand, M., & Grier, S. 2003. When is Honesty the Best Policy? The Effect of Stated
Company Intent on Consumer Skepticism. Journal of Consumer Psychology,
13(3): 349-356.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. 1981. Evaluating Structural Equation Models with
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error. Journal of Marketing Research
18(1): 39-50.
Friestad, M., & Wright, P. 1994. The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope
with Persuasion Attempts. Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1): 1-31.
Ganesan, S. 1994. Determinants of Long-term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships.
The Journal of Marketing, 58(2): 1-19.

204

Gerbing, D., & Anderson, J. 1988. An Updated Paradigm for Scale Development
Incorporating Unidimensionality and Its Assessment. Journal of Marketing
Research, 25(2): 186-192.
Gremler, D. D., & Gwinner, K. P. 2000. Customer-Employee Rapport in Service
Relationships. Journal of Service Research, 3(1): 82.
GRI. 2006. Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Vol. 3.0: GRI.
Guadagnoli, E., & Velicer, W. F. 1988. Relation to Sample Size to the Stability of
Component Patterns. Psychological Bulletin, 103(2): 265.
Gupta, A. 2008. Transparency Under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in Global
Environmental Governance. Global Environmental Politics, 8(2): 1-7.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. 2006a. Chapter
3: Factor Analysis, Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th ed. ed. Upper Saddle River:
Pearson Prentice Hall.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. 2006b. Chapter
10: Structural Equation Modeling: An Introduction, Multivariate Data Analysis,
6th ed. ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. 2006c. Chapter
11: SEM: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th ed. ed.
Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Hair, J. F., Bush, R. P., & Ortinau, D. J. 2009. Marketing Research: In a Digital
Information Environment (4 ed.): McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Hastie, R. 1984. Causes and Effects of Causal Attribution. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 46(1): 44-56.
Hatcher, L. 1996. Using SAS® PROC CALIS for Path Analysis: An Introduction.
Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 3(2): 176-192.
Healy, P., & Palepu, K. 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 31: 405-440.
Hebb, T. 2006. The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’
Corporate Transparency Concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 63: 385-405.
Hein, K. 2002. As Big Scandals Mount, Experts Say Be Truthful--and Careful-- In Ads,
Brandweek, Vol. July 1.
Hendershot-Hurd, K. 2009. Life and Death of a Brand: The Tiger Woods Story, Beyod
Niche Marketing: Creating Marketing Messages that Deliver Results, Vol.
2010.
Herche, J., & Engelland, B. 1996. Reversed-Polarity Items and Scale Unidimensionality.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 24(4): 366-374.
Higgins, K. 2005. A Transparent Legacy, Marketing Management, Vol. March-April
2005: 18-21.
Hofstede, G. 2003. Transparency in Netchains. Paper presented at the EFITA,
Debrecen, Hungary.
Holusha, J. 1989. Exxon's Public-Relations Problem. In T. N. Y. Times (Ed.), Vol. 2010:
The New York Times.
Holzwarth, M., Janiszewski, C., & Neumann, M. 2006. The Influence of Avatars on
Online Consumer Shopping Behavior. Journal of Marketing, 70: 19 - 36.

205

House, R. 1998a. Disclose. In K. Osborne, E. Pearsons, A. Sheidlower, A. Somoroff, &
A. Steinhardt (Eds.), Random House Webster's Dictionary, Third Edition ed.
New York City: Reference & Information Publishing, Random House, Inc.
House, R. 1998b. Transparency. In C. Braham (Ed.), Random House Webster's
Dictionary, 3 ed. New York: Random House.
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. 1998. Fit Indices in Covariance Structure Modeling: Sensitivity to
Underparameterized Model Misspecification. Psychological Methods, 3: 424453.
Hultman, J., & Axelsson, B. 2007. Towards a Typology of Transparency for Marketing
Management Research. Industrial Marketing Management, 36: 627-635.
Hunt, S., & Vitell, S. 2006. The General Theory of Marketing Ethics: A Revision and
Three Questions. Journal of Macromarketing, 26(2): 143.
Jarvis, C., MacKenzie, S., & Podsakoff, P. 2003. A Critical Review of Construct
Indicators and Measurement Model Misspecification in Marketing and Consumer
Research. Journal of Consumer Research, 30(2): 199-218.
Johnson, G., Bruner II, G., & Kumar, A. 2006. Interactivity and Its Facets Revisited:
Theory and Empirical Test. Journal of Advertising, 35(4): 35-52.
Kaikati, A., & Kaikati, J. 2004. Stealth Marketing: How to Reach Consumers
Surreptitiously. California Management Review, 46(4): 6-22.
Kaiser, H. F. 1970. A Second Generation Little Jiffy. Psychometrika, 35(4): 401-415.
Kelley, H., & Michela, J. 1980. Attribution Theory and Research. Annual Review of
Psychology, 31(1): 457-501.
Kenny, D. A., & Judd, C. M. 1984. Estimating the nonlinear and interactive effects of
latent variables. Psychological Bulletin, 96(1): 201.
Kirmani, A., Campbell, M., & Iacobucci, D. 2004. Goal Seeker and Persuasion Sentry:
How Consumer Targets Respond to Interpersonal Marketing Persuasion. Journal
of Consumer Research, 31(3): 573-582.
Kirmani, A., & Rao, A. 2000. No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on
Signaling Unobservable Product Quality. Journal of Marketing, 64(2): 66-79.
Kirmani, A., & Zhu, R. 2007. Vigilant Against Manipulation: The Effect of Regulatory
Focus on the Use of Persuasion Knowledge. Journal of Marketing Research,
44(4): 688-701.
Klara, R. 2010. When the Oil Spill is This Big, It Pays Not to Be Crude, Brandweek,
Vol. 51: 1.
Lazarus, H., & McManus, T. 2006. Transparency Guru: An Interview with Tom
McManus. Journal of Management Development, 25(10): 923-936.
Levine, T., Shaw, A., & Shulman, H. 2010. Increasing Deception Detection Accuracy
with Strategic Questioning. Human Communication Research, 36(2): 216-231.
Liu, Y. 2003. Developing a Scale to Measure the Interactivity of Websites. Journal of
Advertising Research, 43(02): 207-216.
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. 1996. Power analysis and
determination of sample size for covariance structure modeling. Psychological
Methods, 1(2): 130.
MacKenzie, S. 2003. The Dangers of Poor Construct Conceptualization. Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 31(3): 323-326.

206

Marsh, H. W., Wen, Z., & Hau, K. T. 2004. Structural Equation Models of Latent
Interactions: Evaluation of Alternative Estimation Strategies and Indicator
Construction. Psychological Methods, 9(3): 275.
Mason, M. 2008. Transparency for Whom? Information Disclosure and Power in Global
Environmental Governance. Global Environmental Politics, 8(2): 8-13.
McKay, L. 2008. Transparency, Customer Relationship Management, Vol. December
2008: 24-29.
Menon, A., & Varadarajan, P. R. 1992. A Model of Marketing Knowledge Use within
Firms. Journal of Marketing, 56(4): 53-71.
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. 1986. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality. The
Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 796-821.
Morales, A. 2005. Giving Firms an" E" for Effort: Consumer Responses to High-Effort
Firms. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(4): 806-812.
Morgan, R., & Hunt, S. 1994. The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing.
The Journal of Marketing, 58(3): 20-38.
Murphy, P., Laczniak, G., & Wood, G. 2007. An Ethical Basis for Relationship
Marketing: A Virtue Ethics Perspective. European Journal of Marketing,
41(1/2): 37-57.
Netemeyer, R. G., Bearden, W. O., & Sharma, S. 2003. Scaling Procedures: Issues and
Applications: Sage Publications, Inc.
Nielsen, C. 2004. Business Reporting: How Transparency Becomes a Justification
Mechanism, Management Accounting Research Group Working Papers.
Nielsen, C. 2005. Modelling Transparency: A Research Note on Accepting a New
Paradigm in Business Reporting, Management Accounting Research Group
Working Papers.
Nielsen, C., & Madsen, M. 2009. Discourses of Transparency in the Intellectual Capital
Reporting Debate: Moving from Generic Reporting Models to Management
Defined Information. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20: 847-854.
O'Malley, P., Rainford, J., & Thompson, A. 2009. Transparency During Public Health
Emergencies: from Rhetoric to Reality. Bulletin of the World Health
Organization(87): 614-618.
Obama, B. 2010. Transparency and Open Government, Vol. 2010.
Obermiller, C., & Spangenberg, E. 1998. Development of a Scale to Measure Consumer
Skepticism Toward Advertising. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 7(2): 159186.
Occupy. 2011. Principles of Solidarity http://www.nycga.net/resources/principles-ofsolidarity/. In O. W. Street (Ed.): New York City General Assembly.
Oliver, R. L., & Winer, R. S. 1987. A Framework for the Formation and Structure of
Consumer Expectations: Review and Propositions. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 8(4): 469-499.
Paese, P., Schreiber, A., & Taylor, A. 2003. Caught tTelling the Truth: Effects of
Honesty and Communication Media in Distributive Negotiations. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 12(6): 537-566.
Palmatier, R., Dant, R., Grewal, D., & Evans, K. 2006. Factors Influencing the
Effectiveness of Relationship Marketing: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of
Marketing, 70(4): 136-153.
207

Pechmann, C. 1992. Predicting When Two-Sided Ads Will Be More Effective Than OneSided Ads: The Role of Correlational and Correspondent Inferences. Journal of
Marketing Research, 29(4): 441-453.
Ping Jr, R. A. 1996. Latent Variable Interaction and Quadratic Effect Estimation: A TwoStep Technique Using Structural Equation Analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
119(1): 166.
Pirson, M., & Malhotra, D. 2007. What Matters to Whom? Managing Trust Across
Multiple Stakeholder Groups: 1-37: The Hauser Center for Nonprofit
Organizations.
Pirson, M., & Malhotra, D. 2008. Unconventional Insights for Managing Stakeholder
Trust, MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 49: 43-50.
Plaisance, P. 2007. Transparency: An Assessment of the Kantian Roots of a Key Element
in Media Ethics Practice. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 22(2-3): 187-207.
Prahalad, C., & Ramaswamy, V. 2004. Co-Creation Experiences: The Next Practice in
Value Creation. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 18(3): 5-14.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. 2004. SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect
Effects in Simple Mediation Models. Behavior Research Methods, 36(4): 717731.
Rawlins, B. 2008. Measuring the Relationship Between Organizational Transparency and
Employee Trust. Public Relations Journal, 2(2): 1–21.
Rawlins, B. 2009. Give the Emperor a Mirror: Toward Developing a Stakeholder
Measurement of Organizational Transparency. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 21(1): 71-99.
Reidenbach, R., & Robin, D. 1990. Toward the Development of a Multidimensional
Scale for Improving Evaluations of Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics,
9(8): 639-653.
Reidenbach, R., Robin, D., & Dawson, L. 1991. An Application and Extension of a
Multidimensional Ethics Scale to Selected Marketing Practices and Marketing
Groups. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 19(2): 83-92.
Robertson, T., & Gatignon, H. 1986. Competitive Effects on Technology Diffusion. The
Journal of Marketing, 50(3): 1-12.
Robin, D., & Reidenbach, R. 1987. Social Responsibility, Ethics, and Marketing
Strategy: Closing the Gap Between Concept and Application. The Journal of
Marketing, 51(1): 44-58.
Rust, R., & Cooil, B. 1994. Reliability measures for qualitative data: Theory and
implications. Journal of Marketing Research 1-14.
Santana, A., & Wood, D. 2009. Transparency and Social Responsibility Issues for
Wikipedia. Ethics and Information Technology, 11: 133-144.
Shiu, E., Pervan, S. J., Bove, L. L., & Beatty, S. E. 2010. Reflections on Discriminant
Validity: Reexamining the Bove et al.(2009) Findings. Journal of Business
Research.
Smith, J., & Barclay, D. 1997a. The Effects of Organizational Differences and Trust on
the Effectiveness of Selling Partner Relationships. The Journal of Marketing,
61(1): 3-21.

208

Smith, J., & Barclay, D. 1997b. The Effects of Organizational Differences and Trust on
the Effectiveness of Selling Partner Relationships. The Journal of Marketing,
61(January 1997): 3-21.
Spector, P. 1992. Summated Rating Scale Construction: An Introduction: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Srinivasan, N., & Ratchford, B. 1991. An Empirical Test of a Model of External Search
for Automobiles. Journal of Consumer Research, 18(2): 233-242.
Stanley, D. J., Meyer, J. P., & Topolnytsky, L. 2005. Employee Cynicism and Resistance
to Organizational Change. Journal of Business and Psychology, 19(4): 429-459.
Thomson, M., MacInnis, D., & Park, C. 2005. The Ties That Bind: Measuring the
Strength of Consumers' Emotional Attachments to Brands. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 15(1): 77-91.
Transparency. 2010. Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption. In T. International
(Ed.), Vol. 2010.
Uleman, J. 1999. Spontaneous versus Intentional Inferences in Impression Formation. In
Chaiken, & Trope (Eds.), Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology: 141–160:
The Guileford Press.
Uleman, J., Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. 2008. Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit
Impressions, and Implicit Theories. Annual Review of Psychology(59): 329-360.
Urban, G. 2003. The Emerging Era of Customer Advocacy. MIT Sloan Management
Review, 45(2): 77-82.
Urban, G., Amyx, C., & Lorenzon, A. 2009. Online Trust: State of the Art, New
Frontiers, and Research Potential. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 23: 179190.
Vaccaro, A. 2006. Privacy, Security and Transparency: ICT-Related Ethical Perspectives
and Contrasts in Contemporary Firms, Social Inclusion: Societal and
Organizational Implications for Information Systems, Vol. IFIP International
Federation for Information Processing, 28: 245-258. Boston: Springer.
Vaccaro, A., & Madsen, P. 2006. Firm Information Transparency: Ethical Questions in
the Information Age, International Federation for Information ProcessingPublications-IFIP: 145-156.
Vaccaro, A., & Madsen, P. 2009a. Corporate Dynamic Transparency: The New ICTDriven Ethics? Ethics and Information Technology, 11(April 2009): 113-122.
Vaccaro, A., & Madsen, P. 2009b. ICT and an NGO: Difficulties in Attempting to Be
Extremely Transparent. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(January 2009):
221-231.
van Dijk, S., Duysters, G., & Beulens, A. 2003. Transparency Dilemmas in Strategic
Alliances: 2-19: Working Paper. KLICT.
van Woerkum, C. M. J., & Aarts, M. N. C. 2009. Visual Transparency: Looking behind
Thick Walls. Public Relations Review(35): 434-436.
Voss, K. E., Spangenberg, E. R., & Grohmann, B. 2003. Measuring the Hedonic and
Utilitarian Dimensions of Consumer Attitude. Journal of Marketing Research,
40(3): 310-320.
Walsh, G., & Beatty, S. 2007. Customer-Based Corporate Reputation of A Service Firm:
Scale Development and Validation. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 35(1): 127-143.
209

Wei, M., Fischer, E., & Main, K. 2008. An Examination of the Effects of Activating
Persuasion Knowledge on Consumer Response to Brands Engaging in Covert
Marketing. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 27(1): 34-44.
Weiner, B. 1985. An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion.
Psychological Review, 92(4): 548-573.
Weiner, B. 1986. An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Welch, T., & Rotberg, E. 2006. Transparency: Panacea or Pandora's Box. Journal of
Management Development, 25(10): 937-941.
Williams, C. 2008. Toward a Taxonomy of Corporate Reporting Strategies. Journal of
Business Communication, 45(3): 232-264.
WOMMA. 2010. Ethics Code, Vol. 2010.
Wong, P., & Weiner, B. 1981. When People Ask" Why" Questions, and the Heuristics of
Attributional Search. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40(4): 650.
Yim, C., Tse, D., & Chan, K. 2008. Strengthening Customer Loyalty Through Intimacy
and Passion: Roles of Customer-Firm Affection and Customer-Staff Relationships
in Services. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6): 741-756.
Zappos.com. 2010. Zappos.com Las Vegas All Hands Livestream!
http://about.zappos.com/our-unique-culture/zappos-core-values/build-open-andhonest-relationships-communication, Vol. 2012: Zappos.com.
Zappos.com. 2012. Zappos Family Core Value #6: Build Open and Honest Relationships
With Communication http://about.zappos.com/our-unique-culture/zappos-corevalues/build-open-and-honest-relationships-communication, Vol. 2012:
Zappos.com.

210

APPENDICES

211

APPENDIX A
Survey for Study 1, Phases 2 and 3

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

APPENDIX B
Study 3, Supplemental Analysis
Supplemental analyses. Additional supplemental MANOVA analyses were
conducted with the same dataset used to test the hypotheses in Study 3. The purpose was
to investigate whether a second analysis approach would provide corroborating evidence,
to that found through SEM, as to the effects of effort, reciprocity, and negative
information on perceptions of transparency (H1-H3). MANOVA is typically a more
common analysis method in experimental design studies when investigating the effects of
a manipulation on other variables. MANOVAs were performed with transparency,
skepticism, trust, attitude, and PI in the model as dependent variables; and effort,
reciprocity, and negative information in the model as independent variables. For the
effort MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ = .46, F (5, 205) = 48.03, p<.0001.
In support of H1, the effort manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of
transparency, F (1, 209) = 216.71, p<.0001. For the reciprocity MANOVA, the Omnibus
test was significant, Λ = .89, F (5, 205) = 4.83, p=.0003. In support of H2, the reciprocity
manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1, 209) = 11.00,
p<.01. For the negative information MANOVA, the Omnibus test was marginally
significant, Λ = .95, F (5, 205) = 1.98, p<.08. Because the p-value approached
significance, ad hoc ANOVA tests were performed for H3. In support of H3, the negative
information manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1,
209) = 5.52, p<.05.
A second purpose of the supplemental analyses was to test whether the
manipulations impacted other variables in the model beyond transparency. This will help
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clarify whether the variance in the dependent variables is due strictly to other variables
hypothesized to influence them, or whether the variance can be partially attributed to one
of the three manipulated dependent variables. Specifically, MANOVA and Sobel
mediation tests were conducted to better understand which dependent variables in the
model beyond transparency (skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and/or purchase
intention) were directly affected by the manipulated independent variables in the model
(consumer effort, firm reciprocity, and negative information) and if any were partially
mediated by transparency.
For perceived effort, the perceived effort manipulation had direct effects on
skepticism F (1, 209) = 50.78, p<.0001, trust F (1, 209) = 51.48, p<.0001, attitude, F (1,
209) = 144.22, p<.0001, and purchase intention F (1, 209) = 144.25, p<.0001. A
bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were
mediated by transparency. The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct
relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence
interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects
were significant (.11 - .31; -.39 - -.22; -.36 - -.20; and -.52 - -.30 respectively) (Preacher
& Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model.
For reciprocity, the perceived reciprocity manipulation had direct effects on
skepticism F (1, 209) = 8.01, p=.0051, attitude, F (1, 209) = 12.21, p=.0006, and
purchase intention F (1, 209) = 10.48, p=.001. The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of
these direct relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95%
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all
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indirect effects were significant (-.26 - -.29; .17 - .30; and .24 - .43 respectively)
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model.
For negative information, the perceived negative information manipulation had
direct effects on skepticism F (1, 209) = 7.09, p=.008, trust F (1, 209) = 7.29, p=.007,
attitude, F (1, 209) = 5.93, p=.02, and purchase intention F (1, 209) = 3.85, p=.05. A
bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were
mediated by transparency. The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct
relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence
interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects
were significant (-.25 - -.08; .10 - .32; .12 - .34; and .16 - .46 respectively) (Preacher &
Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model.
To summarize the supplemental analyses, the MANOVAs corroborated the
findings from the SEM analysis for H1 – H3. The MANOVAs confirmed that effort,
reciprocity, and negative information, have significant effects on perceptions of
transparency. The MANOVAs also shed light on what specifically managers can do to
change perceptions of transparency by moving from low to high levels of effort,
reciprocity, and negative information. For example, with regard to H1, whereas the SEM
findings only confirmed that there is a direct linear relationship between effort and
transparency, the MANOVAs provided confirmation that the high conditions for each
manipulated variable resulted in higher perceptions of transparency compared to the low
conditions. The supplemental mediation bootstrap analyses also confirmed the SEM
mediation structure.
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APPENDIX C
Study 4, Supplemental Analysis

Supplemental analyses. Similar to Study 3, additional supplemental MANOVA
and mediation analyses were conducted using the same dataset used to test the
hypotheses in Study 4. The purpose was to investigate whether a second analysis
approach would provide corroborating evidence, to that found through SEM, as to the
effects of effort, reciprocity, and negative information on perceptions of transparency
(H1-H3).
For the effort MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ = .91, F (5, 193) =
3.75, p=.003. In support of H1, the effort manipulation had a significant effect on
perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 10.55, p=.001.
For the reciprocity MANOVA, the Omnibus test was not significant, Λ = .99, F
(5, 193) = .27, p=.93. Thus, this was not in support of H2. For H2, an additional ANOVA
confirmed that the reciprocity manipulation did not have a significant effect on
perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 0.17, p = .68. This was an unexpected finding
given the significant and large path estimate in the structural equation model (β = .62,
p<.01). However, the findings from the SEM should not be discounted. A structural
equation model analysis provides insight on the linear relationships between and among
variables, therefore the conclusion that can be made is reciprocity has a positive linear
impact on perceptions of transparency. This is different from an analysis of variance
which provides insight into the mean differences in a dependent variable (perceptions of
transparency) at different levels of an independent variable (reciprocity: high/low). A
non-significant p value for an ANOVA suggests that the high and low conditions for the
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manipulated independent variables resulted in about the same level of attitudes for the
dependent variable (and thus about equal means for the dependent variable for each level
of the independent variable). However, this does not discount the potential for a linear
relationship between the two constructs. Here, an investigation of the means was
conducted to better understand the relationship between reciprocity and transparency.
The transparency mean for the high reciprocity condition was 5.26 and the transparency
mean for the low reciprocity condition was 5.33. Upon close examination, the
transparency means for the two levels of reciprocity were 1) very close together,
confirming why a non-significant ANOVA resulted, 2) both skewed to high levels of
perceived transparency (> 5.0), and most interestingly 3) the means were opposite of
what was expected. The skewness toward the top end of the scale for both high and low
manipulations indicates that the reciprocity manipulations were not strong enough
between the two to impact perceptions of transparency at the different levels of
reciprocity. Recall the manipulation included a statement in ABC’s email that read for
the low condition:
“We can address your questions and comments by email
(newfees@abcairlines.com)”.
Whereas in the high condition the email read:
“We can address your questions and comments by email
(newfees@abcairlines.com) or you can speak to a representative by
calling our toll-free number (888-931-1ABC). You may also chat
with us instantly online by visiting our website.”

One possible explanation for the non-significant ANOVA and the skew in mean
to above 5.0 for both conditions is that providing just one contact method will favorably
impact perceptions of transparency, and as evidence of the means for the two groups,
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perceptions of transparency are influenced to about the same extent whether one contact
method is provided or multiple. Since this was not the finding from Study 3, this
conclusion may be attributed to the change in stimuli, to the sample used (broader age
range), or to a combination of both. Regarding the flip in means in which the low
reciprocity condition had a slightly higher mean, technically speaking the means should
not be interpreted due to the non-significant p-value for the ANOVA. However, if this
were to occur again with significance, a possible explanation for this finding would be
that, those in the high reciprocity condition found it odd that this email contained
numerous contact methods and thus backfired on perceptions of transparency.
Table 28, which provides a transparency mean by reciprocity mean matrix, shows
that generally, there is a linear relationship between reciprocity and transparency. As the
scale average for reciprocity increases, so do perceptions of transparency. This provides
additional evidence of the linear relationship found in the SEM.
Table 28: Study 4, Transparency by Reciprocity Means
Transparency Scale Average
Reciprocity Scale
Average
1

N

Mean

4

2.83

1.5

2

5

2

8

3

2.5

8

3.79

3

6

4.89

3.5

10

4.9

4

23

4.84

4.5

20

5.07

5

40

5.38

5.5

18

5.87

6

47

5.94

6.5

5

6.47

7

10

6.43
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For the negative information MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ =
.93, F (5, 193) = 2.84, p=.02. In support of H3, the effort manipulation had a significant
effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 10.89, p=.001. The transparency
mean was 4.93 for the low negative information condition, and was 5.57 for the high
negative information condition. Although the manipulations were strong enough
influence to different levels of transparency perceptions, the SEM showed no linear
relationship between negative information and perceptions of transparency. Table 29
shows how the means for transparency increase as the means for negative information
increase and this further illustrates a definitive linear trend.
Table 29: Study 4, Means for Negative Information by Transparency Scale
Averages
Transparency Scale
Negative
Information Scale
1.00
1.33
1.67
2.00
2.33
2.67
3.00
3.33
3.67
4.00
4.33
4.67
5.00
5.33
5.67
6.00
6.33
6.67
7.00

N

Mean

7
2
6
18
6
6
16
12
19
31
9
19
18
4
8
7
2
1
3

5.29
6.33
4.94
5.41
4.67
5.56
5.21
4.72
5.44
5.08
5.33
5.49
5.69
4.75
5.92
5.29
6
5
4
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A second purpose of the supplemental analyses was to test whether the
manipulations impacted other variables in the model beyond transparency. This will help
clarify whether the variance in the dependent variables is due strictly to other variables
hypothesized to influence them, or whether the variance can be partially attributed to one
of the three manipulated dependent variables. Specifically, MANOVA and Sobel
mediation tests were conducted to better understand which dependent variables in the
model beyond transparency (skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and/or purchase
intention) were directly affected by the manipulated independent variables in the model
(consumer effort, firm reciprocity, and negative information) and if any were partially
mediated by transparency.
For perceived effort, the perceived effort manipulation had direct effects on
skepticism F (1, 197) = 17.93, p<.0001, trust F (1, 197) = 15.72, p=.0001, attitude, F (1,
197) = 14.24, p=.0002, and purchase intention F (1, 197) = 9.45, p=.002. A bootstrap
analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were mediated
by transparency. The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct relationships also
had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence interval for the size of
the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects were significant (.11 .28; -.42 - -.23; -.32 - -.18; and -.44 - -.25 respectively) (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The
mediation supports the structural equation model.
The additional analyses were not conducted for reciprocity due to the nonsignificant Omnibus test. For negative information, the perceived negative information
manipulation had direct effects on skepticism F (1, 197) = 7.88, p=.005, trust F (1, 197) =
4.05, p=.05, attitude, F (1, 197) = 8.43, p=.004, and purchase intention F (1, 197) = 6.34,
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p=.01. A bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct
relationships were mediated by transparency. In support of the SEM finding of a nonsignificant path from negative information to transparency, the bootstrap analysis
revealed that none of these direct relationships had indirect effects through transparency,
and the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effects included zero,
suggesting all indirect effects were non-significant (-.11- -.09; -.09 - .14; -.08 - .12; and .11 - .17 respectively) (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the findings
from structural equation model.
In summary, the supplemental MANOVAs corroborated the findings from the
SEM analysis for H1. The MANOVA for H2 indicated the conditions were not strong
enough to show differences in perceptions of transparency between the two reciprocity
groups. The findings for the MANOVA for H3 indicated that negative information has an
impact on transparency. This was in support of the SEM findings from Study 2, but in
contrast to the SEM findings from Study 4. The mediation analyses, however, all
supported the structural equation model.
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